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Farming and urban regions are impacted by earthquake disasters in different ways, and 
feature a range of often different recovery requirements.  In New Zealand, and 
elsewhere, most earthquake impact and recovery research is urban focused. This 
creates a research deficit that can lead to the application of well-researched urban 
recovery strategies in rural areas to suboptimal effect.  
To begin to reduce this deficit, in-depth case studies of the earthquake impacts and 
recovery of three New Zealand farms severely impacted by the 14th November 2016, 
M7.8 Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake were conducted. The initial earthquake, its 
aftershocks and coseismic hazards (e.g., landslides, liquefaction, surface rupture) 
affected much of North Canterbury, Marlborough and the Wellington area.  The three 
case study farms were chosen to broadly represent the main types of farming and 
topography in the Hurunui District in North Canterbury.  
The farms were directly and indirectly impacted by earthquakes and related hazards. 
On-farm infrastructure (e.g., woolsheds, homesteads) and essential services (e.g., water, 
power), frequently sourced from distributed networks, were severely impacted. The 
earthquake occurred after two years of regional drought had already stressed farm 
systems and farmers to restructuring or breaking point. Cascading interlinked hazards 
stemming from the earthquakes and coseismic hazards continued to disrupt earthquake 
recovery over a year after the initial earthquake. 
Semi-structured interviews with the farmers were conducted nine and fourteen months 
after the initial earthquake to capture the timeline of on-going impacts and recovery. 
Analysis of both geological hazard data and interview data resulted in the identification 
of key factors influencing farm level earthquake impact and recovery.  These include 
pre-existing conditions (e.g., drought); farm-specific variations in recovery timelines; 
and resilience strategies for farm recovery resources. The earthquake recovery process 
presented all three farms with opportunities to change their business plans and adapt 






The 14th November 2016 M7.8 Hurunui/Kaikōura earthquake damaged farms throughout 
the northern part of South Island New Zealand. The earthquake triggered coseismic hazards 
(i.e., landslides, liquefaction and surface rupture) over large areas of North Canterbury and 
Marlborough. A series of on-going, cascading hazards stemming from the initial coseismic 
hazards continue to disrupt the earthquake recovery. Comparative case studies of three 
farms in the Hurunui District were conducted to analyse earthquake impacts and identify 
recovery factors at farm level. Ten key findings and their respective recommendations 
follow. 
1. Pre-existing Conditions 
Pre-existing conditions (e.g., drought, geology) change the vulnerability of farms. 
Droughts can change soil properties and reduce the relative probability of slope failure. 
Simultaneously, farmers use a variety of strategies to reduce drought impacts (e.g., 
selling off stock, buying supplemental feed). These strategies change the available 
earthquake recovery strategies and influence impact severity. 
Recommendation 1A 
Adapt earthquake preparedness and recovery plans for current climate and financial 
situations. 
Recommendation 1B 
Research the influence of climate conditions and other pre-existing conditions on farm 
vulnerability. Climate change will continue to make this an important influencer. 
 
2. Time of Year 
The time of year when an earthquake occurs can change the impacts. Seasonal 
variations (e.g., precipitation and groundwater levels) and the farming calendar 
influence the coseismic hazards and subsequent impacts. For example, an earthquake 
during the autumn cyclones or winter rains would trigger more extensive slope failure 
and liquefaction than an earthquake in the middle of a dry summer. The farming 
calendar is also seasonally controlled; farm disruption and adaptability changes 
throughout the year depending on what tasks are the priority at that time. 
Recommendation 2 
Farm level earthquake preparedness and recovery plans should take time of year into 
account. Preparedness and recovery plans for rural regions should also be aware of 









3. Hazard Type And Severity Depends On Farm Type And Location 
The farms chosen for the study represent two broad categories of farming present in the 
Hurunui District (sheep and beef; and dairy). They are located in three distinct 
topographic situations: low relief, river terrace; steeps hills; and hill country (elevated 
pastures, river valleys). The coseismic hazards varied depending on farms location. For 
example, liquefaction was much more prevalent on the saturated sands found adjacent 
to rivers and shaking was more intense in the hills due to topographic amplification. 
Farms with highly variable topography are more prone to cascading hazards, which 
increases the level of hazards over a long period of time. Farm type influences 
vulnerability and exposure, which changes hazard severity. 
 Hazard type depends on the geologic/geographic properties of the farm 
 Hazard severity is influenced by farm type and farm management decisions 
Recommendation 3 
An increase in the pool of farm level earthquake impact studies in New Zealand is 
required to expand understanding of the influence farm location and type have on 
earthquake risk. Further investigation of the long-term impact of cascading hazards at 
the farm level is also advised. 
 
4. Cascading Hazards 
Cascading hazards are more common in areas of more variable topography. This does 
not mean they are exclusively limited to these areas. Changes to rivers in low relief areas 
can also lead to additional flooding or changed flood patterns. On-going hazards such as 
drainage change flooding and landsliding can impact most farms. 
Recommendation 4 
Farmers and organisations operating in rural environments should consider the concept 
of cascading hazards in their post-disaster recovery plans. Future land-use plans should 
also take into account potential cascading hazards. 
5. On-farm Asset Resilience 
Farms are reliant on long, exposed distributed infrastructure networks (e.g. electricity 
and road) or they must supply their own essential services in part, if not completely. This 
means that in a disaster where there has been disruption of these essential services, 
farmers either need to have the capacity to repair those systems, have access to 







Farmers should procure back-up systems for their essential services. For example, this 
can be redundant water system elements, power generators, or ready-access to 
excavators for track repair. 
6. Farm Level Recovery Timeline 
Farm earthquake recovery takes place in three major stages: initial response, short-term 
recovery and long-term re-planning. The length of each of these stages varies between 
farms and the transitions between each stage are gradual. After the initial stage 
(emergency recovery of life and lifelines), individual farm priorities in terms of repairs, 
rebuilds and restoration of functionality take over. 
Recommendation 6 
Rural recovery plans, at all levels, should take variable farm recovery rates and 
timelines into account. The length of each stage is broadly predictable and regional or 
local aid can be timed to assist farms depending on what recovery stage they are 
currently in. Outside organisations should also recognise that farms moving into the 
long-term re-planning stage does not mean that all repairs are complete or will be 
complete for several years. Aid such as fence repair support can be beneficial with in 
the first few years due to on-going hazard damage and the often widespread extend of 
initial damage. 
7. Farm Type Influences Recovery Timeline 
There were several key differences in the greatest impact and recovery timing between 
the dairy farm and the two sheep and beef farms in this study. The dairy farm was 
initially more heavily impacted because of the coseismic damage to a high use dairy 
shed. The strong off-farm network inherent in dairy farming made for rapid assistance 
and repair on a large scale. The sheep and beef farms had a greater degree of on-going 
hazards and thus a more protracted recovery period. Many resources were internally or 
much more locally sourced. 
 Vulnerability, resources and recovery timelines differ between farm types 
 Farm type priorities (i.e. high dependency on the dairy shed versus a woolshed) 
influence earthquake vulnerability 
Recommendation 7 
Further studies using a larger variety of farm types will help guide preparation, aid and 
recovery plans that may be tailored for individual farms. 
8. Mental Health 
The cascading effects of disasters effect every aspect of farm life. Stress is cumulative 
and diminishes energy and recovery speed. The loss of emergency assistance, when it is 
still required to some degree, can cause further trauma. This is inevitable and must be 
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planned for. National and regional media and public attention fades away as the initial 
response stage comes to an end. This is long before recovery is complete. The isolation 
this sudden loss of attention and aid causes can exacerbate mental stress. 
Recommendation 8 
Recognise, research and expand mental health resources for rural areas. Address the 
stress created by the removal of emergency aid and assistance. Combat the isolation 
feelings and reality this retraction from the area creates. 
9. Insurance 
In mid-December 2016, the Earthquake Commission (EQC) closed a deal with private 
insurers to manage processing for earthquake claims covered by EQC. The goal of this 
agreement was to simply speed the insurance process for claimants. Two of the three 
farms expressed recovery difficulties stemming from insurance processing. The 
effectiveness of this new arrangement requires further assessment. Regardless, the 
insurance process is complex, long and helps drive recovery rates. 
Recommendation 9A 
Farmers should hire a lawyer to review their insurance policies pre-earthquake. Post-
earthquake, a lawyer should be involved early in the insurance claims process. 
Recommendation 9B 
Post-earthquake, insurance companies operating in the rural sector should debrief their 
clients. This was the first earthquake in which private companies handled EQC claim 
settlements. There are a number of lessons to be learned from this process. 
10. Future Earthquake Risk Adaption 
The final stage of farm earthquake recovery is re-planning. Farms adjust to their 
changed assets and new hazard awareness. Strategies are a mix of conservatism and 
optimistic diversification and expansion, depending on the experiences of the farm. 
Recommendation 10 
There is a present need for the research and development of resources for earthquake 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1  Thesis Context 
Rolling, sheep-covered hills is a common popular image of New Zealand. Farms are a 
large part of Kiwi heritage and culture and are major tourism draw. They are also a 
major contributor to New Zealand’s economy. Dairy products alone are New Zealand’s 
largest export at $1.9 billion in late 2016 (Statistics New Zealand 2018). In 2012, there 
were over 58,000 farms (Statistics New Zealand 2013a). Most were primarily livestock, 
and were either dairy cattle or sheep and beef. When natural disasters impact farms, 
they damage the national economy by reducing production rates. 
Earthquake and coseismic hazards can cause significant immediate and on-going 
damage to farms. Coseismic hazards include strong ground shaking, landslides, 
landslide dams, surface rupture, liquefaction and rockfall. These can directly and 
indirectly damage farm infrastructure (e.g., dairy shed, woolshed, homestead) and 
essential services (e.g., water, power, telecommunications, transportation), and 
threaten the lives of humans and livestock.  The 4th September 2010 M7.1 Darfield 
earthquake was the last significant rural earthquake in New Zealand. The farms on the 
Canterbury plains suffered both structural and non-structural damage (Whitman et al. 
2013). The earthquake impacts on farms differ from those experienced in urban areas. 
This is because farms have different vulnerability factors and do not have the same 
networks and resources as urban areas. 
At time of writing there are few farm-level earthquake impact studies in New Zealand 
and globally. So far most farm hazard impact studies have focused on climate or 
volcano-related hazards rather than earthquakes (Whitman et al. 2013). As a 
consequence, the most researched earthquake impact and recovery studies and plans 
focus on urban areas. Urban recovery needs differ from rural recovery needs, so 
applying even the best researched urban earthquake recovery plans can contribute to 
sub-optimal recovery in rural areas. Further research is required to identify farm-level 
specific recovery factors and develop farm-focused earthquake recovery plans. 
Farm vulnerability is dependent on a number of factors, including pre-exiting 
conditions (Craig et al. 2016a). Farmer strategies for surviving on-going stressors, such 
as droughts, influence their vulnerability and the feasibility of various recovery options. 
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Environmental conditions may change hazard severity either through long-term climate 
change or seasonal variations. Disaster impacts can be cascading, on-going and continue 
to impact farms for years after the initial event (Craig et al. 2016b). Landslides can be 
reactivated by rainstorms days to years after an earthquake weakens the soil. Ground 
deformation can change drainage patterns. Over time this can trigger landsliding and 
flooding, which can be of particular note in areas where it was not prone to either pre-
earthquake.  
Farm type also factors into farm vulnerability (Whitman et al. 2013). Farms in general 
have different vulnerabilities and resiliency attributes than urban business and 
residential areas (Farmar-Bowers & Lane 2009). Farm resilience is rooted in farms 
being both places of residence and businesses, particularly with family farms 
(Darnhofer 2010). Studies in urban environments are more prevalent. In particular, 
there are far more urban business-focused studies than rural business–focused, or even 
more specifically farm-focused, studies. In addition, the recent New Zealand experience 
of large earthquakes is predominantly urban based. Therefore, urban recovery 
strategies are more researched and practiced than rural ones. Rural earthquake impact 
studies at every level are required to improve and develop rural-specific earthquake 
recovery plans. As the best way to improve recovery is to decrease impact, farm level 
preparedness strategies must also be developed. 
In recent years, the New Zealand public has become more aware of earthquakes and 
their impacts. New Zealand is an earthquake prone country; there have been at least 21 
on or near-shore shallow ≥M6.5 earthquake in New Zealand since 1840 (Nicol et al. 
2016). The coseismic hazards vary between localities. Mountainous regions are more 
prone to earthquake-triggered landsliding and rockfall and display topographically-
amplified ground shaking. In areas that are low relief with saturated, sandy soils, 
liquefaction is the main coseismic hazard. Surface ruptures are localised, but regionally-
extensive features. Each of these hazards can damage farm infrastructure and essential 
services. The farm level recovery timelines from this damage is not well detailed. Given 
increased public awareness of these hazards, it is an opportune time to improve 
community specific resilience. 
The occurrence of the 14th November 2016 Hurunui/Kaikōura earthquake, a high 
magnitude (M7.8) earthquake, in a rural area presented the opportunity to develop in-
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depth farm-level case studies. The development of the case studies and recording of the 
timeline concurrently with the recovery period allowed for capturing minute details 
that might have faded from memory over time. This thesis presents and analyses the 
earthquake impacts and recovery of three Hurunui District farms to aid the 
development of recommendations to improve farm earthquake resilience. 
1.2  Project Background 
At 0:02 NZST on November 14th, 2016, a M7.8 earthquake initiated near Waiau in the 
Hurunui District of the South Island, New Zealand (Geonet 2016). The earthquake 
rupture propagated north and east across the Hurunui District, continued up to 
Marlborough and terminated offshore in the Cook Strait (Figure 1).  Farms and towns 
throughout North Canterbury were damaged by the shaking, co-seismic hazards and 
cascading hazards. The natural hazard cascades damaged, disrupted and destroyed on-
farm farm infrastructure (e.g., irrigation systems, shearing sheds) and essential services 
(e.g., roads, electrical power) throughout the Hurunui District. As a result of these 
cascades, the region’s farms have experienced on-going economic impact, long after the 
initial shaking stopped (Stevenson et al. 2017).   
Cascading hazards are a series of hazard events that linked through various triggering 
mechanisms. They can occur over short (seconds) and long (years) periods of time. 
Cascading hazards have often mistakenly been included under multi-hazards in 
previous literature and policy. This interpretation over-simplifies the complexity of the 
interdependent networks involved. The concept currently lacks a standardised 
definition, data collection approach and impact assessment methodology. 
Many lessons from the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) were applied 
to the 2016 North Canterbury Earthquake. As most areas impacted during the CES were 
urban or near-urban areas, this approach has highlighted a lack of understanding of the 
needs of agricultural communities during earthquake impact recovery. For example, the 
red zoning technique for identifying properties in areas deemed too dangerous to live, 
cannot be applied in rural areas the same way as in urban areas. This is because the 
land blocks are much larger, and usually only smaller areas within a farm block require 
red zoning. Also, in rural agricultural areas the land owner’s land is both their home and 
place of work, so the economic weight of the land block is much greater. 
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This thesis presents in-depth case studies of the impact to and recovery from the 
earthquakes on three farms in the Hurunui District. It relies on data collected through 
semi-structured interviews and timeline exercises conducted with farmers from three 
farms in the Hurunui District. These interviews and exercise took place in two rounds. 
The first round approximately nine months after the earthquake (August 2017) and the 
second round approximately fourteen months after (January 2018) after the event.  This 
spacing was a deliberate attempt to capture the temporal components of cascading 
hazards and impact recovery. These interviews are supplemented by regional and on-
farm natural hazard mapping. 
1.3  Research Objectives 
1.3.1  Overarching goal 
The main goal of this thesis is to present three in-depth case studies covering cascading 
hazard impact on farm infrastructure following the 2016 Hurunui/Kaikōura 
earthquake. The case studies present a holistic look at initial and continuing post-event 
impact and future land-use planning.  
1.3.2  Research Objectives 
 Investigate the impacts on farm infrastructure and essential services from the 
November 2016 earthquake and its related hazards 
 Identify key factors that influence farm earthquake risk 
 Develop farm level earthquake recovery timeline 
 Analyse the spatial and temporal components of cascading natural hazards 
 Place farm-scale cascading hazard impact into the framework of impacts to the 
rural, agriculture community 
 Develop recommendations for farmers and non-farmers operating in the 
agricultural sector to improve earthquake resilience 
1.4  Scope 
The scope of this thesis is the impact and recovery at the farm-level of three 
Hurunui District farms from the 14th November 2016 earthquake. This includes 
the state of three farms immediately pre-earthquake, farm assets (e.g., 
homesteads, water pipes, livestock) and human resources (e.g., farmers, staff), 
farm economic plans, the initial earthquake impacts, earthquake related-hazards 
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and the recovery stages over the fourteen months following the earthquake. The 
contribution of off-farm groups (e.g., government agencies, insurers) to the 
recovery efforts of these farms was also explored. The wider community and 
regional recovery was only included to demonstrate extent, timing and as a 
comparison to the three case study farms. 
1.5  Research Methodology  
1. Ethics 
A low risk application was approved by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee on 31st July 2017 (Appendix C). 
2. Document Analysis 
Research began by drawing from peer-reviewed literature covering cascading 
hazard research, farm infrastructure hazard impact models and 14th November 
2016 earthquake impact studies. It also drew on grey literature, media and 
government reports. Geohazard data produced by the University of Canterbury 
was used to develop a farm-level and regional understanding of the post-
earthquake hazard scape. 
3. Interviews 
Three Hurunui District farmers (On-farm farm owners) were invited to 
participate in two rounds of semi-structured interviews in August 2017 and 
January 2018. These farms were purposive sample of the Hurunui Distract 
farming community and represent the farming type and topographies present in 
the district (extensive hill country sheep and beef; steep hill sheep and beef; low 
relief dairy). Participation was voluntary and confidential. The interviews were 
digitally recorded and transcribed. 
The confidentiality of the participants was maintained. During the project, the 
confidential records were maintained a password protected folder on a desktop 
computer and a portable hard drive in a locked cabinet on campus. Following 
project completion, the confidential records (digital and written) were handed 
over to a supervisor to be kept securely for a period of 5 years after which point 
they are to be destroyed. 
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4. Data Analysis 
The transcript data was divided into text segments, summarised, assigned 
themes and sorted into broad categories using a general inductive approach 
(Thomas 2016). The findings and recommendations presented within this thesis 
were developed from this analysis. 
1.6  Literature Review  
1.6.1  Cascading Hazards  
Cascading hazards are a sequence of interlinked events often analogised as “toppling 
dominos” (Pescaroli & Alexander 2016). ‘Cascading hazards’ has neither a universal 
definition nor is there a standardised approach to dealing with them. This lack of 
understanding magnifies the risk they pose to critical infrastructure and essential 
services. Current policies and most other studies mistakenly include the concept under 
multi-hazards, giving the impression of a single initial trigger and linear cascade 
sequence. UNISDR (2009) includes cascading hazards under its definition of multi-
hazards, which over-simplifies the complexity of the interdependent networks involved. 
Cascading hazards are inadequately dealt with in impact assessments and land-use 
plans.  
Some researchers reject the linear event sequence because critical infrastructure 
intersections are too complex. Pescaroli & Alexander (2016) propose a methodology 
focused on critical infrastructure vulnerability rather than deterministic worst-case 
scenarios. The key to this methodology is identifying the susceptible nodes that could 
trigger secondary events. Pescaroli & Alexander (2016) state that the next step in risk 
assessments is to create “worst-case amplification scenarios” instead of the traditional 
initial trigger-based scenarios. 
Cascading effects are a chain of impacts that change vulnerability over space and time 
(Gianluca & David 2015). A collection of cascading effects that progress over time and 
stem from the same extreme event are referred to as a cascading disaster. 
Kumasaki et al. (2015) categorised cascading hazard linkages into four types or modes:  
 Striking: a primary event triggers secondary event through energy transfer,  
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 Undermining: a primary event reduces system stability triggering secondary 
event,  
 Compounding: a primary event leads to increased mass or system change that 
triggers secondary event, and  
 Blocking: a primary event blocks normal flow patterns, which leads to secondary 
event in the form of pressure build up.  
These linkages can be seen in other studies; landslides block rivers creating lakes, which 
leads to further flooding downstream following blockage breach (Nguyen et al. 2012). 
The time between the primary and secondary events is a key factor, especially when the 
secondary event is a delayed effect. 
Most cascading hazard disasters focus on the impacts to industry and urban 
infrastructure rather than natural hazards (Kumasaki et al. 2015). Xie et al. (2013) 
conducted a study that focused on modelling cascading effects in a transportation 
system following a snowstorm by using a computer general equilibrium model (CGE). It 
is suggested that the CGE could be applied to natural hazard systems, but natural 
hazards linkages are harder to quantify than industrial cascading disasters. Nguyen et 
al. (2012) examine rainfall-triggered landslides and the impact of secondary hazards on 
urban infrastructure on Madeira Island. The hilly topography of Madeira Island is more 
similar to that encountered in the Hurunui District, than most of the rural and 
earthquake case studies presented in this literature review. The study notes the pre-
existing condition of wet ground lead to rapid over-saturation and debris flows. Similar 
to compounding, pre-existing conditions increase the destructiveness of the landslides. 
In a positive effect of pre-existing conditions, good climate leading to good 
supplementary feed stores can mitigate disaster impacts on livestock (Wilson et al. 
2009). 
1.6.1.1  Temporal Factors 
Time is a major factor in determining the impact of cascading hazards, both with 
relation to time of year and the length of time between linked hazards. Land-use 
planning relies on adequately predicting the changes over time that the environment 
and community will undergo. These plans are for both short term decisions, 
8 
 
immediately after a major event (e.g., an earthquake), and longer-term decisions (e.g., 
permanent crop and livestock choices). 
Seasonal changes to the environment play a role in the recovery process because of the 
time-variable farming schedule. The 2010 Darfield earthquake occurred in Spring, 
which aided in the recovery process (Almond et al. 2010). The ground, cracked by 
lateral spreading and surface rupture, was wet enough to roll and flatten easily. Also, 
the water requirements at the time of the Darfield earthquake were lower because 
irrigation was not necessary (Whitman et al. 2013). The late autumn/ winter-eruptions 
of three volcanoes in Patagonia (1991, 2008-2011, 2011-2012) was thought to have 
caused more damage due to low seasonal vegetation growth and consequently 
diminished soil protection (Craig et al. 2016b). Livestock birthing seasons and 
significant crop growth times are the most vulnerability times of years for farms 
(Whitman et al. 2013).  
Sometimes, the effects of the secondary hazards are delayed. For many months and 
years after the Patagonian volcanic eruptions, the tephra was remobilised by aeolian 
and fluvial processes, after the initial eruption had ended and expanded the exposure 
area (Craig et al. 2016b). The impacts on livestock and vegetation are the same 
regardless of deposition mode, eruption or remobilisation. The researchers found 
instances where the tephra was still impacting farms sixteen years later. The complex 
factors, including climate, topography and land use, that influence tephra remobilisation 
make its potential future impacts difficult to estimate. Long-term effects also include 
lost production time; in orchards, it takes years for trees to regrow and mature after a 
storm event (Mohan & Strobl 2016).  
1.6.1.2  Previous Studies on Multi-hazards 
Cascading hazards have been typically included under the umbrella of multi-hazards in 
previous studies. Examining previous multi-hazards is the best way to investigate other 
cascading hazard incidences and the assessment methodologies that handle them. 
(Robinson et al. 2015) created a model for the economic multi-hazard impacts of an 
Alpine Fault rupture across multiple critical interdependent South Island infrastructure 
networks called MERIT (Modelling the Economic Resilience of Infrastructure Tool). 
MERIT was built using the information from several single hazard event scenarios. The 
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model focuses on the resilience level of interlinked networks through expert knowledge 
of repair times. A breakdown of an electricity, transportation, wastewater or irrigation 
water network can cause serious disruption in the other networks. The interaction 
between the electricity system and the water and wastewater systems were not covered 
in fine detail due to high local variability and data unavailability. The modeller relied 
heavily on expert knowledge (elicitation) because previous studies have shown to 
provide a high level of realism. For example, on the West Coast many medical personal 
live in Hokitika, but work in the Greymouth hospital, which increases the value of 
transport connection between the two communities. The modellers suggested possible 
pre- and post-event mitigation and adaptions. 
Robinson et al. (2016) estimate the landsliding and landsliding impacts related to a 
possible Alpine Fault earthquake. The study is an initial-event trigger hazard 
assessment that uses an Alpine Fault rupture. The study is on a regional scale, so 
applying it at a local, farm level will require scaling. Their model suggests landsliding is 
responsible for the equivalent of several years of river erosion, which suggest in terms 
of hazard impacts landslides rank high above annual river erosion rates. In other areas 
rainfall and uplift are more influential, so regional geomorphology is a key factor. 
Kongar et al. (2015) conducted an impact assessment of infrastructure after the 2009 
L’Aquila and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes. Their method lays out exactly what assets 
are being referred to, the physical impact and the functional impact. They point out that 
some logistical interdependencies, such as radio communication, road networks and gas 
networks, are only apparent when problems arise during emergencies. The electrical 
system was responsible for many operational interdependent failures (e.g., waste water 
system plant shutdown).  
Pre-existing conditions such as climate states stress systems pre-event and can 
influence event impact severity. The steppe farms suffered a greater impact after the 
Cordón Caulle eruption due to the on-going drought (Craig et al. 2016a). The conditions 
were already difficult before the eruption because the farmers were having to buy extra 
feed for the animals. They were not prepared for compounding hazard effects. 
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1.6.2  Resilience and Sustainable Recovery  
Sustainable recovery is of prime importance if farmers are to remain living and working 
where they are now. Successful farmers incorporate cultivation diversification, 
flexibility and a system of strategic pivot points in the annual plan (Burton & Peoples 
2008). 
Sustainable means an action or practice that is adequate with current operating needs 
and does not negatively impact future operating needs (Saunders & Becker 2015). 
Resilience is both a short-term ‘bounce back’ from disaster ability and an adaptive 
ability. Adaptive capacity means ability to change to handle the negative impacts of an 
event while currently experiencing those effects. Adapting and ‘bouncing back’ are not 
the same thing; adapting implies the new stable stage achieved is slightly different than 
the pre-event condition. Sustainable development addresses economic, environmental 
and social well-being needs and sustainable recovery addresses new risk recognition 
and risk reduction. Recovery can be both resilient and sustainable when the changes 
made to return to a stable stage have a long lasting positive effect on a community’s 
ability to react to disasters in the future. For example, the resilient liquefaction clean-up 
reaction to the Darfield earthquake was not sustainable because they did nothing to 
reduce future effects (Saunders & Becker 2015). Similarly, insurance policies that 
replace ‘like for like’ are not sustainable policies. The red zoning, retiring, of some land 
after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake may be more a sustainable practice in the long 
run (Saunders & Becker 2015).  
After the 2010 Darfield earthquakes, it took several days for a coalition called Rural 
Recovery Group to form based on pre-existing relationships and structure (Almond et 
al. 2010). Researchers had to develop the expertise in remediating the effects of surface 
rupture and liquefaction on farmland post-earthquake. There was no knowledge base or 
action plan in place before the event, so recovery was most likely prolonged.  
Interdependent networks can limit resilience. The reliance of the telecommunications 
and railway systems on the electrical network increases vulnerability (Yu et al. 2010). 
Yu et al. (2010) suggest redundancies in the telecommunications network would reduce 
the network’s vulnerability to landsliding and liquefaction. They also noted that pre-
event resource allocation (e.g., bridge replacement centres) and total resource 
availability impacted lifeline restoration times.  
11 
 
Craig et al. (2016a, 2016b) report several resilient recovery steps taken by the residents 
of Patagonia in response to volcanic eruptions. Many farmers used greenhouses and 
shelter belts as a resilient adaptive measure against the on-going effects of ash 
remobilisation (Craig et al. 2016b). Dry climates and pastoral farmers had less irrigation 
and cultivation equipment and thus were less adaptable. Other farmers were forced to 
resort to farm abandonment because of the ongoing effects of ash remobilisation. Also, 
the electricity network was upgraded to resist ash abrasion and a new well was dug to 
handle the increased water demand in response to ash remobilisation clean-up. Some 
systems were resilient and sustainable; one town, Jacobacci, had a water system that 
was resistant to ash because it was enclosed. The ashfall did increase the needed 
frequency for system maintenance in the water systems of all the towns studied due to 
abrasion or increased water demand. A group’s risk tolerance is a resilience factor. The 
roads stayed open under 50mm of ashfall in Patagonia, while the roads in New Zealand 
closed under less than 3mm (Craig et al. 2016b).  
Folke et al. (2003) identify four factors that, across temporal and spatial scales, create a 
system’s resilience. They are: “learning to live with change and uncertainty; nurturing 
diversity for reorganization and renewal; combining different types of knowledge for 
learning; and creating opportunity for self-organization toward social-ecological 
sustainability”. 
Berkes (2007) expands on these four factors. Living with uncertainty is present at an 
individual and societal level. Society’s memory of disasters is longer and so, society 
tends to rebound better from a disaster than an individual. Diversity applies to all 
aspects of a vulnerable system (e.g., crop type, products, job types, services). 
Diversification also applies to knowledge sources as well. Local knowledge, as with case 
studies, helps fill in the detail gaps of global science. Berkes (2007) also explains how 
the weak local response capacity can occur even in affluent areas (e.g., American Samoa 
responded worse to a hurricane than Tikopia did to a tsunami). Local governments can 
and should be linked to upper levels of government, but they should not be entirely 
reliant on them (e.g., Inuit hunter-trappers and the Artic Council tackling climate 
change). A system has the advantage of being composed of multiple people and benefits 
from the memories of multiple people and predecessors. This collective memory 
decreases deaths in events with long recurrence cycles. One of the most notable 
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examples of this was during the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. The large number of 
survivors on the heavily impacted islands in the Andaman Sea was reportedly due to 
their oral traditions, which taught them to escape to high ground when the sea 
retreated (Gunawardene & Noronha 2007). The system needs to be self-organised to 
react adaptively; inflexibility makes dealing with uncertainty worse. Policies of 
decision-making centralisation decrease resilience because they reduce the chances 
local organisations can learn and develop their own knowledge and links. 
1.6.2.1  Agricultural Resilience Strategies 
Farmers have a number of resilience strategies that they rely on during disaster 
recovery and long-term hardship. Approximately, half of surveyed farmers reported 
that they turned to a bank or meat company for financial assistance during a hard 
period (Parsonson-Ensor & Saunders 2011). This option was far more popular than off-
farm spouse work (11%), sale of land (8%), off-farm work by the farm (8%) and other 
options. The strategies New Zealand farmers take changed slightly from 1986 to 2010. 
The number of dairy cows and farms has grown exponentially, while sheep farms have 
shrunk over the same time period. Parsonson-Ensor & Saunders (2011) infer this is the 
reason for the increase in willingness to buy land and irrigate more because there is an 
increased need for dairy cow feed. Environmental conditions, such as drought, drives 
the stock increase or reduction trend.   
Farmar-Bowers & Lane (2009) examine farmer decision-systems to suggest biodiversity 
policy approaches. They attribute actions to a combination of personal components 
(e.g., knowledge, land, capital, interest), external component (e.g., market, insurance, 
government programs) and random components (e.g., price fluctuations, droughts, 
disasters). They also noted that farmers actively create opportunities that are suitable 
(fit motivation) and available (resources accessible). Land-use changes are due to family 
decision-system, farm business trading decision-system or land-ownership decision-
system. A farming family’s position along the life-cycle of the farm also influenced their 
decisions. Farmar-Bowers & Lane (2009) develop the concept of ‘lens’ to explain the 
influencers on farmer decisions (e.g. intrinsic interest, family, knowledge of personal 
strengths, society and knowledge of outside influences). They suggest that government 
policies should seek to play through these lenses to be effective. For example, education 
(at any level) can influence both intrinsic interest and knowledge of personal strengths.  
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1.6.2.2  Agricultural Community Resilience Strategies 
Darnhofer (2010) conducted a case study of Austrian family farms to assess if the four 
resilience factors identified by Folke et al. (2003) and Berkes (2007) apply to farming 
resilience. Family farm economic strategies do not conform with mainstream economic 
strategies (Farmar-Bowers & Lane 2009). The goal of farm resilience is to maintain the 
function of the farm, not necessarily the specific production activities (Darnhofer 2010). 
That means farmers react to economics to preserve the farm (e.g. converting from 
mostly sheep to dairy farming). The farms in Darnhofer (2010)’s study were all small, 
approximately 17ha, so the findings may not be perfectly applied to the larger New 
Zealand farms discussed in this case study. Farmers often have a personal connection to 
land, a sense of ‘belonging’ (Delind & Bingen 2007). This belonging fuels a desire to stay 
on the farm and builds community loyalty. This desire can also stretch past a person’s 
lifetime (e.g., planting trees to grow a forest). Shocks, unexpected, short-term 
devastating events (e.g. earthquakes), and stresses, long-term changes (e.g. 
environmental policy regulation shift) both test farmer resilience (Darnhofer 2010). 
Farmers learn to adapt to change, diversify (crops, livestock, economic opportunities, 
resources, relationship types), call on different sources of knowledge (science research, 
traditional methods, neighbours) and community engagement. Some forms of 
uncertainty were considered more acceptable than other. For example, the small 
Austrian farmers considered 15-20 year credit plans with banks too long, but were 
willing to make large monetary and time commitments as part of a consortium with 
other farmers. Community engagement plays a part in all resilience factors. It is a source 
of knowledge, collective financial aid and social support through hard times.  
1.6.3  Land-use Planning 
Land-use planning is part of an effective vulnerability modification plan, but it is often 
bypassed for more reactionary forms of recovery post-event (Sapountzaki et al. 2011). 
Poor land-use or spatial planning, can lead to maintaining or even increasing the risk 
level. 
Few Civil Defence & Emergency Management (CDEM) plans use pre-event planning for 
reduction and recovery, thus missing out on potentially less costly options (Becker et al. 
2008). To address this deficit, Becker et al. (2008) developed a framework for pre-
recovery land use planning that emphasises communication between various expert 
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groups (insurers, risk managers, land owners, construction industry personal, etc.). 
Bathrellos et al. (2012) use pre-event land use planning on a large scale by 
incorporating natural hazard maps in their rural rejuvenation land use planning 
methodology for Trikala, Greece. They attempt to show an alternative to the traditional 
socio-economic factors method. Their methodology includes expert opinion weighted 
physical factors (natural hazards, geology and geomorphology) and socio-economic 
factors. The hazard maps they use are single hazard only (erosion, landslide, flood, 
earthquake), which for a high-level regional analysis may be all that is required. 
Robinson et al. (2015) briefly touch on pre-event land-use planning during their risk 
adaption sections where they discuss the benefits of relocating the community of Franz 
Josef. 
1.6.4  Previous Rural and Agriculture Hazard Studies  
There are three types of farms: arable (crops only), mixed (crops and animals) and 
pastoral (dairy, sheep, etc.). A farm’s main source of profit (crops or livestock) is also 
their biggest vulnerability (Lawes & Kingwell 2012). Vulnerability severity is farm-type 
specific. Pastoral farms (especially dairy) are most vulnerable to electricity outages, 
arable farms to water system break-downs and ground-deformation and mixed to 
livestock health (influenced by water and feed access) (Whitman et al. 2013). 
Most hazard impacts on farm infrastructure studies focus on single event impacts. Craig 
et al. (2016a, 2016b) conducted a post-event impact assessment of tephra falls on 
agricultural areas in Patagonia, South America, following three volcanic eruptions. They 
use a combination of site visits, tephra thickness isopach maps from previous studies 
and semi-structured interviews with farmers, production managers and agricultural 
agency staff to collect data. This study converts qualitative to quantitative data to 
improve comparison accuracy and account for variable regional settings. The farm type, 
pastoral or horticultural, also changed the severity, timing and mitigation strategy. The 
study uses maximum loss to estimate recovery. The climate and farm type were the best 
predicative factors for estimating tephra remobilisation impact (Craig et al. 2016a).  
Most risk assessment studies for agriculture focus on climate related hazards (Burton & 
Peoples 2008; Dong et al. 2016; Mohan & Strobl 2016). Both Dong et al. (2016) and 
Mohan & Strobl (2016) focus on risk impact as a function of economic loss and calculate 
future loss as a result of a given hazard’s impact. Burton & Peoples (2008) take a 
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different approach using semi-structured interviews and qualitative data to examine 
adaptive strategies for farmers in droughts. Dong et al. (2016) use crop yield as a direct 
impact expression for on-going climate events (drought, floods, heat waves, climate-
induced soil erosion). Mohan & Strobl (2016) calculate the future impact of hurricanes 
on the agriculture of various Caribbean islands. Mohan & Strobl (2016) attempt to 
correct for the limited hurricane data by introducing synthetically calculated events. 
They used a statistically deterministic method and pre-exiting meteorological and storm 
models. Their use of this data and method means that the results are relevant for the 
near future only and means the method may not be adaptable to other regions. 
1.6.5  Historical Rural Earthquake Impact Cases  
Whitman et al. (2013) notes that as of 2013 there were no international studies on the 
impact of earthquakes on agricultural organizations. The research for this literature 
review have revealed few studies in the intervening years. Agriculture damage is 
frequently treated as a side note. The following are three key New Zealand rural 
earthquake studies. See Appendix A for a longer collection of similar global studies. 
On May 25th, 1968, a M 7.1 earthquake occurred near Inangahua Junction, South Island, 
New Zealand (Earthquake Commission 2015). It took nearly seven hours for rescue 
helicopters and damage surveyors to arrive because the town was almost completely 
cut off and damage elsewhere was minor. 
On March 2nd, 1987, a M 6.3 earthquake occurred near the Eastern Bay of Plenty, North 
Island, New Zealand (Butcher et al. 1998). Shaking, ground deformation, liquefaction 
and slope failures were the predominate forms of damage. Kiwifruit orchards, which 
were just about to be harvested, suffered collapsed support structures and the packing 
sheds were shaken, but the damage was not severe enough to prevent the harvest from 
commencing on schedule. Ground deformation changed the natural drainage systems, 
damaged boreholes for irrigation water and created new springs. The loss of electricity 
and water systems as well as stress were the highest reported problems. Similar issues 
were reported for the 2010 Darfield earthquake. A Rural Support Group, Civil Defence 
and local Whakatane Branch of Federated Farmers checked-in on farmers, surveyed for 
necessary assistance, provided assistance and repairs. There was a reported NZ$20 
million of damage to 600 properties.  
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On September 4th, 2010, a M 7.1 earthquake occurred on a previously unidentified fault 
near Darfield, Canterbury, New Zealand (Almond et al. 2010). The land closest to the 
fault surface rupture was mostly arable and pastoral (dairy) farming. Most farms near 
the fault experienced ground shaking, liquefaction (lateral spreading, sand ejection and 
‘sand blisters’), surface rupture related damage and animal injuries (dairy cows 
reportedly broke legs while standing on concrete milking shed floors). Loss of electricity 
was reportedly the most disruptive impact to dairy farms (dairy sheds), while water 
system damage (pipes and wells) was the greatest impact for mixed or arable farms 
(Whitman et al. 2012). Several dairy farms used generators as temporary mitigation. 
Despite the physical damage, the psychosocial traumas associated with the event were 
more concerning to the farmers questioned. The strongest mitigating factor for many 
farmers was their relationship with their neighbours; a trait generally not shared with 
urban organisations.  
1.7  Case Study Area 
1.7.1  Regional Geology and Geomorphology 
The Hurunui District is located in North Canterbury, South Island, New Zealand (Figure 
1). The region sits astride the main Australia-Pacific Plate boundary marked by the 
Alpine Fault and related fault systems. The area is mostly hills and river valleys 
bounded by the northernmost section of the Southern Alps, and the Inland and Seaward 




Figure 1 Regional map. Hurunui District outlined in white sourced from (Statistics New Zealand 2011). 14th November 2016 
surface ruptures marked in red (Litchfield et al. 2018; Nicol et al. 2018). 
1.7.1.1  Geological History 
The North Canterbury region has had a complex geological history including periods of 
marine transgression, tectonic uplift and erosion (Rattenbury et al. 2006). Most of the 
rocks occurring below the Quaternary sediments are ‘basement’ Torlesse Group and 
erosion-resistant igneous intrusions.  There are smaller outcrops of weak marine 
sedimentary rocks. Glaciation in the Quaternary led to the formation of many lakes (e.g., 
Rotoiti, Rotorua, Sumner). Large rivers run from these lakes cutting gorges and valleys. 
During the Quaternary, the Southern Alps and mountain ranges throughout Marlbourgh, 




erosion. Alternating glacial and interglacial climatic fluctuations then gave rise to the 
sediment deposits (soils) that occur across the region. 
1.7.1.2  Tectonic History 
North Canterbury has a long tectonic history record extending back to the early 
Ordovician (Rattenbury et al. 2006). It is still tectonically active today. Located on the 
Australian-Pacific plate boundary the region is crossed by a number of major active 
faults, several of which have generated damaging earthquakes in historical time.  
1.7.1.3  Geological Units 
Basement Torlesse greywacke, formed from the Cambrian to early Cretaceous, is 
generally more resistant to erosion than the younger overlying sedimentary rocks. In 
places where the rock has been heavily fractured by faults or through folding and 
shearing processes (e.g., schist and mélange) the rock is weaker and more prone to 
slope failure (Rattenbury et al. 2006).  
The overlying Waima Formation and Greta Formation (Motunau Group) are Neogene 
siltstones (GNS 2013). They are weak and friable. Undifferentiated Cookson Volcanic 
Group is predominantly basalt. It is fractured, but more erosion resistant than the 
sedimentary rocks into which it was intruded. Paleogene limestone and calcareous 
mudstone is erosion resistant, often forming prominent ridges. The sandstone, siltstone, 
mudstone and conglomerate formed in the late Cretaceous to Pliocene (Rattenbury et al. 
2006). The sandstones, while weakly cemented, are relatively hard like the 
conglomerates. The siltstones and mudstones are softer and more prone to erosion. The 
clay-rich material they form through erosion are highly plastic, water saturated and are 
prone to slope failure. Most of the limestone and volcanic units, with the exception of 
the uncemented and weathered units, are strong. 
The late Pleistocene river gravels are weathered and eroded (GNS 2013). Quaternary 
sediments are generally weak, weathered and water-saturated (Rattenbury et al. 2006). 
Deposits with high clay content are less prone to slope failure. Loess, common in 
Northeast Canterbury, is usually several metres thick and has relatively high dry 
strength. However, loess displays tunnel gully erosion on slopes and develops debris 
flow with increasing moisture content.  
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1.7.1.4  Regional Climate 
Canterbury has a temperate climate (Macara 2016).  NIWA released a report in 2016 
detailing Canterbury’s climate.  One of the rainfall data collection sites was Culverden, 
centrally located in the Hurunui District (Figure 1).  Winter is the wettest season, with a 
high average rainfall (9 days/month) and highest number of days of rainfall (27 days) 
(Figure 2).  This is despite the November having the highest monthly rainfall at an 
average of 63mm out of an annual average of 576mm (Figure 3). 
Hanmer Springs, compared to four other locations in other parts of Canterbury, showed 
the lowest moisture deficit and highest runoff (Macara 2016).  This can be extrapolated 
to mean that the Hurunui District has a higher soil moisture content than much of the 
rest of the region.  As expected, and within the regional temperate trend, winter is the 
wettest season with most runoff and summer is the driest. 
The temperature data for the Hurunui District does not have a proxy within Macara 
(2016)’s report.  The town of Kaikōura’s geography and coastal location is different 
from the majority of the Hurunui District. A temperature map within the report 
indicates that Kaikōura temperatures are typically lower on average than the Hurunui 
District’s.  The area’s hilly topography creates a large degree of variability. 
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Figure 3 Mean monthly rainfall for Culverden adapted from NIWA report using data from 1981-2010 (Macara 2016) . 
The Canterbury plains has a history of drought. The Hurunui District in particular was 
affected by the 1997-1998, 2000-2001 and 2015-2017 droughts (MPI 2013,2015). The 
drought was on-going at the time of the earthquake.  
1.7.1.5  Geohazards 
The primary geohazards in North Canterbury include: landslides, earthquakes, co-
seismic hazards (e.g., liquefaction, strong ground shaking), coastal erosion and tsunami. 
Coastal erosion and tsunami are not a concern for the farm case studies in this thesis as 
they are all located sufficiently inland. Earthquakes or heavy rainfall typically triggers 
landslides. They can also occur in weak shallow marine deposits originating in the 
Cretaceous and Cenozoic (Rattenbury et al. 2006). Coastal erosion and rivers 
undercutting slopes also trigger landslides. Hundreds of faults were mapped in North 
Canterbury pre-November 2016. Unconsolidated water-saturated Quaternary 
sediments can amplify earthquake ground motions leading to stronger shaking than 
experienced on a bedrock site. Such amplification has the potential to result in greater 
shaking damage. 
Since the beginning of written human record in the Kaikōura area (about 1840), there 
have been many strong earthquakes (Table 1). The first of these were the M 7.0+ 1848 
Marlborough and 1888 North Canterbury earthquakes. The North Canterbury 
earthquake ruptured part of the Hope Fault, which with a slip rate of 20-40mmyr-1 is 
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Table 1 Earthquakes that have impacted the study area. Local refers to earthquakes that occurred within the 2006 Kaikōura 
Geological Map area. Notably the 1855 M 8.1 Wairarapa earthquake occurred on the North Island. Modified from 
(Rattenbury et al. 2006). 
Rural New Zealand Earthquakes 
Current Study Area 
Year Location/ Name Magnitude (M) 
1848 Marlborough 7.5 
1888 North Canterbury 7.0-7.3 
1901 Cheviot 6.9 
1922 Motunau 6.4 
1948 Waiau 6.4 
2016 Culverden/ Kaikōura 7.8 
Outside the Study Area 
1855 Wairarapa 8.1 
1929 Arthur's Pass 7.0 
1929 Buller 7.7 




1.7.2  Hurunui District 
 
Figure 4 The Hurunui District wards. Adapted from (Hurunui District Council, 2012). 
The Hurunui District is 864,640 ha (Figure 4)(Hurunui District Council 2012). In 2013, 
the population was 11,529 (Statistics New Zealand 2013b). Agriculture and forestry are 
the major industries. The District also has growing viticulture and tourism industries 
based around the areas vineyards, coastline, hot springs and lakes. The climate across 
the district includes coastal micro-climates and alpine climates (Hurunui District 
Council 2012). North Canterbury contains river valleys, mountains and ocean coastlines. 
1.7.2.1  North Canterbury Farming 
According to the 2012 Agricultural census, there are 993 farms in the Hurunui District 
(Statistics New Zealand 2013a). In 2012, a third of the farms specialise in sheep, a tenth 
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specialise in beef, another fifteenth produce a mixture of sheep, cattle and crop and less 
than a tenth are dairy. The rest of the farms have other livestock or are exclusively crop. 
The average farm size is 420 ha. 
1.7.2.2  Community Support 
Farmers depend on other farmers in the community and rural organisations for 
support. In North Canterbury, most farmers draw some support from Beef+Lamb, 
DairyNZ, Environment Canterbury, EQC, Federated Farmers, their insurance companies 
(e.g. Farmers Mutual), local councils (e.g., Hurunui District Council), the Ministry for 
Primary Industries and NZ Meridian. 
Following the November 2016 earthquake, farmers were a significant source of support 
for each other. For example, there was a community organised system of relief supply 
flights (Small 2016). A common refrain on official releases was for farmers to check in 
on their neighbours. 
1.7.2.3  Drought 
A drought affected the Hurunui region in 2015 and 2016 (Environment Canterbury 
2016). In November 2016, the region experiences significant rainfall and higher than 
average, for November, river flows (Environment Canterbury Regional Council 2016b). 
In December, rainfalls were average, which was still higher than it had been since the 
drought began (Environment Canterbury Regional Council 2016a). Rains in January 
2017 brought some flooding in alpine areas.  
1.7.2.4  Previous Hurunui District Hazard Studies 
In 2000, Geotech Consulting, Ltd. completed a natural hazards assessment as part of the 
Engineering Lifeline Project for Environment Canterbury (Yetton et al. 2000). As the 
first of the district lifeline studies, its authors covered more than just earthquake 
hazards. The study covers earthquakes, floods, meteorological (e.g., snowstorm, 
rainstorms and droughts), mass movements and coastal hazards. Yetton et al. (2000) 
did not conduct any new surveys for the study. Instead they rely on historical accounts 
and previous studies to create various hazards scenarios. These scenarios were single 
hazard focused.  
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Yetton et al. (2000) highlight earthquakes as the greatest hazard to the Hurunui District 
because of the wide range of effects they have over a large area and multiple systems 
simultaneously.  The district also has the most known faults of any Canterbury district. 
The study based a scenario on the 1901 Cheviot Earthquake and summarised the effects 
over six months. An earthquake affects all lifelines. The scenario predicted weeks and 
months to repair the transportation networks, restoration of 90% of the power within 
48 hours, a month or two to repair the water network and almost complete 
telecommunications restoration within a week of the event. 
Flooding occurs in confined to certain areas and tied to two extreme rainfall patterns 
(Yetton et al. 2000). The north-westerly rainfall pattern, causes more hazards in the 
Lewis Pass, Waiau River and tributary areas. Parts of SH7 and SH1 lie in this zone. The 
east or south rainfall pattern affects the foothills and coast more than the north-
westerly. It is more likely to impact the entirety of the district, causing slips, surface 
flooding and washouts. An overflow of storm water into the sewerage system is also 
possible. 
Meteorological hazards (i.e., “heavy rain, snowstorms, wind, severe local storms, 
including lightning and hail, and drought.”) like earthquakes have wide area impacts 
(Yetton et al. 2000). Flooding and mass movements, both possibly triggered by 
meteorological hazards, were seen as significant enough to have their own sections. 
Yetton et al. (2000) compile the historical storm records and considered snowstorms to 
be the most significant, wind to be lacking in data and droughts as too slow acting to 
create a significant impact on lifelines.  
Yetton et al. (2000) consider mass movements the least significant hazard due to the 
small area affected by each instance. Mass movement impacts transport corridors 
greater than any other lifeline due to their lengths. The impact is significant if the mass 
movement occurs at a key node location. The other lifelines can be impacted by mass 
movements as well when individual components or nodes are disturbed or destroyed 
by the hazard. 
Coastal hazards include coastal erosion, tsunami, and storm surge inundation (Yetton et 




A liquefaction study of the Hurunui District was not conducted until 2011 (Geotech 
2011). The study produced a zoned map of the district to highlight areas with 
liquefaction potential. This is no zone with high potential and the relatively small zones 
that do exist are located mostly in river valleys and along the coast. Much of the district 
is coarse gravels, rock and soils that are not liquefiable. 
1.7.2.5  Water Quality 
The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management (NPS-FM), released in 2014 
to the place the 2011 statement, is a New Zealand government water reform initiative 
(MPI 2014). The initiative is aimed at regional councils and directs them to create 
objectives, limits and methods to manage freshwater.  The NPS-FM falls under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). It therefore works in conjunction with other 
National Policy Statements, National Environmental Standards, Resource Management 
Regulations 2010, Water conservation orders, treaty settlement legislation and the 
Hauraki Gulf Marine Park Act 2000. Complete implementation of the initiative is not 
required until 31 December 2025- with provision for extension to 2030, if deemed 
necessary. 
The Canterbury Strategic Water Study (CSWS), first published in 2002, called for a 
regional water management scheme (Hurunui District Council 2012). The Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy (CWMS) was created out of the study in 2009, after several 
stages of further investigation. The Hurunui Waiau Zone Committee, the first of the 
Canterbury water zone committees, was formed in July 2010. The risk of community 
decline and death through a ‘do-nothing’ approach helped to prompt greater attention 
being placed on future proofing land-use. 
“The CWMS sets as its first order priorities: environment, customary use, community 
supplies and stock water; with second order priorities as irrigation, renewable electricity 
generation, recreation and amenity” (Hurunui District Council 2012). 
The Zone Implementation Programme (ZIP) is the Hurunui Waiau Zone Committees’ 
recommendations for achieving the water management goals. 
In 2015, the Dairy Environment Leadership Group (DELG), a partnership of various 
companies and groups related or part of the dairy industry released The Sustainable 
Dairying: Water Accord (Dairy Environment Leadership Group 2015). This Accord is the 
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successor to the 2003-2011 Dairying and Clean Stream Accord. It lists a series of 
expectations and commitments from the signed parties with regards to managing 
waterways, nitrate loss, effluent water use, etc. This accord updated the 2013 version. 
1.7.3  November 14th, 2016 Earthquake Sequence 
1.7.3.1  Overview 
At 12:02am on Monday, 14th November 2016 a M 7.8 occurred at a depth of 15km and 
15 km north-east of the town of Culverden, Canterbury, South Island, New Zealand 
(Geonet 2016)(Figure 5). This initial earthquake was immediately followed by a series 
of fault ruptures along at least twenty-one faults from just north of Culverden to just 
north of Cape Campbell . Two people were killed in earthquake related incidents and 
more than 20 injuries were reported (Whelan 2016).  
 
Figure 5 North Canterbury, South Island New Zealand. The main Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake and six months of 
aftershocks (14th November 2016 to mid-May 2017). Note the M 7.8 earthquake epicentre is marked with a red star. 
Adapted from GNS data. 
1.7.3.2  Impacts on Lifelines – Essential Services 
Essential service lifelines are routes, connections and pathways that provide supplies 
necessary for continued production and survival. These include: telecommunications, 
electricity and water. The phone network was disabled due to phone line congestion 
and power cuts (NZ Herald 2016a). Power outages were reported throughout the area 
(Cronshaw et al. 2016). Water sheds and pipes were also damaged. The Hurunui District 




systems suffered minor damage during the earthquake, which took several weeks to fix 
(Hurunui District Council 2017b). 
1.7.3.3  Impacts on Lifelines – Roads 
The initial earthquake damaged many roads. Within a few hours, NZTA closed sections 
of State Highway 1 and State Highway 7 due to landsliding, earthquake shaking damage, 
tsunami risk and geotechnical survey requirements (NZTA 2016b,c). Large sections of 
State Highway 1 remained closed as of June 2017 due extensive landsliding, subsidence 
and damaged bridges and infrastructure (NZ Herald 2016a). Re-establishing an access 
route for Kaikōura and the large trucks stuck in the Picton, the ferry port from the North 
Island, was a major priority for NZTA. The inland road from Culverden to Kaikōura was 
temporary closed due to aftershock risks and time needed to survey for damage (NZTA 
2016a). Limited access was granted in the first few days after the earthquake. 
Aftershocks and rain-triggered mudslides led to occasional closures in the months after 
the initial earthquake. 
1.7.3.4  Effects on Farms 
Many dairy farms were forced to dump their milk in the weeks after the earthquake due 
to poor road conditions blocking milk truck access (Dennett 2016). If cows are not 
milked, they will dry off or develop mastitis. Some farmers had insurance for events like 
this and the milk Company Fonterra reportedly worked directly with their effected 
farmers. Graham Collins, a Kaikōura dairy farmer, told stuff that the 1993 flood and 
1975 ‘wind storm’ were not as severe as the November earthquake. Many farmers 
turned to neighbours to borrow generators and use dairy sheds (2016b). The 
earthquake occurred during peak milk production time.  
1.7.3.5  Post-Disaster Recovery Frustrations 
Some farmers expressed frustration with Civil Defence’s lack of focus on animal welfare 
and farm recovery (Hill 2016). ‘Team Ag’, a consortium of local and national rural 
organisations was formed to address this issue. Advocates for the consortium 
emphasised its people’s understanding of farmers’ emotions and situations (i.e. their 
home and workplace are often the same). Road closures were another source of 
frustration with civil defence. The closure of the Inland Road from Waiau to Kaikōura to 
all, including local residents and essential service repair teams was particularly 
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frustrating to Mt. Lyford locals (Broughton 2016). The decision was made by someone 
stationed in Christchurch, not locally. This situation typified the disconnection between 
inter-post disaster recovery groups.  
After the earthquake, there was greater governmental and media focus on Kaikōura. 
Helicopters traveling to Kaikōura reportedly flew over many isolated farms, without 
stopping to check in on the farmers (Cook 2016). Isolated farmers are typically capable 
of being self-sufficient, but the sudden lack of communication and drain on their 
resources was stressful. Helplines cannot help people who cannot call in. One official 
advised calling in an ask for assistance for neighbours who were unable to do so for 
themselves (Cook 2016). 
1.7.3.6  Relevant Post-Earthquake Sequence Legislation 
The Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Emergency Relief Act 2016 received royal assent 
on 5th December 2016 (2016). The Act allowed for a temporary relaxation of the 
resource consents and emergency powers under the Resource Management Act (RMA), 
explicitly for repairs related to this earthquake sequence. The Act was designed to assist 
communities and councils in the earthquake-affected area to recovery, specifically 
economic, and to plan, rebuild and restore and improve buildings, infrastructure, and 
economic, social and cultural well-being. 
1.7.3.7  Post-Earthquake Sequence Funding for Farmers 
Several funding sources were setup or repurposed post-earthquake sequence to assist 
farmers and rural communities rebuild and plan for the future. The Primary Industries 
Earthquake Recovery Fund is a $5 million support fund (MPI 2017d). The Fund is in two 
parts: part one is a community group project application and part two is an advisory 
services fund. The applications for the community projects were collected between 10th 
May and 23rd June, approved on 31st July, announced on 3rd August and contracted on 
31st September. Eight projects were approved for a collective total of $3,542,920 (MPI 
2017a). Part two is enacted by farmers’ approaching approved contractors. The MPI will 
pay the $5,000 grant directly to the contractor. 
The government made use of industry resources and structures to support, drive and 
run initiatives. MPI also created a skilled farm workers initiative to support farm 
recovery during the first six months (Guy 2017). The initiative utilised the Federated 
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Farmers’ 0800 FARMING line. Both Agriculture Employment Services Ltd (AgStaff) and 
Federated Farmers were contracted to manage the initiative. This initiative was funded 
with $600,000 (MPI 2017b). 
The Kaikōura Earthquake Relief Fund was $4 million fund for primary production 
industries to cover restoring uninsurable infrastructure and initial clean-up costs (MPI 
2017c). 
1.8  Thesis Format  
The thesis structure had been designed to address each of the objectives listed in 
Section 1.3.2  in a clear and logical manner. Chapter 2 details methodology used to 
develop the case studies. Chapter 3 presents the basic characteristics and timelines for 
each case study farm. Chapter 4 discusses the major themes developed from the 
analysis of the case studies. Chapter 5 contains a thesis scope, conclusions summary, 




Chapter 2  Research Methodology 
2.1  Introduction 
In order to begin to address the gap in farm-level earthquake impact knowledge, an in-
depth qualitative case study approach was chosen. Three farms, known to have been 
significantly impacted by the 14th November 2016 earthquakes, were approached to 
participate. Two rounds of semi-structured interviews were used to capture the farms’ 
earthquake stories as they changed over time. The semi-structured question sets were 
generated from an initial literature review. A multi-disciplinary approach of media 
analysis and geological data review supplement the previous literature and interviews. 
A general inductive approach was used to analyse the common themes developed from 
the interviews. From these themes, the factors that influenced the earthquake impacts 
and recovery of the farms were identified. 
2.2  November Earthquake Interviews  
2.2.1  Ethical approval  
A low risk application was submitted to the Human Ethics Committee on the 21st June, 
2017.  The application went through two rounds of refinement (emailed on the 11th July 
and 20th July) before being approved on 31st July 2017. The semi-structured interviews 
were designed so as to not contain culturally offensive or distressing material, and 
interviewers remained mindful that this could have been a distressing event for some 
people. Three main forms of distress mitigation included: constraining interview topics 
to impacts to farm infrastructure and essential services, having at least one researcher 
with experience in post-disaster contexts present for the interview, and recruiting by 
word of mouth and personal networks – which allowed judgement of participant 
selection.  Participation was entirely voluntary and all data recorded remains 
confidential. Information sheets were used to draw participants attention to the risks 
associated with participation, and to clarify that although identifying details of 
individuals and farms would not be included in any publications based on this data, the 
small sample pool made total anonymity difficult to achieve. Consent was gained after 
participants had discussed this risk with interviewers. 
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2.2.2  Interview Participant Selection 
The interviewees were a purposive sample of Hurunui District farming community 
chosen as representative of the broad farming categories and topographies typical of 
Hurunui District discussed in the (Section 1.7.2.1 ). This study focused on the Hurunui 
District because the University of Canterbury was actively involved in mapping the 
coseismic earthquake impacts in the area at the time of project inception. The decision 
to limit the interviewee sample to three farms was to allow for in-depth analysis for 
approximately a year-long recovery period. All three farms were significantly impacted 
by the coseismic effects of the 2016 earthquakes and foresee various stages of recovery 
lasting years. 
Interviewees were invited (by phone or email) to participate in the interviews. A 
convenient time and location for the interview was arranged. All participants chose to 
be interviewed on their farms. A consent form and information sheet (Appendix C) was 
provided (by email) to the participant ahead of the interview and again at the beginning 
of the interview (in a hard copy).  To protect the identity of the participants, each farm 
was assigned a letter identifier. Farm A is an extensive hill country sheep and beef farm. 
Farm B is a medium-sized steep hill sheep and beef farm. Farm C is a relatively small flat 
river terrace dairy farm. Where use of specific names risks confidentiality, the names of 
outside organisations (e.g., government departments and NGOs, have been replaced 
with a generic name as another measure of confidentiality. The Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment (MBIE); the Ministry of Primary Infrastructure (MPI); 
Environment Canterbury (ECan); Civil Defence and Emergency Management1 (CDEM) 
and the local council are [The Government Department]. The Earthquake Commission 
(EQC) and private insurance are [Insurer]. Any names are replaced with occupations. 
2.2.3  Semi-Structured Interviews 
Two rounds of semi-structured interviews were conducted, in August 2017 and January 
2018. The two rounds were designed to allow for follow-up questions that stemmed 
from first round analysis and to capture the recovery and hazard impact changes over a 
longer period of time. In total a 14-month recovery timeline was captured. The semi-
structured approach was chosen to allow for participant driven conversation within the 
                                                          
1 CDEM may refer to the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), Canterbury Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management (CCDEM), Hurunui CDEM and many other organisations. 
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bounds of the project’s objectives. The interviewer’s lack of farming knowledge and the 
limited number of comparable case studies informed this decision because there were 
likely to be relevant topics and ideas that had not occurred to the interviewer prior the 
interview. The interviews took place on each of the farms and were of a one to two-hour 
duration. The first round of interviews focused on capturing the farms’ status at the 
time of the earthquakes and all the impacts that stemmed from them over the 
intervening nine months. The second round focused on follow-up questions from round 
one, changes over the intervening five months and the future of the farms. 
2.2.4  Research Questions 
The following are the high-level questions used to explore the thesis’ objectives of 
investigating the farm-scale earthquake impacts to infrastructure and essential services 
with the perspective of change over space and time. These questions were rewritten 
into a four section set of more detailed interview questions. The sections were shaped 
to capture temporal changes and draw on previous agricultural hazard impact studies 
(Section 2.2.5 ). 
 How do farm characteristics (e.g., size, farm type and topography) influence the 
earthquake impacts? 
 What was the status of each farm at the time of the earthquake? 
 What, if any, are the disruptions to each farm’s annual calendar? 
 What were the initial impacts of the 2016 Kaikōura/ Hurunui earthquakes on the 
farms?  
o What are the various components of on-farm infrastructure and how are 
the impacted? 
 What were the direct and indirect impacts to each farm from cascading hazards 
stemming from the 2016 Kaikōura/ Hurunui earthquakes? 
o What do cascading hazards look like at farm-scale and how can that data 
be captured? 
 What impact did NGO and government initiatives have on farm recovery? 
 What land-use/ business model changes are farms considering post-recovery? 
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2.2.5  Semi-Structured Interview Question Set Development 
The question sets were developed in advance of the interviews using previous rural 
hazard impact studies as guidance. The first round of questions focused on capturing 
each farm setting pre-earthquakes, the initial earthquake impacts and the first nine 
months of post-earthquake recovery. Four sections were used to guide interview to 
address the research questions (Section 2.2.4 ).  
The first question section was developed to capture the farm characteristics. This 
covered everything from a farm’s basic characteristics (e.g., topography, livestock type, 
personnel) and annual calendar to its infrastructure and essential service assets. The 
studies of Almond et al. (2010) and Whitman et al. (2013) from the 2010 Darfield 
earthquakes, and Craig et al. (2016b), a study on long-term volcanic ash impacts to 
agriculture, emphasise the contribution of farm characteristics and event time to impact 
severity and farm vulnerability.  
The next section of questions was designed to capture the farm and the farmer’s 
previous experiences with hazards. These questions stemmed from the concept of 
cascading hazards, specifically investigating the part the farm and farmer’s experience 
with hazard events influence the impact from subsequent hazard events. Craig et al. 
(2016a), Farmar-Bowers & Lane (2009) and Berkes (2007) all discussed the influence 
of pre-existing conditions (e.g., droughts, financial hardship) on vulnerability and 
farmer/local hazard experience on recovery.   
The third section of questions was aimed at capturing the timeline of events and their 
impacts on the key physical assets named in the first section of questions. This began by 
asking the farmer to recount the events in their own words starting with the 
earthquake. These questions were shaped by the studies of Whitman et al. 
(2012),(2013) which discussed both the physical earthquake impacts to farms and 
mental/emotional earthquake impacts to farmers. The discussion of Craig et al. (2016b) 
on the relationship between on essential service and livestock characteristics and 
hazard impacts were also drawn on. Recovery factor questions covering outside help, 
community resilience and farm-scale decision making were influenced by the study of 
Darnhofer (2010) on farm resilience.  
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The final section was designed to capture non-physical impacts as well as providing 
some insight into what the farmer thought the future of the farm might look like. This 
included changes to the farm plan and economic impacts. These questions were shaped 
by the concept recovery’s time cost (Mohan & Strobl 2016) and studies about the 
various factors involved in land-use changes and farm recovery (Farmar-Bowers & Lane 
2009; Saunders & Becker 2015). 
The second round of interview questions varied between the farms. For the most part, 
they were follow-ups to the questions from round one. This began with general 
questions about impacts and recovery changes over the intervening five months. This 
was followed by a section on drought and government aid questions was developed 
from the collective round one responses. The second round interviews ended with 
specific questions regarding the contents of their responses designed to capture aspects 
of impacts and recovery that had not been addressed fully in first round interview.  
2.2.6  Data Collection and Processing 
Two researchers were present for every interviews. The presence of a second 
researcher (at least one of the supervisors – one of whom was raised on a farm in 
Canterbury) was to reduce the chance of causing inadvertent moral or cultural offence. 
The interviewer and questions were substantially prepared before the interview with 
regards to the cultural aspects to be aware of. The interviews were audio recorded to 
reduce the possibility of misunderstandings and allow for post-interview clarifications 
and corrections. All recorded notes (notebook, audio recordings and electronic files) 
were kept securely in locked room or vehicle (while traveling). Electronic data was 
stored on-campus on a desktop computer and in a portable hard drive, which was kept 
in a locked office or on the researcher’s person. Data on laptops was deleted after 
transfer. At the completion of the project all the data (both written and electronic file) 
was handed over to a supervisor for secure keeping for a period of 5 years, after which 
it will be destroyed. The interviewees were referred to by a letter assigned to their farm, 
or their occupation (e.g. Farmer A, Farmer B, etc.). Given the small area in which the 
interviewees are being selected and the size of the farms, it is improbable that the 
identities of the interviewees will be kept completely confidential. After the audio 
recordings were transcribed, they were sent to the participants for review, comment, 
clarification and approval. 
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2.2.7  Transcription 
Within two weeks of each interview, a transcript of the interview was produced. This 
transcript was sent to the participants to check for accuracy and completeness. The 
participants then had thirty days, time period flexible if participant requested, to review 
the transcript and send back their comments, clarifications and requests for deletions. 
2.2.8  Interpretation of interview results 
This study uses a general inductive approach as outlined by Thomas (2016). This 
approach was selected because the volume of raw text data was the equivalent of over 
nine hours of audio recording. Summarising these data. It allowed for comparison 
between different sections of the transcripts. This approach also allowed for the 
development of themes addressing the research questions. 
The first step of the general inductive approach was to send the prepared transcripts to 
be reviewed by the participants.  After the reviewed transcripts were returned, the 
inductive coding process began. The transcript texts were read thoroughly. Each 
distinct quote section from the transcripts was entered into a spread sheet and 
summarised (Table 2). Then most sections were assigned at least one theme. If a 
sections displayed multiple themes, the row was duplicated. Some sections were 
deemed outside the scope of the study and not assigned a theme. A second level of 
theme assignment was conducted to reduce the number of individual themes, which 
numbered over one hundred. Finally, these revised themes were condensed to the five 
categories that encompassed the various aspects of the analysis. The benefits of 
iterative organisations of themes and sub-themes allowed for adaptation as appropriate 
as new themes or factors emerged from later interviews. Use of the spread sheet 
allowed for easy inclusion. 
Table 2 General inductive coding headings and category descriptions. The transcript data was entered into an excel 
spreadsheet as block of quotes. They were then summarised and assigned themes. 
 
The trustworthiness of the interpretations was evaluated through stakeholder checks 
(Thomas 2016). The stakeholders for this study are the interview participants. The 
participants were sent copies of their transcripts to review before analysis was started. 
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The participants were also provided a copy of the executive summary for this study 
before thesis completion. 
2.2.9  Multi-disciplinary Approach 
In addition to the semi-structured interviews, peer-reviewed literature and secondary 
data available in public domain (e.g., media reports, blogs) were reviewed. 
Before the interviews, a timeline of the earthquake recovery was collated from a variety 
of news outlets, government and NGO websites.  
The latest available fault trace and landslide maps were examined and capture the types 
and amounts of damage to each property. Soils and geology maps were consulted for an 
indication of liquefaction and landslide probability, and shaking intensification. 
Recovery news, and the concerns of the farming community in general, has been 
followed over the course of the project. One highlighted concern is a mycoplasma bovis 
outbreak. Although not directly related to the earthquake, situations like these highlight 
the problem of livestock safety/security with on-going landsliding and fence damage. 
The issues become more than financial, they are also water quality and biosecurity 
issues. 
2.3  Methodology Summary 
An ethics application was submitted to the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee and approved on 31st July 2017. Peer-reviewed literature, grey literature 
(media and government reports) and geohazard data produced by University of 
Canterbury researchers were drawn from to develop a set of research questions. 
Farmers on three Hurunui District farms, representative of the various topographies 
and farming types present in the district, were approached and agreed to participate in 
two rounds of semi-structure interviews. Transcripts were produced from audio 
recordings of the interviews. After the participants reviewed and approved their 
transcripts, a general inductive approach analysis was applied (Thomas 2016). The 
transcript text was divided into sections, summarised, assigned to themes and 
categories. The hazard impacts, recovery factors and recommendations were developed 
from the results of this analysis. 
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Chapter 3  Case Studies 
3.1  Introduction 
About half of land area of the Hurunui District is farmland (Statistics New Zealand 
2013a). Dairy farms are mostly confined to the flat river terraces and the hilly, 
mountainous areas contain sheep, arable and beef cattle farms. Across the Hurunui 
District, most of the surface ruptures, landslides and other ground deformation from the 
14th November earthquakes were on farmland (Dellow et al. 2017; Stirling et al. 2017). 
University of Canterbury geologists mapping these features spoke to the farmers on 
whose land they were working (C. Fenton, University of Canterbury, pers. comm., 15th 
February 2017). They learned not only about the initial damage to these farms, but also 
about a series of on-going hazards (e.g., landslides and flooding) stemming from the 
initial earthquake. Previous literature regarding earthquakes tends to focus on urban 
area impact and recovery as historically sparsely populated area earthquake have been 
deemed insignificant (Reitherman 2006). Whitman et al. (2012) studied the impact of 
the 2010 Darfield earthquake on rural organisation, including farms, exclusively on the 
Canterbury plains; this geographic locale made on-going, or cascading, hazards less 
likely than in more complex terrain. Even so, there are many similarities between the 
two farm communities’ experiences. To understand the differences, the work of (Craig 
et al. 2016a, 2016b) on volcanic impacts on agriculture were consulted. This deals with 
the influence of pre-existing conditions, such as drought, and farm characteristics on 
hazard vulnerability. To date there is a significant lack of studies on earthquake impacts 
at a farm-scale. This thesis draws on studies of other hazards at a farm-scale to create 
several farm case studies for the 14th November earthquakes. 
This chapter summarises the case studies compiled for this thesis. Section 3.2  covers 
the case study characteristics. Each subsection covers a different asset of the case 
studies, first in a comparison chart and then in a summary that highlights the key 
points. 
3.2  Case Studies 
3.2.1  Farm Contexts 
This section discusses the basics of the farm characteristics, assets and impacts. Section 
3.2.1.1  covers the geological and geographical characteristics of the farms and their 
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coseismic hazard influences. Section 3.2.1.2  covers the farms’ prior hazard experience 
and their contributions to farm resilience and vulnerability. Section 3.2.1.3  covers 
earthquake impact variations due to farm types and workforce types. Section 3.2.1.4  
covers the farm’s physical asset (infrastructures and essential services) and their 
damage. 
3.2.1.1  Case Study Farms’ Physical Descriptions 
The physical aspects of the case studies’ land determined the types and magnitudes of 
coseismic hazards that impacted each farm in relation to the 14th November earthquake 
(Table 3). The three farms display three different topographic profiles. This appears to 
be a key factor in different experiences of cascading hazards stemming from the 
earthquake. Some of this information was garnered from the interviews. Others was 
sourced from public records and maps. 
Table 3 Physical data for Case Study Farms A, B and C. Size and topography information pulled from interview data. Soil 
description sourced from (LINZ n.d.) and geological description sourced from (GNS 2013). 
Case Study Farms’ Physical Descriptions 




Farm A ~2000ha 
Hill country, 
mountains, hills, 


















Farm B ~700ha 
































Topography and soil and bedrock characteristics provided the greatest influence on the 
types and magnitudes of hazards impacting each farm. Amplification of seismic waves 
due to varying ground conditions was seen in both the 2016 Hurunui/Kaikōura and the 
2010/2011 Christchurch earthquakes (e.g., Kaiser AE et al. 2014). Similar to the Port 
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Hills affected by the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, Farms A and B are 
located in hilly areas with variable soil cover. Hills and ridges produce strong 
topographic amplification of earthquake ground motions. This correlates with the 
higher levels of infrastructure damage observed on these properties. Farms A and B also 
have steep slopes contributing to higher levels of landsliding and related ground 
deformation. Slope failure on Farm C was confined to river terrace edges and related 
ground deformation, while present, was relatively minor. Soil with the potential to 
liquefy is generally loose and sandy, located near-surface and saturated. These 
conditions are generally limited to on or near current river floodplains. Only Farm C 
reported experiencing liquefaction. A large portion of land has high liquefaction 
potential, which matches the assessments from pre-earthquake susceptibility maps. 
Farms A and B had low potential for liquefaction due to the predominant soil type and 
low water content. Even the adjacent river floodplains comprise gravels which have a 
low susceptibility for liquefaction. The initial coseismic hazards on each farm varied due 
to proximity to the primary fault rupture, the underlying bedrock geology, topography 
and soil type. 
3.2.1.2  Farm hazard histories 
The previous hazard experiences of the farmers and farms shape the way they react to 
and are impacted by the earthquakes (Table 4). None of the farmers had experienced an 
earthquake impacting their farm before. However, they were aware of the proximity of 
several major faults. The experiences from previous natural hazards increased the 










Table 4 Previous natural hazard experiences of each farm. These were gathered during the interviews. 
Hazard Histories 
 Farm A Farm B Farm C 









1992 Snow storm  -  - 
2015-
2017 















Most of the previous hazard events recounted by the farmers were weather related. 
Snowstorms and rainstorms (Nor’westers) are frequent winter events that leave the 
farms without power for several days. In response, the farms have prepared to run 
without grid electricity for extended periods of time. A drought heavily impacted Farms 
A and B for three years before the earthquake. The farmers reduced the number of stock 
on Farm A in order to compensate for the reduced grazing. They do not use large-scale 
irrigation to maintain year-round grazing. On the drought impact to the livestock, a 
farmer commented: 
 “Three years of below average rain is the most recent activity. That has had a cascading effect because we 
had less animals when the earthquake hit. We were probably down 25 to 30 percent of our normal carrying 
capacity.”  
Rather than aggravating the effect of earthquake impacts, this decrease meant that 
economic losses were reduced. They also let go their part-time help, which helped 
economically, but put heavy strain on the farmer and their family as they picked up the 
full-time workload. The farmer commented that this was simply part of farming life: 
 “Family farming in New Zealand is a tale of survival. When drought hits you lose a lot of money and have to 
work harder and longer than before. During the recent drought I had to lay off our helper and worked 7 days 
a week for 9 months [.] But our land is precious to us it’s our Tūrangawaewae, its worth fighting for. our 
children are 5 generation, they are aware of the struggles and accept that its part of living here, it’s good for 
them to know that tough times are ahead. My wife and children did a massive amount of unpaid work during 
the drought.” 
The Farm B farmers’ strategy was to send their animals off farm for winter grazing. A 
coexistent downturn in dairy payouts increased available grazing land in the region. 
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Following the earthquakes, they were unable to repeat this drought strategy and 
struggled to adjust. 
Farm C has suffered historical flooding. The frequency of flood events used to be twice a 
year and a ten-year flood. The flood impacts were limited to grazing areas and fencing 
damage. As part of a community flood protection scheme, the farmers have built flood 
mitigation and put in planting that have reduced the frequency of floods.  
Both Farms A and B also have experienced annual landsliding and large historical 
landsliding. Most of the annual landsliding is induced by winter rain and is an expected 
occurrence. This pattern did not hold for the earthquake, creating frustration. A farmer 
found that slips occurred in new places: 
“I have seen 12 inches of rain in one day. That was a really significant rainstorm that created land movement. 
But that was more in places that you thought would slip. You know, steep slope with say little vegetation. 
Whereas, at the moment I drive ‘round and go ‘why the heck didn’t you move? And you did?’ That’s what I find 
interesting. And really annoying.”  
Although the farmer on Farm B had not experienced earthquakes effects, the farm had. 
An April 1923 cyclone reactivated a large landslide that had been triggered near the 
main dwelling by the 1922 M6.4 Motunau earthquake. The farmer was concerned that 
the 2016 earthquakes would reactivate this area of landsliding. This slope had issues as 
recent as 2004 when water seepage was observed. The family evacuated from the 
homestead and later investigations of the site concluded that the landslide had 
reactivated and the homestead was at risk. A farmer described the large landslide’s 
history: 
“There’s already historic landslide beside the house. That was triggered after an earthquake in Motunau in 
1922 or 23 [it was 1922]. And we had a massive rain event here in April of 19-, whatever year the earthquake 
was, the following year we had a massive rain even in April. We had 357 ml, I know that we had 700ml over 
that month. Because of the recordings, that was in 1924 I think is was [it was probably 1923] the recording 
back then recorded a month. We don’t know how much we got in one day or three days. At that time of the 
year, I’m imagining it’s a cyclonic event. Because March, April here in Canterbury or along the east coast we 
can get big tropical storms come in. The start in a south-easterly, north-easterly circle and then wherever they 
decide to sit they’ll dump. And we get those quite often here. And that’s my guess as to what was triggered in 
April. So, the hill’s rattled. It’s got some loosing of sediments. And the rains got into it.” 
Farmers gain relevant experience from hazard events because of what they can reveal 
or influence the farms’ hazard susceptibility. The annual cyclone and winter seasons 
have prepared farmers to manage their farms without essential services, such as power, 
provided from off-farm sources. 
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3.2.1.3  Type of farm, size, workforce 
The three farms represent different parts of the farming spectrum in the Hurunui 
District (Table 5). Their farm types, irrigation usage and hired staff influence how the 
farms were impacted. Their recovery priorities and resources also differed because of 
these factors. 
Table 5 Farm Type Characteristics. The stock class, presence of irrigation and on-farm workforce influenced initial impacts 
and recovery decisions. Note: part of Farm C is unirrigated. 
Farm Characteristics 
























Farms A and B are winter wet, summer dry farms, which means they are not irrigated 
and instead rely on the natural climate patterns to provide enough water for crop and 
fodder growth. Most of Farm C is irrigated. Its dry stock are kept on a section of 
unirrigated land called the runoff. 
Farms A and B hire contract or seasonal workers for drilling, weed removal and 
shearing.  These jobs typical take a couple of days and workers on Farm B take care of 
their own accommodation and travel. Before the earthquake, Farm A provided 
accommodation in the shearers’ quarters. Seasonal workers’ time on farm is typically 
weather dependent. For example, wet weather increases the length of time required for 
(seed) drilling. Farm A used to hire a part-time on-farm helper, but they let them go 
during the drought. The workload was picked up by the farmer and their family. Farm B 
hires a full-time worker from mid-April to the start of August every year to do 
maintenance during the winter season. Before the earthquake, Farm C had around ten 
full-time staff members who were mostly housed on-farm. Following the earthquake, all 
but one staff member was let go. The farm has since partially re-staffed. As of January 
2018, although the farm had returned to full operation, it was understaffed due to 
damaged staff accommodation. 
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Farm C, as a dairy farm and the largest full-time employer, was initially the most 
severely impacted by the earthquake. The immediate loss of functionality of their dairy 
shed put their cows at risk of developing life-threatening health problems. Swift 
relocation of the dairy herd saved their livestock. However, the loss of the dairy shed 
and staff housing damage reduced their ability to continue to employ their staff. The 
impact to staff on Farm B was less severe as their employment was mostly seasonal and 
their housing was off-farm. Only the timing of major jobs, impacted by the earthquake, 
on Farm B was changed.  
Farm A lost its shearers’ quarters and thus the ability to house staff on-farm. However, 
like Farm B, it mainly only hired seasonal employees, thus the impact to farm operation 
was minimal. Even so, the loss of the shearers’ quarters has limited the ability to bring 
in contractors for farm tasks and repair work. The repair speed of their other 
infrastructure and essential services has, in part, suffered as result. 
3.2.1.4  Farm infrastructure and essential services 
All three farms have vital infrastructure components that are necessary for the daily 
running of the farm (Table 6).  Each farm also relies on essential services (water, power, 
telecommunication and transportation). Primary economic infrastructure is a farms’ 
currently active complex that is essential for its main money producing activity. The 
farms have various types of housing (the main homestead and staff housing). Other 
infrastructure includes any other physical construction on the farm (e.g., fences, silos, 
stockyards). The organisation and resiliency of each of these components varies 









Table 6  The physical assets of farms are essential infrastructure and essential services. The primary economic infrastructure 
refers to the building or complex that is the main source of production on-farm. Essential infrastructure are the buildings 
and complexes. Essential services are the on- and nearby off-farm lifelines. 
Case Study Farm Essential Infrastructure and Services 
 























Spotty landline and 
poor mobile phone 
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Strong mobile phone 
reception 

















Spotty landline and 
strong mobile phone 
reception 
Close main off-farm 
road, tracks 
Farm B is on the county water scheme. This is a gravity fed system sourced from the 
Waiau River. The water is stored in several reservoirs and tanks on the property. The 
farm received around 12 or 13 units a day. Each unit is 1800 litres, which equates to a 
total on-farm use of about 21600-23400 litres a day. The farm uses dams at the base of 
gullies to act as sediment traps for storm water. The county water scheme was badly 
damaged by the earthquake when many water tanks located on high ridges and buried 
water pipes were damaged (Hughes et al. 2017) . 
The water sources for both Farms A and Farm C are located on their properties. Farm C 
has a couple of shallow wells due to its proximity to the Waiau River. Before the 
earthquake, Farm C had a generator powerful enough to run the dairy shed or the 
irrigation system. The generator allowed them to restore their water access before the 
main powerlines were repaired. Farm A gets its water by pumping from springs on the 
property. Much of this infrastructure was damaged during the earthquake. A new 
system took several months to install. 
All of Farm A’s main buildings are clustered together with the stockyards on the only 
flat section of land. Farm C’s main buildings are clustered near the river. Farm B’s main 
infrastructure is also clustered in a small section of the farm, but they also have 




Farm C’s dairy shed repair was more urgent because it is used daily 10 months of the 
year compared to Farms A and B’s woolsheds which are used for several days 1 to 3 
times a year. 
Without infrastructure a farm is just a piece of land. A farm’s ability to be economically 
viable and perform the basic tasks of animal husbandry are reduced when vital 
infrastructure and services are damaged or disrupted. The various farm infrastructure 
found on each farm reacted differently to the earthquake shaking and coseismic 
hazards. The observed variations in damage were a result of infrastructure location, 
ground conditions and construction materials. The daily reliance on the dairy shed on 
Farm C, versus the seasonal use of the woolshed on the other two farms, raised the 
repair urgency at this location. Essential services were impacted across all three farms, 
but recovery rates varied based on farm location and essential service source. 
Regardless, all three benefits from having lifeline backup systems, such as generators. 
3.2.2  Annual Calendar 
The annual calendar for a farm contains all of the important farming activities (Figure 
6). These include animal husbandry (e.g., lambing), crop-related (e.g., drilling) and other 
maintenance tasks. These are frequently seasonal and variously weather dependent 
tasks. The earthquake in late 2016 and the weather events in 2017 impacted the 








Farms A and B, which are both sheep and beef farms, do not have identical annual 
calendars (Figure 6). Most of their major seasonal work occurs at roughly the same 
time. Their essential farm practices involving animal husbandry make up the bulk of the 
work. Several sheep-related farming activities were disrupted by earthquake and 
attendant coseismic hazards. The sheep have a much more seasonally-dependent 
Figure 6 The annual calendar of the farm contains all of the important farm jobs. These jobs are seasonal. Solid lines 
indicate the normal time for the noted task. If a job was skipped or shifted, they appear twice. Dashed or greyed lines 
indicate a job occurred, but at a different time than typical. Dash-n-dot lines indicates jobs that were skipped during 
2017. Farm A marks the change between their wet and dry seasons. Farm C has two calendars, 1 is the milking platform 
and 2 is the runoff. 
Farm C (1) 
Farm A Farm B 
Farm C (2) 
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schedule than the cattle.   The woolsheds on both Farms A and B were damaged by the 
earthquake. The Farm A farmers initially borrowed a neighbour’s woolshed to complete 
their tailing. The Farm B farmers were able to perform emergency repairs, but the 
woolshed repair delays moved their normal shearing time from May to August. The 
delay also caused changes to a number of smaller woolshed dependent activities, such 
as dipping for lice. The farmers resorted to using dry chemical instead of water-based 
ones. Dry chemicals have a longer withhold period to sell off animal meat. Thus, there 
was a knock-on effect of delayed wool and meat sales, which ultimately decreased the 
realised sale price. However, the majority of Farm B’s activity offset was not 
earthquake-related but was shifted or skipped seasonal plantings and delayed lamb 
weaning due to unfavourable climate conditions. Farm A had two periods of sheep 
conception due to earthquake damage. Rams from a neighbouring farm entered Farm A 
through a damaged boundary fence. Coupled with their normal conception time in April, 
Farm A had a longer lambing period. 
Farm C has two calendars (Figure 6) because the milking platform and the runoff 
operate almost independently of each other. The activities on the milking platform were 
disrupted by initial earthquake damage from November and persisted through the first 
half of 2017. Artificial Insemination (A.I.) was in progress at the time of the 2016 
earthquakes. The Farm C farmers had to rely on other farmers to continue the process 
for them. As the milking shed needed to be completely rebuilt and the cows had been 
shipped off farm, the farm missed out on milking for seven months. None of the 
essential runoff activities were disrupted, even though there was damage to the water 
and fencing infrastructure.  
Farm type is a factor in the level and type of disruption an earthquake has on a farm’s 
calendar. Dairy farms are completely dependent on their dairy shed’s ability to function 
because it is used daily for most of the year. The loss of the dairy shed halted the Farm C 
farmers’ ability to operate on their milking platform. In contrast, the farmers of Farms A 
and B were able to work around their damaged woolsheds because they have seasonally 
variant use. Their farming practices were disrupted, but they were more easily able to 
adapt. Assistance from neighbours helped all of the farms complete vital farm tasks by 
lending them the use of their undamaged infrastructure and equipment. 
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3.2.3  Impact and Recovery Timelines 
Table 7 Key pre- and post-earthquake impact and recovery event timeline through January 2018. 
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Over the fourteen months covered by the interviews, each farm recovered from the 
impacts of the 14th November earthquake at varying rates (Table 7). The impacts of 
some events were experienced across each farm: the earthquake, large storm events 
and government interventions. The first six weeks following the November 2016 
earthquake saw the most intense recovery for all three farms. The pathways for 
recovery diverged for each farm once emergency repairs were completed and individual 
long-term recovery priorities emerged. 
Differing pre-earthquake decisions and practices on each farm influenced the initial 
earthquake’s impacts. A three-year drought heavily impacted Farms A and B. The 
drought impact to Farm C was minimal because the farmers were able to continue to 
irrigate their fields. The Farm A and B farmers had decreased their stock to reduce the 
impact of the drought. Even so, the years of drought had caused significant economic 
losses. The farmers on both farms upgraded their water and fencing infrastructure 
during the drought. The Farm A farmers invested several thousand dollars upgrading 
their infrastructure. The Farm B farmers installed new water systems in part of the farm 
to manage the effects of drought. 
Immediately following the earthquake, on all three farms buildings were evacuated.   
Family, staff and neighbours gathered together to evaluate the immediate post-
earthquake situation. Farm C had the largest initial response to the earthquake. Its dairy 
shed’s loss of functionality meant that all one thousand milking cows needed to be 
evacuated to other farms throughout North Canterbury. The dairy cow evacuation was 
facilitated by a team including the farmers’ farm advisor and bank manager. Within 48 
hours all the dairy cows had been settled onto other dairy farms in North Canterbury 
within dairy sheds similar to Farm C’s. The task was made more difficult by damage to 
the main road, poor telecommunications and the fact that dairy cows are reluctant to 
use dairy sheds that are different from what they are used to. Thus, the receiving farms 
for the displaced herd were required to have rotary milking sheds that rotated in the 
same direction as the shed that had been damaged on Farm C. 
After those first 48 hours, the priorities of the three farms became similar: restoring 
power, water and road access. Farm C, on river terraces near a major town, had these 
restored the quickest. The Farm A farmers stayed with family for the first few days due 
to the power and water access being immediately lost. The majority of their roads and 
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tracks were damaged or destroyed. The woolshed was damaged and left without power, 
so the farm was unable to use it to complete planned shearing. Instead they were able to 
use their neighbours’ woolshed. The job of walking the sheep to the neighbour’s 
woolshed and shearing them took several days.  
Following the earthquakes, the Farm B farmers immediately evacuated into a caravan 
and due to the damage to the house and risk posed by a slope that had a history of 
instability. They never moved back into their house. They lived in a campervan for 
several months before settling into a Rawhiti cottage in May. The Rawhiti cottage was 
sold to them at a discounted rate by MBIE. Farm B was also severely damaged across 
the farm. Surface ruptures across the farm damaged paddocks and the power supply, 
and killed many sheep and some cattle both during the initial earthquake and in the 
following weeks and months. The farmers began construction on a shed-house that they 
were able to move into in October.   
Farm C has its own wells and with the use of a generator its time without water was 
short. Power was restored within a couple of days. In the meantime, the farmers were 
able to use their generator to power a few houses and the wells. Despite the swift 
restoration of essential services (e.g., the main road was repaired within six weeks), 
Farm C’s dairy shed loss meant that the farmers missed out on most of the milking 
season and had to let go all but one of their staff. The farmers were able to take 
advantage of MBIE fund to pay their employees during the interim between losing the 
milking shed and letting them go. They also applied to and received money from MPI’s 
uninsurable fund to cover their fencing damage.  
Unlike Farms A and B, Farm C did not experience on-going hazard events stemming 
from this earthquake. Farm A’s water access, fences and flood gates were damaged 
several times by reactivated landslides and landslide dams bursting. Farm B’s 
homestead was at imminent risk from a reactivated landslide. Both continue to have 
landsliding across their properties. All three farms have seen changes to their drainage 
patterns.  
The speed with which insurance applications were settled also varied between the 
farms. Farm B’s insurance was not settled until November 2017. The insurance 
resolution delay kept the woolshed unusable until August, which led to a delay in 
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shearing sheep and sales. Without water the farmer had to resort to using dry solutions 
to dip their sheep. The use of dry solution chemicals decreased their meat prices by 
delaying the time they could send the meat to market. Any delay in selling decreases the 
price the farmer can get. Farm C’s insurance was very quick to assist with the dairy shed 
rebuild. As of January 2018, the settlements for the damaged staff houses were still on-
going, but despite the farm’s smaller-than-optimal staffing option, the restoration of 
staff accommodation buildings is not a priority. Farm A which had only minor write-off 





























Figure 9 Block models demonstrating the major geological, infrastructure and service changes pre-, immediately post- and over fourteen months of recovery on Farm C. 
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3.2.3.1  Key Events Timeline Summary 
The condition of the farms at the time of the earthquake influenced how they were 
impacted geologically and economically. The Farm A and B farmers had to deal with 
capital and livestock death issues steaming from the droughts and recent infrastructure 
upgrades. Both farms also experienced landslide reactivation. During the initial phrases 
of recovery, all of the farms priorities were roughly the same: life (of humans and 
livestock); lifelines, power and water restoration; and then infrastructure repair. Farms 
A and B experienced on-going or cascading hazards while Farm C did not. This was due 
to the topographic and geological variations between the farms. The farmers repaired 
their infrastructure and essential services at various speeds based on insurance 
resolution timing, capital availability and priority. 
3.3  Case Studies Summary 
The case studies in this thesis are three Hurunui District farms significantly impacted by 
the Kaikōura/Hurunui Earthquake Sequence (Figure 7, Figure 8 Figure 9). They are an 
extensive hill country sheep and beef farm (Farm A), a steep hill sheep and beef farm 
(Farm B) and a flat river terrace dairy farm (Farm C). The farm characteristics 
influenced initial and on-going impacts. The differing topography on each farm varied 
the occurrence of on-going geohazards. Farmer hazard experience increased resiliency 
across all three farms, particularly during long-term climate events. Farmers applied 
lessons from these events to develop infrastructure and service backups that increased 
resiliency. Initial recovery is rapid emergency repairs with similar priorities (life, power 
and water) for all the farms. After the initial recovery slows down, the speed and 





Chapter 4  Analysis 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter explores five themes encompassing the key issues and aspects of farm 
impacts and recovery drawn from the case study interviews: Pre-existing conditions, 
Earthquake Impacts on Physical Environment, Essential Assets, Human Factors, and 
Economic Factors. The themes were developed from analysis of the case study 
interviews and previous literature (e.g., Craig et al. 2016a; Farmar-Bowers & Lane 2009; 
Whitman et al. 2013). These themes interact with the impact and recovery timeline of 
each farm. The factors identified through the themes contribute to the vulnerability, 
exposure and resilience of the farms and farmers before the earthquakes; evolve over 
the course of the earthquake and recovery timeline; and future plans, goals and changes. 
Each theme section explains how that particular theme relates to farm impact and 
recovery in detail with key quotes and anecdotes. Section 4.2-4.6 contain the analysis 
and breakdown of the five themes. Section 4.7 discusses the impact and recovery 
timeline of the case study farms. Section 4.8 details the future plans and approaches of 
the case study farms. Section 4.9 summarises the key findings and recommendations 
from each theme and the timelines. 
4.2  Pre-existing Conditions 
Pre-existing conditions refer to major physical factors that influence the vulnerability, 
expose and preparedness of the farm pre-earthquake. Three major factors are: regional 
climate trends, farm geography and geology, and farmer experience. Pre-existing 
conditions may magnify or reduce the effects of the earthquake and related hazards, 
and influence recovery. 
4.2.1  Climate 
The influence of climate largely outside the scope of the farmer’s control. The regional 
effect of climate trends can limit resources. However, major climate issues (e.g. 
droughts, cyclones) may trigger an influx of resources into the region through 
government or NGO aid. Seasonal weather and farm priority changes also contribute to 
farm vulnerability. The time of year can adjust farm characteristics and resilience. 
Climate effects available resources and geohazard probabilities. 
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In 2015, a drought was declared in North Canterbury that continued through 2016 
(Environment Canterbury 2016). Farmers make a variety of management and business 
decisions in order to survive the drought. The drought also effects the soil properties; 
reduced soil moisture increases effective stress and generally reduces the probability of 
a slope to undergo landsliding. Farms A and B were significantly affected by the 
drought. One farmer commented the following on their on-going dry weather: 
“…We were as dry as we had ever been in December [2017], in the last four years, we were just dry. Obviously, 
the whole country is dry. We’ve had some unusual rain and that’s sort of relieved the pressure. The big things 
are: you’ve got less animals, prices are higher this year and we aren’t able to capitalise on those prices. So, 
costs you when you sell those animals because you sell them cheaply. Like this year we sold some ewes, we 
probably averaged 140 dollars. At the high of the drought, I think we sold them for forty dollars. Supply and 
demand now. So, you’re at the bottleneck of the drought now because people are starting to rebuild because 
the optimism restores itself. Grass comes and people have to restock, they sold low and they have to buy high.” 
Farm A’s business decisions during the drought lessened the financial blow of the 
earthquake in an unexpected way. A farmer commented that their drought strategy of 
stock reduction also reduced earthquake impact: 
“Three years of below average rain is the most recent activity. That has had a cascading effect because we had 
less animals when the earthquake hit. We were probably down 25 to 30 percent of our normal carrying 
capacity. That allowed us to open the gates and let the animals find a drink as opposed to a more complex 
management system were you’re trying to maximise grass grown and output. So, from a livestock perspective 
the pressure was greatly reduced, which allowed us to focus on fixing stuff. And then our income doesn’t seem 
to have been compromised too much. So, that was really pleasing to maintain the cash flow of the business. It 
would’ve been different if my flats had been covered in barley and I had to harvest them with a harvester. 
That would’ve been major.” 
Climate and weather influences earthquake-related geohazard probability as well. The 
soil type and moisture content influences the degree of landsliding. The severity of on-
going hazards varies in part due to the seasonal changes following the earthquake. The 
time of year that the earthquake occurs influences the severity of the coseismic hazards. 
On the seasonal changes to Farm A, a farmer commented: 
 “Generally, you could probably divide us through there and that would be wetter, that would be drier. That’s 
just how this farm operates and with our soils it’s like ice. When you get clay tires and clay ground you just 
slide. And obviously that blue subsoil stuff is really friable. That’s where we tend to get the slips. We are a 
pretty simple system.” 
This farmer predicted that the relatively dry climate and time of year saved Farm A 
from more severe damage: 
“I reckon that if we’d had got that earthquake like now [August 2017] or if we’d had it in a really wet summer 
and the ground was water logged anyway the topsoil and the clay- Cause we’re so clay based up here and 
parpari clay and stuff. You’ve got this water that lubricated the topsoil and the clay ‘cause we get slip up here 
anyway. Quite big ones. It just gets waterlogged and it falls off. If we’d have got that earthquake at a different 
time of the year or when rain levels had been at averages, or slightly above, I think the scope of damage would 
have been horrific.” 
The farmer’s preparedness and ability to react changes depending on the time of year as 
well. Farm A believes that the earthquake occurred at the best possible time for their 
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farm. It did not to interrupt essential tasks and their equipment was readily available to 
begin repairs. The farmer commented: 
 “The likes of my tractor would be engaged everyday feeding out hay and getting me to and fro but because all 
that had been done, in November my tractor was free and I could use it to help fix things.”  
4.2.2  Geography and Geology 
The geographical and geological characteristics of the farm influence its vulnerability to 
geohazards and resilience. These environmental aspects of each farm control the 
magnitude of earthquake experience, the initial coseismic hazards and on-going 
hazards. See Section 3.2.1.1  for an overview of each farm’s physical characteristics.  
The key aspects of a farm’s physical environment that influence geohazard occurrence 
and severity are: topography, and soil and bedrock characteristics. Topography 
influences the type and magnitude of earthquake triggered hazards. Farms A and B have 
steep hills and experienced a greater degree of landsliding than Farm C, which is low 
relief. Farm C, on a river terrace, had more liquefaction than the other two farms 
because it has the most saturated sandy soil.  
The Farm A farmers credits their geographical isolation with aiding the development of 
their resilient attitude and essential service back-ups (Section 4.4.2 ). The three farms 
are aware of their relative isolation due to being in rural rather than urban 
environments. They have built forms of resilience (e.g., generators, digital-based 
communication systems) into their farms in response to this awareness. 
4.2.3  Experience 
Farmer experience is the most important pre-earthquake resilience factor. It shapes 
pre-earthquake and recovery decisions. Experience refers to the knowledge farmers 
have with regards to how to run and operate their farms. According to Folke et al. 
(2003), “combining different types of knowledge for learning” is one of the four factors 
that influence resilience. Farmar-Bowers & Lane (2009) described different types of 
knowledge, such as personal strength and outside influences, as part of the influencers 
of farm decision-systems. The experiences highlighted in the presented case studies fall 
into the categories of lifetime experience, occupational experience and spatial 
experience (Table 8). Lifetime experience is closely connected to a farmer’s age. 
Occupational experience is a farmer’s knowledge of farming. This knowledge may have 
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been gained from other farmers or when working on other farms, as well as their own. 
Spatial experience is a farmer’s knowledge of their particular farm and land.  
Hazard/disaster experience is context specific and is divided amongst the experience 
categories. Community memory and knowledge has been related to reduced disaster-
related deaths (Berkes 2007). Berkes (2007) also found that diversification of 
knowledge sources increases resilience, whether it is multiple forms of experience or 
the adding of local case studies to the area of global science. 
Table 8 Farmer experience in three categories: lifetime, occupational and spatial. Lifetime experience refers to general life 
knowledge (e.g. patience and coping mechanisms). Occupational experience refers to experience with the specific type of 
farming the farmer is currently active in (dairy or sheep and beef). Spatial experience refers to experience with their 
particular farm/property. Low (>10 years), Medium (10-20 years), High (<20 years).  Farm A are young farmers who have 
been working in sheep and beef on their farm for just over ten years, but the farm has been in the family for almost 100. 
Farm B are also young farmers who have been working in sheep and beef on their farm for just over ten years and are new 
to their land. Farm C has a lifetime of experience on their farm, but has only recently switched to dairy. 
Farmer Experience 
  Lifetime Occupational Spatial 
Farm A Medium Medium High 
Farm B Medium Medium Low 
Farm C High Low High 
 
4.2.3.1  Lifetime Experience 
Lifetime experience is gained over time and can also be referred to as common wisdom. 
This experience is not farming specific but can be applied to farming. Lifetime lessons 
teach patience, resilience and coping mechanisms for difficult long-term situations.   
Farm C has the oldest of the farmers and consequently the largest pool of lifetime 
experience. They credit their age and experience with giving them stress reducing 
patience and perspective. One of the farmers commented: 
 “…being a bit older and a bit more experienced, we are reasonably resourceful and think that’s very 
important…Younger people expect more than we do. And I think that’s helped me and us get through that, 
hasn’t it? Puts it in perspective, it’s only an earthquake. We’re still here. We can go down the pub and have a 
beer on Friday. We aren’t in Syria and getting bombed every night. So, when you put it down, it’s a big event 
for us and I don’t want to go through another one, but it’s not the end.” 
Living through adverse periods is an accelerated way of gaining this type of experience 
and it can shape perspective and coping mechanisms. Farms A and B survived through a 




“After three years of drought, you’re either into it for the long haul or not. And you just hope that you’re in it 
long enough to pay the money back.” 
The drought made the Farm A farmers’ approach to farming more conservative. This 
approach may pay off if they avoid losing money in risky financial endeavours but may 
also limit their flexibility and mean they miss out on potentially lucrative ventures. One 
farmer says their mentality might go against the common diversify advice, but not 
everyone would agree. They described their conservative approach to drought survival 
as a more traditional approach to risk management: 
 “Three years of drought is, obviously, a lot time. It’s almost like doing a degree in how to survive droughts. 
You tend to come out the other side of it as quite conservative. I was always told that if you could afford to 
diversify not to. That’s probably the opposite of what a lot of people say. Don’t put all your eggs in one basket. 
But, an old guy said, ‘If you’ve only got one ball to juggle, you probably won’t drop it.’ There’s all that sort of 
risk management.” 
Whether from gained age or living through difficult times like drought, lifetime 
experience can benefit a farmer’s mental and emotional response to a disaster. This 
experience is transmitted through the advice and stories of other farmers who have 
been in similar situations. Strong farming community and family networks allow 
farmers to use each other’s experience. 
4.2.3.2  Occupational Experience 
Occupational experience refers to a farmer’s experience with their specific type of 
farming. Dairy farms and sheep and beef farms do not operate the same, so while there 
is some experience overlap, experience of one does not equate to experience with the 
other. Farm C had been a sheep farm for decades but had only been a dairy farm for nine 
years. Therefore its farmers have lower occupational experience than the other two sets 
of farmers. 
As with the Farm A farmers, the Farm B farmers have had the experience of farming 
through a drought. They found that they had learned quick adaptability. This ability 
came from knowing their type of farming well enough to improvise plans. One farmer 
said: 
 “…we’d learnt from the previous two years that you make some quick decisions and- So, we were back in 
drought mode and we were starting to sell some capital stock and looking at grazing out. And then, like in the 
blink of an eye, it just changed. We were really lucky. Before we’d had to put some of those plans too deeply in 
place, we went back to sort of a normal autumn." 
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This flexibility was also applied to manage the variable soil conditions in the year 
following the earthquake that were climate related. There were periods when the soil 
was hard and dry and other when it was water logged. 
A Farm A farmer has also learned a day-to-day adaptive managing style. The farmer 
described this flexible style: 
“Yeah, I probably farm in my fingertips. You know, I don’t go to bed the night before with a list. Again, because 
I’m only dealing with myself. I mean today, this morning, I spent half an hour with the fencing contractors. 
Last night I did today’s work, so I could have a sit down with you guys. And this afternoon I’ll deliver some 
materials to the contractors. And then I’ll go and feed the animals so I can have tomorrow off. So, I basically 
only get one day off in a weekend if I’m lucky. I’ve increased my employment. I’ve employed a guy just to do a 
lot of the stuff that I was doing day to day and that frees me up to deal with the contractors.” 
Sometimes farming experience is not helpful. A Farm A farmer commented that water 
pipe wisdom did not apply in earthquake situations: 
"I love all those things. ‘You always bury your water pipe as deep are you can.’ All the pipes on top of the 
surface are fine. It’s all the stuff we buried that’s buggered. I don’t’ mind that because it just tells me that you 
can’t win sometimes and that’s ok.” 
Occupational experience is knowing what does and does not work for a particular type 
of farming. It shapes the management style the farmer uses. When an event is far 
outside a farmer’s experience and the experiences of those they’ve learned from, then 
impacts can be worsened or recovery can be negatively affected. 
4.2.3.3  Spatial Experience 
Spatial experience is a farmer’s knowledge about their particular farmland. It might 
come from years of working that land or from previous owners. An earthquake 
reshapes land in ways that can make spatial experience useless. At the same time having 
spatial experience aids in knowing how an earthquake might trigger a hazard cascade. 
Not all spatial experience is advantageous. 
4.2.3.3.1  Experience Source 
Spatial experience can come from living and working on a farm or from the records of 
previous owners. Farm A and C have been in the current farmers’ families for decades. 
The Farm B farmers are relatively new to their land, but they have access to decades of 
the records from previous owners. 
The Farm A farmers credits the amount of time they have spent farming and in 
particular farming their farm for limiting the stress and panic they experienced. Their 
recognition of their isolated location means that they have taken steps to become more 
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self-sufficient (Section 4.4.2.4 ). One farmer commented the following about their 
confidence: 
“But I had twelve years of being in control of this farm. If this had happened in my first one or two years, I 
think my response might have been a lot more maybe emotional even. Just stressful. I just got a lot more 
experience with the property and knowledge about what’s going on and what I can handle. So, from a 
personal perspective, I think that helped.” 
The Farm A farmers have nearly a century of family history and experience with their 
land. They said: 
“But after 97 years, we seem to know what works. And it’s generally a sheep dominated system.” 
The Farm B farmers do not have the years of family experience that the Farm A and C 
farmers have. Therefore, there were plenty of systems whose locations they were 
unsure of because they did not personally put them in. A farmer mentioned how this 
impacted emergency repairs: 
“Lucky, we had been here for quite a lot time before the earthquake and I had a rough idea where all the pipe 
lines were. I knew where some of them were because we had fixed them or put them in, but we were three 
weeks with a digger after the earthquake." 
Despite the disadvantage of not having lived on Farm B for their whole life, these 
farmers were still able to tap into farm-specific knowledge. In the case of Farm B, 
previous owners have left detailed weather records. So, they have the benefit of one 
hundred years of rainfall records for their property. These have allowed them to be 
aware of and prepare for climate trends. The farmer described these records: 
“When we’ve gone through a dry spell and we have averages. We have rainfall data from the neighbour back 
to 1907 have been recorded and there’s even a MetService weather station up there. So, the last sixty or so 
years, it’s been recorded not just farmer’s readings, but it’s been officially recorded. That when you get 
averages and you can see from the last hundred and ten years, whatever it was, we did get these really dry 
spells, but it’ll make up for it. You’ll get a really wet spell. And that’s exactly what happened last winter. “ 
On Farm C, one farmer had had the benefit of more than one lifetime of farming 
experience on the property, growing up these to take over from his father. Of their on-
farm experience, the farmers said: 
Farmer C1: “I think it’s just experience. We know what this farm does well. And we employ staff and they all 
come in with their own ideas, but we’re quite adamant now we know what this farm does and we’ll stick to 
that rather than chopping with different people’s views.” 
Farmer C2: “Use as much technologies as we can and things like that, but the basic systems we stick mighty 
close to them.” 
4.2.3.3.2  Farm Hazard Experience 
Earthquakes can change the landscape dramatically. Normal hazard zones can be 
deactivated and new hazards can form. This challenges how well a farmer can plan for 
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cascading hazards because some of their spatial knowledge may have become obsolete. 
This was the experience on Farm A when the land that years of experience had taught 
them was slip-prone was not the land to slip during the earthquake. These farmers now 
perceive their land to be more prone to landsliding and shaking damage than before due 
to the earthquake. A Farm A farmer described how this unease influences their 
understanding of risk: 
 “But then you see your flat paddocks up the flats dropped off and then you’ve got these fault ruptures and 
they are forming pies, which to me is a bit freaky. And then just the loosening. I just think everything has just 
been loosened. Even though it might not move now, it’s probably going to move at some stage and even a 
smaller event in the future doesn’t need to work as much to move things. The big work’s been done. 
Everything’s been separated. You might get a 5 or a 6 in 20…thousand years’ time. Gets back to that 
classification of faults whether it’s a 400-year fault or the probability of things. I just feel as though in the 
future, we might be on the outside of big event, but because we are so shaken and loosened here, we may 
experience more here because of that. That would be my logic.  
That’s where I am really concerned personally about the woolshed site. Is that it’s more the cascading effect of 
another event now.” 
Floods, unlike earthquake, are easier to predict and mitigate. Farm C was impacted by 
twice yearly and ten-year floods. The local community flood mitigation scheme has 
successfully reduced the frequency of these events. 
4.2.4  Pre-existing Conditions Summary 
Many of the pre-existing conditions fall outside the farmer’s and even outside forces’ 
realms of influence (e.g., climate). Knowing what the pre-existing conditions are (i.e. the 
geohazard influencing environmental characteristics) and vulnerability of the farm to 
earthquakes ahead of time allows for better preparedness. Experience does not change 
the impact of an earthquake, but it can influence both how a farmer reacts, and rates of 
post-earthquake recovery. The different types of experience are acquired in different 
temporal and spatial senses, but they combine to shape a farmer’s response. The most 
organic way to gain experience is with the passage of time. However, these experiences 
can be learned from other people. Spatial specific experience can be gained from the 
farm’s previous farmers through records, journals or family conversations. 
Occupational experience can be gained from field experts and training courses. Lifetime 
experience can be transferred through conversations with family and the community. 





4.3  Physical Environment 
When the earthquakes struck they shook the land and infrastructure of the farms. 
Numerous coseismic hazards were triggered. Liquefaction and lateral spreading 
occurred in the saturated, sandy river sediments. The ground warped and deformed. 
Over 10,000 landslides formed, many of which slid into rivers to form landslide dams 
(Massey et al. 2018). Some of these landslide dams burst multiple times over the course 
of the following few months. A few have since formed permanent lakes. Rockfall 
occurred on many of the areas hills and cliffs. The farms directly on the activated fault 
lines had surface ruptures of up to 9m vertical and 11m horizontal (Litchfield et al. 
2018) . The occurrence of these hazards was not just limited to the time of the 
earthquake. Over the course of the year, several of these hazards reactivated, further 
damaging infrastructure and undoing repair work. These cascading hazards became a 
distinct obstacle in the farm planning efforts moving forward. 
4.3.1  Liquefaction and Lateral Spreading 
Liquefaction and lateral spreading was restricted to the saturated, near river sediments. 
Liquefaction was not as widespread an issue on the South Island as it was during the 
CES (Stringer et al. 2017). Most damage was on river terrace farms like Farm C (Figure 
10). 
 
Figure 10 The impacts of lateral spreading on bridge abutments and road near Waiau. Photographs by C. Fenton (18 
November 2016). 
Farm C’s dairy shed was within the flood plain of a wide river. Lateral spreading 
beneath it cracked the foundation and made the shed non-functional. The farmers 
reported boulders had been jettisoned out of the river sediments as well. Several of 
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their paddocks were damaged so badly that they needed to be reflattened. A farmer 
said: 
 “We got more so down on the dairy shed was, on the flat down there. It’s boulders underneath, so we got 
boulder-faction. Little heaps of boulders came up, so we had to heavy roll the whole place.” 
Farm C’s main off-farm road was damaged by liquefaction and was impassable for several weeks.  
4.3.2  Landslides 
Landslides formed across the hilly and mountainous landscape. They broke fences, 
buried livestock and slid into rivers to create dams.  
 
Figure 11 Landsliding in the Hurunui District. Note the fence damage in the middle of the image. Photograph by C. Fenton 
(13 December 2016). 
Farm C, on flat river terraces, was the least affected by landslides. There was minor 
landsliding on the edge of its terraces that damaged the on-farm roads and a pivot 
irrigator.  
Several landslides formed on Farm B. A large landslide above the homestead 
reactivated. In response, the farmers evacuated their homestead and spent most of the 
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year following the earthquake setting up a permanent house on another part of the 
property. 
Most of Farm A’s landslides damaged fences and paddocks. Part of its flat land dropped 
as landslides formed. The farmers have fenced off sections of land against stock use due 
to the increased risk. The woolshed is immediately adjacent to an area of slope failure 
and surface rupture. 
The largest landslide on Farm A formed a landslide dam on the main river creating a 
lake that persists to date. 
4.3.3  Landslide dams 
Landslide dams form when landslides block rivers. They frequently form lakes. The 
main risk from landslide dams is that they will eventually fail by overtopping breach. 
When this occurs, the immediate downstream area will flood and can possibly be 
subject to significant scour and/or sedimentation. Larger landslide dams may burst 




Figure 12 Landslide dam and impounded lake on the Stanton River, Hurunui District. Photograph by C. Fenton (13 December 
2016). 
Only Farm A was directly impacted by a landslide dam. The farmers heard the large 
landslide forming within the first two minutes of the earthquake. Farm A’s pump shed 
was buried by the initial landslide. The pump and generator was restored downstream 
by mid-January. A month later, the lake overtopped the landslide dam. The downstream 
area was flooded and the new pump and generator were buried. The fences and flood 
gates were damaged during every overtopping event. One farmer described the extent 
of the damage:  
“So, on the 15th of February when the dam overflowed. We lost our pump and generator that was pumping 
water out of the river. So, that sort of left it in a precarious position….and then the underground pipe. We 
towed an underground pipe in, which wasn’t towed in deep enough, even though we had a 30-ton digger. That 
was washed out and damaged when the flood water came through. So, we’ve actually lost our spring ‘cause 
that pipes been damaged.” 
The breaching of the landslide dam lake also formed a second smaller lake downstream. 
In the aftermath of a Cyclones Cook and Debbie in April, this smaller lake also breached. 




 “[When Lake Ray burst on the 16th/17th April,] I got a whole new level of damage to my fences and flood 
gates. And luckily, we did get some insurance because we’re covered for flooding, but not earthquake. So, we 
got some money out of the insurance company for that.” 
The surface of Farm A’s earthquake-formed lake has changed elevation since formation, 
but it appears to have stabilised by January 2018. 
4.3.4  Rockfall 
In comparison to landsliding, rockfall was only a minor issue on the hilly farms. A Farm 
B farmer is the only one to have specifically mentioned it. They chose to cancel an event 
due to the risk. 
 
Figure 13 Rockfall onto and partially blocking a farm access road in Hurunui District. Photograph by C. Fenton (16 
November 2016). 
4.3.5  Surface Ruptures 
Besides landslides, surface fault ruptures were the most dramatic geological hazards. 
The surface ruptures offset fences, paddocks and buildings. On the farms, at least one 
building was destroyed by surface ruptures. Several others suffered significant damage 
form fault-related ground displacement (Van Dissen et al. 2018). 
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Farm A’s shearers’ quarters was offset by a surface rupture, which rendered it 
uninhabitable. The same surface rupture was proximal to their woolshed. 
Pipes and powerlines throughout the farms were offset and broken by the surface 
ruptures. Surface ruptures developed through Farm B’s woolshed stockyard. Surface 
rupture raised the land by 1.5m beneath the last power pole before the woolshed. The 
decreased clearance meant that the power had to be disconnected until a new line could 
be installed.  
 
Figure 14 Surface ruptures damaging fences and gates. Differential ground displacement damages gates and lifts fence 
posts and waratahs out of the ground. Photographs by C. Fenton (11 January 2017 and 27 January 2017). 
4.3.6  Ground Deformation 
The faults deformed and warped the ground on all of the farms. In response various 
physical assets of the farms moved or were damaged. Fences and pipes, as long 
connected units, were the most prone to damage. Land levels changed as a result of fault 




Figure 15 Flooding in paddock and tilted powerlines due to liquefaction-induced ground deformation along the Waiau River 
floodplain. Photography by C. Fenton (28 November 2016). 
The main road to Farm A was further damaged during the winter rains. After three 
years of drought rainfall was occurring at normal winter levels, which combined with 
new drainage paths caused this additional damage. 
On Farm C changes to groundwater have been the longest continuing hazard. As one of 
the farmers commented in October 2017: 
 “I must say, out of that day, I’m still suffering ground damage. Where the quake has split the ground, there is 
a lot of water lying around where normally, I would be able to work those paddocks. I haven’t been yet. So, I 
think down the road there the water table seems higher at this stage. So, that’s affecting us a wee bit.” 
4.3.7  Geological Cascading Hazards 
Cascading hazards are a series of interlinked hazards that form over time and space 
(Pescaroli & Alexander 2016). Hazards can be triggered or reactivated by other 
geological hazards (e.g., earthquakes, landslides), weather and human activity. The 2017 
autumn cyclones and winter rains reactivated many landslides throughout the region. 
The landslide that reactivated behind the homestead on Farm B is an example of a long 
time period of hazard activation. The landslide was first recorded to have moved during 
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the 1922 Motunau earthquake and after a cyclone the following year. Farm A was also 
subject to cascading geological hazards. Their landslide dam burst several times. It 
created another smaller landslide dam lake, flooded the downstream area multiple 
times and reshaped the river’s course. Multiple hazards can combine over time to do 
further damage. For example, the return to normal winter rain levels after the reduced 
precipitation of the drought and earthquake changed drainage patterns that then 
damaged Farm A’s road. Cascading hazards must be taken into account for all future 
planning. As a Farm A farmer put it: 
 “Part of your mind set just not realising the next cascading thing. I think now I’m more aware of the next 
thing coming.” 
4.3.8  Physical Impacts Summary 
The initial and cascading geological hazards associated with the earthquakes both 
damage the infrastructure and essential services, and endanger lives on the farms. The 
internal and external resources of the farms are all employed to mitigate these hazards 
and maintain the function of the farm into the future. 
4.4  Essential Assets 
The essential assets of a farm are its infrastructure, services and livestock. The 
infrastructure encompasses the buildings and other structures on the farms. The 
essential services (e.g., water) are either delivered from off-farm or sourced on-farm. All 
three farms are mixed arable-livestock. Their livestock are their key economic 
resources. The earthquake and coseismic hazards directly impacted the farms’ essential 
assets. 
4.4.1  Essential Infrastructure  
The first concrete impact of the earthquakes is on farm infrastructure. Each farm has at 
least one primary economic infrastructure building (woolshed, dairy shed), a 
homestead and a collection of other infrastructure (e.g., staff houses, water tanks, sheds, 
fence, tracks). Damage or destruction of the primary economic infrastructure is an 
immediate concern to a farm’s stability. It may also be a threat to livestock health and 
safety. The impacts of a damaged or unsafe homestead can influence a farmer’s ability to 
mentally recover. Damage to or destruction of infrastructure such as water tanks, sheds, 
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fencing and tracks also has more than economic impact. It can impact employment 
capacities, essential service access, and livestock health and safety. 
4.4.1.1  Primary Economic Infrastructure 
Each of the three case study farms has only one currently operational primary economic 
infrastructure unit. Farms A and B both have woolsheds with surrounding stockyards. 
Farm C has a dairy shed, which includes milk storage tanks, and is also surrounded by 
stockyards. The earthquakes severely impacted the building complexes on all three 
farms. 
Woolsheds are used 2 or 3 times a year, which means that they are much lower 
occupancy buildings than dairy sheds, which are used daily for around 10 months of the 
year. However, when the woolsheds are being used they are high occupancy buildings 
full of contract workers and sheep. 
Farm A’s woolshed is situated on the small section of flat land on which most of its 
primary infrastructure is located. It is near the edge of a steep river valley. It was 
damaged by earthquake shaking and is in close proximity to surface rupture and 
landslides activated by the earthquakes. As of January 2018, the woolshed is still 
awaiting repair and declared unusable because the farmers have yet to reach an 
acceptable settlement for the shed. The farmers’ and insurers’ disagreement stems from 
the multiple hazard risks (surface rupture and landslides), building code classifications 
and wording of the insurance. 
Farm B’s woolshed is also situated on their small section of flat land. Surface ruptures 
went right through the stockyards outside the woolshed and uplifted the ground 
beneath its powerlines. The power was disabled until ground repairs could be made. 
The immediate concern was the completion of tailing. The farmer did emergency pre-
Christmas repairs to the stockyards in order to finish tailing. Like Farm A, Farm B’s 
woolshed repair was delayed due to postponed insurance resolution. Pre-Christmas 
discussions with contractors and insurance indicated that they would have a 
functioning woolshed by February, but after Christmas, this estimate changed to July. 
These delays disrupted normal animal husbandry practices and negatively impacted the 
year’s wool prices. 
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Farm C’s dairy shed is located on a river terrace several hundred metres from a river. 
The building complex includes stockyards, silos and milk storage tanks. The 
earthquakes caused the lateral spreading of the loose, saturated river sediments 
beneath the dairy shed. As morning approached on the day of the earthquake, the 
farmers realised that their milking shed was not going to be functional. The bulk of their 
initial energy was thrown into relocating their cows to various farms in North 
Canterbury that could milk them. Farm C’s insurance company played a large part in the 
rapid rebuilding of the dairy shed, which operational on July 28th. The process was also 
sped by the farmers spending the month of January researching dairy shed and builders, 
and a neighbour buying their old dairy platform. 
The damage and permanent disabling of primary infrastructure had significant impacts 
on the ability of the relevant farm to function and complete essential animal husbandry 
tasks. The loss of primary economic infrastructure also diminishes the financial return a 
farmer can receive if they chose to sell their farm in the aftermath of an earthquake. A 
sheep farm without a woolshed is just a piece of land. 
4.4.1.2  Homestead 
A farm without a homestead is not a home. All three sets of farmers live on their farms. 
None of the homesteads was significantly damaged as a direct result of the earthquakes, 
but one was declared uninhabitable due to imminent risk from a reactivated landslide. 
There is a significant mental/emotional impact during the recovery process. Damage 
and insurance delays with regards to homestead repair influence the ease at which 




Figure 16 Kekerengu fault surface rupture through a homestead in Clarence River Valley. Photograph by Nicola Litchfield 
(GNS). 
The homesteads on Farms A and C received minor content damage. On Farm A, the 
sewage system was cracked by earthquake shaking, but the damage was not considered 
severe until the winter rains about six or seven months later. Having mostly undamaged 
houses, helped Farms A and C recover. As a Farm C farmer commented: 
 “We were very lucky and if this house had been munted too that would have been a hell of a job. That would 
have been, mentally, really hard. But it was nice to come back at night to a nice warm house.” 
Farm B’s homestead received the same level of content damage as the other two farms. 
The situation was worsened by the reactivation of a nearby historic landslide. The 
farmers were aware of the danger and moved out of the house immediately. They 
described the impacts of the loss of their homestead: 
"We haven't slept back in the house at all from that day [the night of 13th of November], we slept in the 
caravan for probably two to three nights. We had a lady who [farmer’s family member] teaches with, her 
parents have a fifth wheeler. So, they brought that up for us and we parked that at the end of the lawn. And 
we lived in that until just before Christmas. They wanted it back to go camping…We had an old caravan; we 
purchased a new caravan that had a chemical toilet and a shower, hooked that up to the water. And we lived 
in that until the start of February. At that point [farmer’s family member] had had enough of caravanning, so 
she moved out with the kids, which was when they went back to school. She moved out with the kids and didn’t 
come back here until the middle of April, start of May when this got brought in [Rawhiti cottage]. So, we 
bought this as a unit and it came in on a truck. So, I lived by myself in the caravan from the start of February 
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until the middle of April, start of May. I’ve got a few days that I consider to be really happy, but one of the 
happiest days was when wife and kids came back. Baching by yourself after being married for eighteen years 
was quite cool for about for about two weeks and then it lost its [appeal].” 
The family on Farm B moved into a Rawhiti cottage purchased from the MBIE from 
April to October. The time in the cottage allowed them the time to consider their future 
recovery steps. They constructed a shed to be used as a three-bedroom home in August 
and were able to move in over school break in October. They also have plans to 
construct another larger homestead and keep the house shed as a guest house. The new 
housing allowed them to develop plans to hire a full-time employee and perhaps expand 
their economic profile by renting it out to vacationers. 
Damage to the homestead has significant impact on mental/emotional wellbeing. 
Conversely, having a safe home, even a temporary cottage, is enough to allow for clearer 
and calmer future planning. Outside organisations can help alleviate some of this stress 
by providing temporary housing. 
4.4.1.3  Fencing and Other Infrastructure 
Farms have a variety of infrastructure scattered across their farm, including: fences, 
essential service components like water tanks and obsolete or repurposed 
infrastructure. Damage to this infrastructure considerably adds to the overall cost, in 
time and money, of recovery, and can slow the repair of the main farm buildings. In 





Fences are the backbone of farming and directly related to land productivity. They are 
costly and time-consuming to construct and maintain. In the case of property boundary 
fences there is an additional cost from the need for detailed land surveying. Fences are 
designed with particular livestock in mind. Cattle fencing is the simplest as it uses one 
or two electrified lines. If the cattle are trained then the fence might still work if the 
power is down. Sheep fencing must be high enough that sheep cannot jump over and 
tight enough in weaving and to the ground to prevent the sheep escaping. Deer fencing, 
though not present on any of these farms, is like a much taller version of sheep fencing. 
The fence’s complexity changes how easily it can be repaired and how much it’s repair 
is a priority for the farmer. Prices for fences vary depending on type and topography 
(The AgriBusiness Group 2016).  
All three farms experienced varying degrees of damage to fencing. As almost a third of a 
million dollars had been spent to upgrade Farm A’s fencing and water infrastructure 
Figure 17 Earthquake and coseismic hazard damage to farm infrastructure. (a) Surface rupture through a fence. 16 
November 2016 (b) Surface rupture partially under a shed and through a fence. 19 January 2017 (c) A silo shaken off its legs 
and foundation. 3 April 2017 (d) A broken plastic water tank. 5 May 2017. Photographs by C. Fenton. 
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immediately before the earthquake, the losses were relatively greater than on the other 
farms.  
Fences were also impacted by on-going hazards (e.g., landslides and landslide dam 
breach flooding). When the smaller landslide dam lake on Farm A burst in mid-April, 
fences and floodgates downstream were washed out. This damage was covered by flood 
insurance. Damage to fencing has a long-term impact on how the farm will run moving 
forward, as a Farm A farmer explains: 
“I’ve fixed the same fence three times. Slipping land. We have ripped out fences. They’ve obviously been 
damaged, but we’ve reinstated them onto the top of ridges. That hasn’t necessarily worked because we’ve had 
a lot of damage on top of ridges as well. But in the overall bigger picture we will deintensify our land. Change 
our stock class. And we will probably end up running less livestock.” 
The Farm B farmers strategically prioritised stock proofing several blocks and 
postponed repairs likely to be reversed by of reactivated landslides. Importantly, they 
also took the risk of delaying repairs to some boundary fences. 
Boundary fence damage potentially has a greater impact than internal fence damage 
because it also carries a biosecurity risk. A neighbour’s ram, for example, entered Farm 
A through a damaged boundary fence and caused a double lambing. Boundary fence 
repairs depend on relationships with and the impact/recovery situations of the 
neighbours as well. A farmer described the relationship variables: 
“Then ‘cause you’re dealing with large boundary fences, some people are really active and pragmatic and they 
want to get it done too and others don’t. It could be based on their financial position, they might be more 
exposed to debt than you so they just don’t want to do it. So, there’s lots of different relationships in the 
boundaries." 
The Farm B farmers and their neighbour had the same mindset with regards to their 
boundary fence repairs and were able to successfully manage a damaged boundary 
fence through the winter rains. They found that their mutual postponement allowed 
them to avoid the multiple repairs that others had to do in the face of ongoing slope 
movements. The farmer described the wait to repair boundary fence: 
“A lot of the fencing has ruptured, with that landslide and stuff, and so we're going to have to get earthworks 
done to put a fence on it. We’ve got the same problem...do we send a contractor in there? On that land at the 
moment because of what could happen. And the other reason that we haven't done anything cause some of its 
boundary fencing was that we needed to let it get wet through the winter, stabilise itself a bit. Because a lot of 
people went in and ripped in if they've got their own dozers and stuff put the fence lines back in, put the fences 
up, the earth was still moving and all of that repair that they’d done, was done again. Luckily, my neighbour 
was pretty practical like me in thinking let's manage it but when it comes to actually putting the repairs in 
let’s give it some time to work out what it wants to do because it may be that on a map and it would have to 
be resurveyed, I suppose, if one of us sold. That the fence is there, but the most practical thing is to put the 
fence out there. It’s not good putting it straight through a bluff that's going to keep [moving]" 
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On Farm A the implications of having to fence off all water sources in the future 
concerned the farmer. In hilly areas, these might be an unfeasible or costly annual 
project.  
Fencing damage on Farm C was all internal, most caused by land deformation. This 
made it less of a problem. One farmer explained: 
“We can’t say fencing is a problem here. No. No. There’s still fencing to be done. The cattle yards, down the 
road, where they used to, between the gate and the post, they used to shut against each other there’s a gap 
like that, you know, 7 or 8 inches. And you can’t see any cracks in the ground, no sign of anything.  It’s just, the 
ground has just stretched. So, we’ve got all that sort of thing. There’s posts lying over. But it’s not a biggie by 
any means. It’s not like the hill country where there’s a sheep fence and it’s big gullies through rubbish. Nah, 
it’s pretty easy.”  
Even so, all of the farmers anticipate that it will take years to tidy up. 
Most of Farm C’s damage was concentrated on larger structures, such as staff housing. 
Farms A and C both had employee housing on the property at the time of the 
earthquake. Farm A’s building was for seasonal workers and was not inhabited at the 
time of the earthquake. Farm C had several staff houses that were fully occupied. Farm 
A’s shearers’ quarters was made immediately uninhabitable by a surface rupture 
directly through the middle of the building. All of Farm C’s staff houses were damaged 
by the shaking and ground deformation, with at least one requiring a rebuild due to 
foundation damage caused by lateral spreading. The other houses are either rebuilds or 
repairs. As of January 2018, insurance claims on the Farm C staff houses were close to 
resolution. Their repair was not a major priority for the farmers while the dairy shed 
was still being repaired. There was also temporary staff accommodation was available 
in a Rawhiti cottage. However, the farm has remained understaffed as a result of this 
housing damage and the unavailability of accommodation off-farm. One of the farmers 
said: 
“So, on the dairy side of it, we are pretty well staffed up. But I run the runoff side of it and I usually have two 
staff and I’ve got no one to help me. I rely on neighbours and contractors and that sort of thing this year.”  
Many farms have a level of infrastructure redundancy. For example, there are three 
stockyards spread across Farm B. The primary purpose of this stockyard distribution is 
to limit the time lost herding the stock across the farm. They also serve the purpose of 
decreasing the overall exposure their stockyards have to hazards. On all three farms 
there are sheds or other old infrastructure that have been abandoned or repurposed. 
The Farm C farmers were able to use their old woolshed, which had been converted to 
storage after they changed from a sheep to dairy farm.  
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The miscellaneous infrastructure of a farm may not carry the same level of repair 
priority as the primary economic infrastructure and homestead, but it still plays a vital 
part in the running of a farm. Fences are life, legal, economic, water quality and 
biosecurity safety measures. Staff housing habitability influences the level of employed 
help a farm can bring on. Whether these be long term employees like the dairy shed, or 
temporary contract workers for seasonal or repair jobs. Old buildings can be 
repurposed during an emergency and may even display greater resiliency than newer 
buildings. 
4.4.1.4  Essential Infrastructure Summary 
Farms have several types of infrastructure: primary economic infrastructure, a 
homestead and miscellaneous infrastructure (e.g. sheds, fences, tracks). Primary 
economic infrastructure damage can put livestock at risk and hence impact the stability 
of the farm. Homestead damage contributes to the mental/emotional capacity of 
farmers to plan and execute their recovery. Damage to the other various infrastructure 
affects various farm systems and the farm recovery rate. Having a backup on-farm for 
infrastructure is not necessarily helpful because it can be damaged as well. Although the 
capacity of miscellaneous infrastructure to be repurposed to adapt for main 
infrastructure damage should not be discounted. Instead, having strong relationships 
with neighbours is the best form of resilience to infrastructure damage. The farmers on 
Farms A and C were able to use their neighbours and neighbour networks to work 
around their primary infrastructure damage. The Farm B farmers’ trusting relationship 
with their neighbour allowed them to save money and time by managing an unrepaired 
boundary fence through the cascade triggering winter rains. The repair of infrastructure 
is dependent on the functionality of essential services. 
4.4.2  Essential Services 
Essential services—the utilities, and infrastructure via which these utilities are 
delivered, required for the farm to function—are the same regardless of farm type or 
location (water, power, telecommunications and transportation). Although the services 
are the same, sources and infrastructure vary between farms. These differences factor 
in to the vulnerability of each system. Restoration of these systems is essential to the 
continuing function of the farm. 
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4.4.2.1  Water: Systems and Damage 
Water is the most important essential service to the running of the farm. It is used to 
supply animal and farmer needs, irrigate fields and perform animal husbandry tasks 
(e.g. chemical dipping to control external parasites.) On the three case study farms, 
water is sourced from groundwater on-farm or delivered by a county water scheme. 
Farm water systems have high exposure to hazards due to the location of pipes and 
water tanks. Topography, water source type and component position all contribute to 
the level of damage. Water supply is generally gravity fed. The consequent, location of 
water tanks on hills or ridges contributes to damage caused by earthquake shaking or 
coseismic landsliding. Earthquake ground motions are amplified by topography and 
water-saturated slopes are more prone to slope movement. Water systems require 




Figure 18 Schematic cross-sections showing the water systems of the case study farms pre- and immediately post-
earthquake. Farms A and C both had on-farm water sources. Farm used a pump by their main river. Farm C used shallow 
wells. Farm B used the county water scheme. 
Farm A and C source their water on-farm. On Farm A, a pump shed is situated near and 
draws water from its main river. On Farm C, several shallow groundwater wells are 
situated close to a major river. On Farm B, water is drawn from the county water 
scheme. This scheme is gravity fed, using water pumped from a major river into storage 
tanks high up in the hills. Each farm participating in the scheme pays for a daily 
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allowance. The Farm B farmer has decreased the farm’s dependency on the scheme by 
supplementing their water with on-farm dams in gullies to collect storm runoff. The 
dams also act as sediment traps. 
On Farm A, the pump shed and generator were buried by a large landslide triggered by 
the initial earthquake. Farm C’s power supply was disabled by the earthquake, so the 
well pumps could not operate initially. 
The county water scheme was severely damaged by the earthquake shaking. The water 
tanks, mostly situated high on ridges, suffered from shaking damage exacerbated by 
topographic amplification.  
Water system components- including water pipes, tanks and troughs were also 
damaged.  Concrete tanks cracked during shaking. As they drained sand and pebbles 
from the concrete flowed through the pipes clogging the system. This meant that even 
undamaged pipes were sometimes clogged to the point of becoming unusable. Only 
three of Farm B’s twelve water tanks did not break their fittings and ‘rock off their 
platforms’ during the earthquake. 
Water pipes on all three farms were badly damaged. Some pipes snapped and others 
bent and buckled as the ground deformed. A farmer commented that damage to buried 
pipes went against traditional farming wisdom: 
“‘You always bury your water pipe as deep are you can.’ All the pipes on top of the surface are fine. It’s all the 
stuff we buried that’s buggered. I don’t mind that because it just tells me that you can’t win sometimes and 
that’s ok.”  
As a consequence, they planned to adjust the way they constructed pipe systems 
moving forward.  
One of the difficulties with fixing pipe leaks is finding them. Flushing lines with water is 
the fastest way and when the water tanks broke initially all the water drained. On Farm 
B, the farmers found that when pipes bent in areas of ground that at compressed there 
was no leak. So, finding the blockages was made even harder.  
Ground deformations affecting fences also impacted water systems placed above the 
surface. The pivots on Farm C were the most impacted of the irrigator types because the 
slots allowing them to fit through fences were displaced by ground surface deformation. 
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Troughs used throughout farms to supply stock water were also damaged by 
earthquake shaking. Farm C’s runoff troughs broke because the pipe connections 
between them and the tanks were too rigid to resist the earthquake shaking. Farm B’s 
troughs were often clogged following the earthquake. Particles from imploded concrete 
water tanks had flowed through the pipes. The rubber grommets that were supposed to 
keep the troughs from draining were often found to have vibrated out completely or just 
enough to allow seeping.  
The sewage systems on all three farms are buried septic tanks. The initial earthquakes 
partially cracked Farm A’s septic tank. There were no major problems until half a year 
later when the winter rains arrived. Farm B’s septic tank was abandoned with the 
homestead, so the damage was inconsequential. On Farm C, several septic tanks became 
buoyant as the ground liquefied and they floated to the surface. Notably, one of the 
farm’s red stickered (declared unsafe for human habitation) houses had one of the still 
functioning toilets. 
4.4.2.2  Water: Recovery and On-going Impacts 
Much initial recovery time and energy was put into restoring water access. Checking 
each component of the water systems to find the damage took a long time. On Farm A, 
cascading hazards repeatedly undid the repair efforts. 
The immediate water restoration concern on Farm A was accessing a new water source 
because the water pump had been completely buried and lost. A farmer commented on 
their use of a spring to do emergency repairs to their water system: 
“…the water infrastructure was severely compromised. We didn’t have water to a lot of the farm probably for 
six weeks after the earthquake. But that’s sort of been pumped out of the river. Well, actually, we ran out of 
water completely because we had a side stream that we were able to put a pump into because the river had 
completely dried up. And then that side stream dried up. ‘Cause it was the middle of the summer. We went out 
the back of the farm and we tapped a spring. And that supplemented what we were able to pump from the 
riverbed.” 
Water system repairs were affected by on-farm transportation. All but two of the water 
tanks on Farm A had to be replaced. Due to the damage to the on-farm roads, the farmer 
had to bring them in themselves. 
As part of the county water scheme, the Farm B farmers were not solely reliant on their 
own efforts. Civil Defence and the local council delivered tanker trucks of water daily to 
affected farms. This, a farmer said, is why water tanks should be installed close to easy 
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road and track access. It helps outside aid deliver water for use and for repair. They 
described their water system damage and initial repair as follows: 
“We’ve got all 25,000 and 30,000 litre tanks, which sit up high, which gravity feed all of the troughs. And out 
of the, I dunno, rough guess, 10 or 12 big tanks that feed the farm, might even be more than that, there was 
only three of them that didn’t rock off their platform and so they broke all their fittings. So, 30,000 litres, 30 
tons in a tank plus the tank it bounced literally up and down and they all moved about a foot. Half a foot to a 
foot and so all the fittings that are ridged had just snapped. So, all the water drained out of the tanks. And 
then trying to get them repaired, with no water, ‘cause you’ve got to flush the lines to find the leak. And so, we 
had four-wheel drive fire tanker trucks, us and everyone in the area really, running ‘round farm tracks that, 
you know, weren’t really designed for that fill up tanks to try and get some charge of water to flush them back 
down the lines.”   
The Farm A farmers used a water company to install their water shed. The company 
sent over an engineer for five days in December to help repair the water system. Even 
so, they did not have a reliable and adequate water pump in place until the middle of 
January, two months after the earthquake destroyed their original water system. A 
month later their system was damaged again by the landslide dam breach and 
consequent flooding of the downstream area. The system was rapidly restored 
following this event. 
Initial water supply recovery on Farm C was focused on restoring the power supply. 
Because the farmers owned a generator large enough to power a dairy shed, this was 
almost immediate. However, the wells took a while to start producing water because 
sediment shaken by the earthquake was still settling. 
Following power restoration on Farm C the repair of individual water system 
components became the most pressing matter. One of the pivot irrigators was damaged 
when the terrace collapsed underneath it. The main water lines and runoff trough 
connections were broken and one pump had slipped. Repair of these major components 
and the pivot irrigator was achieved within a month. Restoration of irrigation systems 
was vital to farmers because silage production was a key financial avenue for them 
while their dairy shed was being repaired. One of the farmers commented on their 
irrigation loss and restoration impacts: 
"We had no irrigation for a while. So, that meant it we were quite dry, but we were able to look after our own 
stock. Then after we got our irrigation going we had silage to sell, so that gave us a little bit of income. And 
then we, because it was quite a good growth season, nobody needed any grazing until February. And then it 
got a bit dry, so people were after grazing so we had about 1600 on here grazing, which gave us a little bit 
more income.” 
Water pipe repairs are time-consuming and costly. On Farm B, the farmers finally 
stopped trying to find the main leaks and simply brought in new pipes and tanks. The 
amount of time and cost of having contractors walk the property searching for leaks 
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was considered to be too great. They also took the opportunity to put more of their own 
money into the system and improve it by replacing decades-old concrete tanks with 
plastic ones and adding more troughs. Even the new plastic tanks posed problems. 
When the fittings were drilled from the outside of the tanks, plastic fell into the tanks 
and clogged pipes.  A few weeks before, the original concrete tanks had imploded. The 
fines and pebbles of the concrete had been sucked through the pipes and clogged them. 
On Farm B, farmers were able to draw on system redundancy upgrades made before the 
earthquake in response to the drought. The farmer described this back-up system: 
 “So, second year of the drought we had to- We have a river at the front and a creek that runs through the 
farm and we had a lot of springs that flowed into wet areas, which stock could get water from ‘cause we’re on 
a county water scheme here for stock and house water, so if that broke down which it does do and it got 
completely destroyed in the earthquake, so it wasn’t running for quite some time. We always had the ability to 
put the stock where water was. Because of the drought the creek had completely dried up, there was nothing 
left. The wet areas were dry. We had a couple of springs that were still flowing, but they weren’t flowing 
enough to create water. So, in the second year, we had to start putting a water scheme over the far side of the 
farm, which was an area predominately done with natural water, so we’d put a whole new scheme in. And 
luckily, for me, that end didn’t get damaged in the earthquake and what we were able to do was tap into the 
new infrastructure and bring it back this way. " 
Much of the farms’ water systems were uninsurable. This contributed a reduction in 
water system restoration speed.  
All three farms noted that despite now having functional water systems, it will take 
many years to restore them to pre-earthquake levels of functionality. This included 
acknowledging that the new water source will inevitably have problems in the future.  
Farm A farmer on the future of water:  
“Anything to do with that river is always going to be vulnerable. It’s just- we’ve already fixed the pipe a couple 
of times. Water is just an on-going thing really, it just doesn’t go away.”  
Farm B farmer on the future of water:  
“So, we had the initial earthquake, we had fractures that got fixed, but obviously a lot of stuff got stressed. So, 
we are forever finding wet patches where the pipes have just got tiny, little splits or have just got holes in 
them.”  
Farm C farmer on the future of water:  
"Water systems here. We are still working with water. We will be for a long time, finding leaks and finding 
broken hoses and pipes. That’s going to on-going for some time."  
Seasonal system repair is part of a farm’s annual calendar. The earthquake damage has 
increased this workload. 
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4.4.2.3  Water Summary 
The impact of an earthquake on farm water systems is dependent on water source type 
and farm topography. If a farm sources its water on-farm through wells or drawing from 
rivers, then a backup system is vital to reduce impact. This can mean having multiple 
wells, water sheds, or having backup parts and generators on hand. If a farm receives 
water from a community water scheme, then making the on-farm water system 
components as accessible as possible is key to aiding post-earthquake recovery. Easy 
road and track access makes truck water delivery and system repair easier. Farms with 
steep slopes will have more reoccurring issues with water systems post-earthquake. 
The chance of landslides, landslide dams and damage from topographic amplification 
are higher. Regardless of farm type or location, the water system is a vulnerable and 
vital asset that may suffer long-term damage following an earthquake. 
4.4.2.4  Power: Damage and Recovery 
Power is required to run the major economic infrastructure of a farm, any electric 
fences, telecommunications and the homestead. Power outages are a common winter 
and cyclone season occurrence, so most farms are prepared to operate without off-farm 
sourced power for a number of days throughout the year. Some farmers are moving 
towards increasing the length of time their farms can run independently by using 
generators and solar panels. 
Many power poles were damaged during the earthquakes. Farmers on Farms A and B 
noted that they were prepared to cook and run their homes without power for several 
days at a time. Farm C has a generator powerful enough to run the dairy shed or the 
irrigation system. Power was restored to most of the district within the first week or 
two. Power restored to Farm C within four days. Farm B’s woolshed never actually lost 
power, but deformation of the ground below the power poles decreased the clearance 
and meant that the power to the shed had to be disconnected. It was restored in April 
2017 when insurance was finally settled. Farm A, the most geographically isolated, 
spent the longest amount of power without to most of the property. Power was not 
restored until early December 2016. Farm A’s isolation has led to the farmers 




 “We would probably budget losing power nearly a month a year. We’re an isolated farm that are subject to 
snow and wind and tree fall. And being two families, they always fix everyone else first. So, we are just geared 
up to be a little bit self-sufficient. I think when looking to the future, when we rebuild. We are looking at trying 
to be more independent with our energy sources.” 
They also built in the ability to switch their homestead to run off a generator rather than 
the mains. They are looking for ways (e.g., solar panels) to become even more self-
sufficient with their power in the future.  
The regional power company repaired the power systems remarkably rapidly in light of 
the level of damage experienced across the district. The more isolated farms in the hilly 
country were the last serviced, as expected. The Farm A farmers acknowledged that 
being more self-sufficient with this aspect of their system, is the most resilient option. 
4.4.2.5  Telecommunications 
Telecommunication systems are reliant on regional and local power. Mountainous areas 
limit the accessibility of cell phone signals. Landlines are frequently disrupted and the 
on-going unreliability has led many farmers to abandon them. 
Farms A and C had on-going issues with landlines reliability following the earthquake. 
The Farm B and C farmers were able to use cell phones. Farm B did not have a landline 
and ran all of its telecommunication and internet off a nearby cell tower. Cell phone 
services were disrupted for only a few days after the earthquake. On Farm A, the 
farmers needed to go to the front of the farm or up to hilltops to obtain cell phone 
reception. They accepted that their situation is marginal due to their farm’s distance 
from any major towns and the 10km distance between their homestead and the main 
road. They said they relied on radios, satellite broad band and the ability to switch their 
house to run off-grid if need be.  
All three farming families reported moving towards telecommunications systems with 
reduced vulnerability. This was being accomplished through digital or satellite 
telecommunication rather than landlines and increasing power self-sufficiency. 
4.4.2.6  Transportation 
Transportation refers to both access to the farm (off-farm transportation) and access 
within the farm itself in the form of tracks and roads (on-farm transportation). Although 
access to Farms A and B was affected by a CDEM roadblock for several weeks after the 
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earthquake, none of the three farms experienced major and long-lasting isolation. 
Damage to on-farm tracks and roads increased with topographic variation.   
The farmers stated that on Farm A 99% of their roading was damaged by the 
earthquake; both fault rupture and landsliding impacts their tracks and roadways. They 
lost their main route of access to the paddocks at the back of their farm due to a large 
landslide. Travel time to those paddocks changed from a couple of hours to more than a 
day. In the winter, the possibility of mudslides makes safe passage nearly impossible. 
The farmer had to adapt by mustering their whole farm when they shear rather than 
just one or two paddocks. They noticed that normal drainage patterns were disrupted 
and the places where the ground previously moved during heavy rainfall have changed. 
Clearing on-farm access immediately was essential for the farmers, not only because 
access made repairs easier, but also because they needed to finish tailing.  
By contrast Farm B’s on-farm transportation suffered only minor impacts. All of the 
other infrastructure was damaged, but on-farm access was not impeded. 
The Farm C farmers reported that extensive liquefaction damaged their main off-farm 
road access. This road was fixed and repaved within six weeks by the local council.  
Transportation systems were key to any part of the farm being repaired. Off-farm roads 
are under the jurisdiction of local and regional councils. They were cleared and made 
passable relatively quickly. On-farm track and road access was a little more flexible. 
Farmers frequently had 4WD and motorbikes that facilitated off-road access. Repairing 
annual weather-related damage was an expected part of farm maintenance. Farmers 
typically had a sense of which areas were prone to slipping on their farm. The 
earthquake-related ground deformation changed the drainage patterns. The farmers 
needed to learn the locations of the new landslide prone zones. Level of access damage 
varied from farm to farm, lower lying areas (Farm B and C) had fewer issues than 
upland areas (Farm A) who had large landslides and surface ruptures cutting off 
sections of the farm. Repair and replacement of these tracks required attention to 
landslide reactivation and new drainage patterns. 
4.4.2.7  Essential Services Summary 
Essential services were vital to maintaining farm functionality and facilitating repairs. 
Water was the most important resource, but strategies regarding resilience and repair 
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vary depending on source and system infrastructure. Regardless, having backups of the 
other essential services had a positive impact on water restoration and maintenance. 
Backup power sources, generators or perhaps solar panels, helped fill the gap while 
power was being restored to and across the farm. The farmers found that digital based 
telecommunication was more resilient than landlines, although reliability still varies for 
the more geographically isolated. Access was key to infrastructure repair. It was reliant 
on heavy machinery (e.g., bulldozer or excavator) availability and roading redundancy. 
All three farms reported taking steps to increase the resiliency of their essential 
services. 
4.4.3  Livestock 
Farms cannot function without their essential infrastructure and services, but their 
continued economic viability is dependent on their livestock. Livestock refers to all farm 
animals that are an economic asset. The three farms have sheep, cattle, dairy cows and 
bees. Livestock are at risk of death, injury, disease and becoming lost in the aftermath of 
a disaster. They were the farmers’ second priority, after human life, during immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake. 
4.4.3.1  Bees 
Bee hives are fast becoming a common sight on farms throughout New Zealand (Brown 
et al. 2018). They require very little infrastructure and maintenance for the high profit 
their honey returns. Bees can also take advantage of land that may be too hazardous for 
other livestock to use. Land that a farmer retires and returns to native bush does not 
lose productivity if bees are on the farm. 
Farms A and B have bees on-farm. Bees produce honey between November and March, 
but begin flying in November. They require very little infrastructure and their hives can 
be installed across a farm to take advantage of wild foliage that other livestock cannot.  
At the time of the study, the farmers on Farm A and B contracted with third party 
beekeepers. The Farm A farmers said they had plans to do beekeeping training and 
bring in their own hives. One farmer commented on how this decision affected their 
risk: 
 “We have decided that we see beekeeping as a future here. We’ve bought some hives. [Farmer] is doing some 
training. ‘Cause it just changes the risk profile because bees don’t need infrastructure. I think beekeeping has 
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a massive future. I just think anything to do with real food and nature operating in a system has got to be 
good to be involved it.” 
During the earthquake, most of the beehives fell over. Resetting the beehives was one of 
farmers’ first priorities. With the help of a helicopter this was completed within 48 
hours. Although beehives are vulnerable to floods and landslides, they can be relocated 
to avoid these hazards.  
Bees present an excellent opportunity for farmers who have lost otherwise productive 
land to landsliding and surface ruptures. The infrastructure and upkeep for bees is 
relatively low. They can use damaged land that has been allowed to regrow native 
plants (e.g. Manuka).  
As with all livestock, bees can be vulnerable to hazards (e.g. floods, earthquake). 
However, their small infrastructure footprint and low maintenance requirements make 
them an excellent investment for farmers hoping to utilise ‘lost’ land. 
4.4.3.2  Dairy Cows 
Dairy cows numbers within New Zealand increased by about 128% between 2006 and 
2016 (Statistics New Zealand 2017). Despite the minor slowdown from the previous 
decade in the overall stock number increase, there are still a significant number of dairy 
farms in the Hurunui District (Statistics New Zealand 2013a). High profits can offset 
high infrastructure and maintenance requirements (Wales & Kolver 2017).  
There are one thousand milking dairy cows on Farm C. Several hundred young cows are 
kept on the runoff. These young cows are rotated onto the milking platform when they 
mature.  
Dairy cows are heavily infrastructure-dependent as they require low relief, irrigated 
land and a dairy shed. Farm C’s dairy shed is used for milking 10 months of the year 
(August to May). When lactating, a cow cannot go unmilked for more than about three 
days without developing mastitis, a painful and often deadly infection in the udder. The 
main earthquake occurred in the middle of milking season, so farmers were not able to 
dry off their cows. They were also in the process of artificially inseminating (A.I.ing) the 
herd. Disruption of even a day during this process can mean missing a cow’s fertile 
period and necessitate waiting for the next cycle. They needed to be able to continue 
this process or hand it off to someone who could. The farmers called on their 
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management team (Farm Advisor and Bank Manager) to help them relocate all one 
thousand of their milking cows. Their efforts were successful and every cow had been 
shipped to another farm and milked within 48 hours of the earthquake.  
The effort of relocating the cows was complicated by the damaged telecommunication 
systems and the specifications of the receiving farm. Dairy cows are reluctant to enter 
new dairy sheds, so the ones they were sent to had to be identical to Farm C’s. The 
milking sheds on the receiving farms had to be rotary sheds that rotated the same 
direction as the one on Farm C. The receiving farms also had to have to capacity to hire 
on more staff to handle to stock influx. One of the farmers described the teamwork: 
Farmer C1: “So, you know that’s what the bank manager and farm advisor were doing. So, there was a lot of 
work in it. They would ring out. Well I suppose they knew who had what types of sheds… “ 
Farmer C2: “Then their staff had to have extra staff. Calling in staff to get the milk because they won’t go in a 
new shed. So, there’s a lot of work to be done there. And they had to be A.I.ed too. The next day they had to 
bring them in as a mob and check them. So, a lot of work done by a lot of people.” 
The dairy cows began to be sent back to them in April, as they dried off. In late July, a 
few of the cows calved early, but once again the farmers were able to call on their 
neighbours for help. A neighbour’s milking shed was borrowed until the new dairy shed 
was completed and functional on July 28th. 
Dairy cows are the most vulnerable to hazards (e.g., floods, earthquakes). They have 
large, expensive and intricate infrastructure and high maintenance requirements. Dairy 
cows have a strict annual calendar that means their level and type of impact is slightly 
variable. Farmers must be prepared with a large support network and management 
team to navigate post-disaster recovery. 
4.4.3.3  Beef Cattle 
Beef cattle in New Zealand have decreased 82% over the last ten years (Statistics New 
Zealand 2017). Sheep and beef farms still make up a significant section of Hurunui 
District farming (Section 1.7.2.1 ). Beef cattle have lower on-farm infrastructure and 
maintenance requirements than dairy cows and sheep.  
All three farms have cattle. Farms A and B have exclusively beef cattle. Farm C’s cattle 
are a mixture of beef and future dairy stock.  
The main cattle infrastructure is fences. Cattle fences are the simplest and easiest to 
maintain fences. A Farm A farmer commented on cattle fences: 
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“[With] cattle, you can put one wire up as high as your hip and they will generally stay behind that wire, if 
they’re trained. The ability to reinstate that sort of infrastructure after an event is quite simple. Because you 
can almost pick it up and bang it back into the ground.” 
They mean that a single wire fence might still work even if it is not electrified. The initial 
priorities for beef cattle include water access and fence restoration.  
Beef cattle are vulnerable, however, to ground deformation and fissures. Farm B lost 
several cows to a partially covered fissure. 
Beef cattle are the second most resilient of the livestock covered in this thesis. They 
have a low infrastructure dependency. Their lack of a rigid annual calendar, outside 
artificial insemination and calving, make their year-round vulnerability relatively equal. 
4.4.3.4  Sheep 
Sheep in New Zealand have increased 140% over the last ten years (Statistics New 
Zealand 2017). Specialised sheep farms and sheep and beef farms still make up a 
significant section of Hurunui District farming (Section 1.7.2.1 ). 
Farms A and B have several hundred sheep. Farm B lost approximately 150 sheep to 
surface ruptures and landslide fissures during the earthquake and to other causes 
within the first few months. The farm’s exact loss numbers are uncertain. The farmer 
described the earthquake’s impact on their sheep: 
"Sheep tend to camp up at night. So, they were probably camped up on the crests of hills. The shaking would 
have been worse on the tops I imagine than the bases. We found the odd sheep where the cracks, something 
had come through, it’s opened. Whether a sheep fell into that crack or whether it was asleep and the cracked 
just opened around it, but they’d opened and closed so we found pancake sheep. The dogs found a lot of sheep 
about two and three weeks later that had probably fallen into crevices were alive, but literally couldn’t get 
out. So, as they died, and we didn’t know they were there. We found a lot of the cracks in the weeks afterwards 
and as they died of course they started to decompose and with dogs being dogs they could pick up the scent. I 
don’t know how many sheep we would have lost in that. Nowhere near as bad as some of the people up round 
Kekerengu and that. That’s a bit of an unknown really.” 
Sheep infrastructure is more complex than bees or beef cattle. Sheep farms must have 
an operational woolshed. Unlike dairy cows, a woolshed is not used daily. Both the Farm 
A and B farmers spread their shearing out over several months to decrease their risk. 
The Farm A farmers missed a planned shearing when their woolshed was rendered 
non-functional by the earthquake. However, they were able to use a neighbour’s 
woolshed. The farmer described this event: 
 “One of the first big events we had. On the 6th of December we had to walk our sheep to our neighbours to 
shear them. And they’re probably 10kms away. And we were offered their help, the free use of [their] 
woolshed, which was really pleasing.” 
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Farm A’s woolshed continues to be non-functional. As a result, the farmers have had to 
delay shearing some of their sheep. The wool deteriorates in the meantime because 
sheep will seek shade in summer and become covered in vegetable matter as a result. 
The wool price decreases as it deteriorates. Business interruption insurance can help 
address the deterioration gap. 
The loss of water access had more of an impact than just dehydration for Farm B’s 
sheep. The process of fly dipping typically uses water-solvent chemicals. The farmers 
delayed dipping as long as possible, but eventually had to resort to dry chemicals. Their 
wool prices suffered as a result. A farmer described this: 
 “So, we had to use a range of chemicals that don’t require water. They came at a far greater expense and 
their efficiency is far less. And then you have withholding periods because they’re a different sort of product 
that effect your ability to kill animals for meat…so everything got turned upside down.” 
Like cattle, effective sheep husbandry requires fences and stockyards. These are more 
complicated than the cattle versions to repair. A Farm A farmer commented on the 
resulting farm plan impacts: 
“We’ll be running less sheep because it’s almost impossible now to keep sheep in a paddock. Because we’ve got 
all these cracks and they can fit through tiny holes.” 
The farmers on Farms A and B had planned tailing to conduct at the time of the 
earthquake. On Farm A, friends and volunteers helped the farmers to complete this task 
less than two weeks after the earthquake. On Farm B, the farmers were able to do some 
emergency repairs to their stockyards to complete these, but the more permanent 
repairs required more time. 
Sheep are the second most vulnerable livestock on the case study farms, after dairy 
cows. Their annual calendar means that the severity and type of impact can change 
depending on the time of year the earthquake occurs. The sheep annual calendar does 
have some flexibility. Both sets of farmers spread out their shearing slightly to reduce 
risk. On Farm B, lambing and weaning was able to be shifted for climate and crop 
growth reasons as well. Strong neighbour relationships can reduce the initial impacts if 




4.4.3.5  Livestock Summary 
Livestock hazard vulnerability varies. Their vulnerability depends on required 
infrastructure, maintenance and hazard timing. Livestock with variable annual calendar 
are more vulnerable to earthquakes at sometimes of year than others. The livestock 
present on the case studies farms, in order of most resilient to least: bees, beef cattle, 
sheep and dairy cows. To reduce a specific livestock’s vulnerability, farmers can 
construct key redundant infrastructure (e.g. multiple stockyards) and build flexibility 
into their annual calendar when possible. As with other aspects of farm resiliency 
strong neighbour network, allow for resource pooling. For severely impacts farmers, 
they may consider more drastic changes such as reducing stock numbers or changing 
stock class. Alternatively, a farm may diversify their stock classes to reduce overall farm 
impact.  
4.5  Human Factors 
Human factors that influence farm recovery are the mental health of the farmers, 
endogenous support (e.g., staff, family) and exogenous support (e.g., government 
agencies, NGOs). Human factors change over the recovery timeline. Intense off-farm aid 
is more common early in the recovery process. Long-term, human resources are more 
internally based. On-farm and on-farm groups frequently interact and support each 
other. However, these relationships can also become oppositional or disruptive to the 
recovery process for an individual farm. 
4.5.1  Mental Health 
The mental health of a farmer and their community significantly impacts a farm’s 
recovery process. The psychosocial trauma of the 2010 Darfield earthquake was found 
to more negatively impact Canterbury plain farmers’ operational capacity than the 
earthquake’s physical impacts (Whitman et al. 2012). Sleep deprivation, decreased 
focus and uncertainty were reported as the most frequent side effects of stress. This 
study did not set out to explore the mental health impacts of the Hurunui-Kaikōura 
earthquakes. The semi-structured interviews allowed the participants to discuss them 
as a significant part of their farms’ recoveries. The internal and external stress and 
support factors changed over time (Table 9). The factor changes influence and are 
influenced by the farmers’ recovery decisions. 
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Table 9 Earthquakes have a major impact on the mental health of farmers. The recovery process itself is a source of stress. 
Some of the contributors are internal to the farm and others are external. A farmer’s mental health impacts their ability to 
proceed with recovery. 
Mental Health Factors 
 Internal External 
Pre-
earthquake 
Farmer personality   
Farmer experience   
Infrastructure status   
Financial performance Climate (Drought) 
  Geography (Isolation) 
Earthquake/ 
Short-term 
Life safety (livestock, staff and family)   
Emergency repairs/clean-up (short-term hyper focus) Community 
Infrastructure Damage Assistance quality 
Safe Home Outside attention 
  Access Restriction 
Long-term 
Future/children/opportunity/planning Community 
Momentum/fatigue/on-going Assistance quality 
Time Insurance process/Finance 
  Climate 
  Isolation/loss of attention 
 
4.5.1.1  Pre-earthquake 
The pre-earthquake mental health factors are farm and farmer characteristic based. 
Geographical isolation has a negative impact on farmer’s extensive networks. It 
contributes to developing a resilient attitude. All three farms adapted their essential 
service sources in response to their isolation levels (Section 4.4.2 ). The North 
Canterbury region experienced a drought for the two years before the earthquake. The 
financial stress of the drought impacted Farms A and B the heaviest. The farmers’ 
mindset heading into the earthquake was a product of personality and experience. This 
contributed to their baseline stress levels. The Farm A farmers found themselves being 
not optimistic after dealing with drought and low economic returns for several years 
preceding the earthquake. One farmer commented: 
 “I think your optimism comes with financial performance and we’ve had four or five years of really poor 
prices…” 
4.5.1.2  Immediate/Short-term 
Immediately after the earthquake, the main stress factors were the earthquake itself 
and coseismic hazards. Outside aid, family and timely competent emergency aid and 
96 
 
repairs helped combat this stress. Even so, the multiple sources of stress built-up and 
combined to occasionally overwhelm farm and farmer recovery capacities. On this 
cumulative stress, a farmer said:  
 “So, this is all happening while we’re still in drought. We had to get stock off farm because it was having a 
major implication on being able to carry them forward without them losing weight because we were fast 
running out of grass. We couldn’t even get a truck in to get the stock off farm. We were going to have to take 
the stock somewhere else. But, where were we going to take them because they weren’t letting anyone 
through the roadblocks. And then we had insurance that won’t settle. And I can understand that you need to 
take some processes and some time frames around that, but insurance that won’t settle. We are physically 
covering the cost, immediate costs ourselves, which is a bit of a burden on the cash flow, etc. and the fact that 
we’d run at some quite big losses for the previous two years because of the drought.” 
Perceived incompetency, ineffectiveness and dishonesty of outside help was a major 
stressor. One Farm A farmer commented that working with new contractors whose 
competency was an unknown was a constant recovery stressor. They also felt isolated 
and frustrated by CDEM organisations asking the same impact assessment questions, 
particularly before and after the transition from local to regional control. This repetition 
raised doubts about how impact assessment information was being collected, 
coordinated and applied. 
Farmer A1: “Then you got your rural support network where people come and just touch base with ya. We 
had a bloke turn up, he was a volunteer for civil defense, to talk to us and he wrote down what we thought our 
immediate concerns were.” 
Farmer A2: “But then once civil defense national body took over they had to come back and ask us all the 
same questions again.” 
Farmer A1: “I think I immediately realised that we were on our own.” 
Farmer A2: “We didn’t even think about it. It just needed to be fixed, so we just got on to fixing stuff.” 
A Farm B farmer commented on their insurance company’s email newsletters. They 
found the promised priorities did not match reality. This perceived dishonesty only 
increased frustration. Nevertheless, as one farmer said, the simple presence of people in 
the early days helped morale: 
 “And those first three or four days a lot of people came in to see how we were and all that and a lot of people 
that I didn’t know. I was in amongst them, but I didn’t speak to them. But it was always good to see a face 
further away. You knew why they were there, just being supportive. So, it gives you quite a buzz, you feel 
better about it. You aren’t sitting there by yourself.” 
Farm B’s homestead was left uninhabitable by the earthquake damage. The farmer’s 
family moved off farm for a few months. This temporary separation had a negative 
effect on the farmer. The farmer commented: 
“I’ve got a few days that I consider to be really happy, but one of the happiest days was when wife and kids 
came back. Baching by yourself after being married for eighteen years was quite cool for about for about two 
weeks and then it lost its [appeal].” 
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The Farm C farmers recognised the mental benefit of being able to return to a habitable 
and relatively undamaged house every night. One farmer commented: 
“…we were very lucky and if this house had been munted too that would have been a hell of a job. That would 
have been, mentally, really hard. But it was nice to come back at night to a nice warm house.”  
They drew on the kindness and support of their staff, neighbours and wider community.  
On their staff, they said: 
“So, I think it was really good that everyone was together. And the young boys, they showed up, they really 
rose to the occasion, didn’t they? And lit the fire and got water and looked after people. We didn’t know at 
that stage that the dairy shed- we didn’t know the severity of the earthquake.” 
The much wider community assisted as well. The farmers also praised a community aid 
initiative by the lottery board: 
 “And that lottery board grant, that was set aside from the lotteries in December. You know the proceeds were 
put in a fund. That’s been wonderful for the community. Like, I’m a member of the tennis club and our tennis 
courts, they weren’t totally munted, but they’d got cracks in them and we’d only just resealed them and we got 
money out of that. Various organisation have gotten money to do something in the hall or do something here 
or there. So, that’s been great.” 
In the early days of farm recovery, safety, human contact and kindness did a great deal 
to combat earthquake-related stress. The intensive activity of multiple off-farm 
organisations was generally beneficial to speed emergency repair, but all increased the 
chances of instances of hindrances or annoyances rather than aid. 
4.5.1.3  Long-term 
As farm recovery enters the long-term stage, the farms’ and outside organisations’ 
priorities and main focuses shift. Much of the regional and national attention retracts 
from the area, as emergency aid slows down. The loss of focus outside attention can 
create a magnified sense of isolation. One farmer said: 
 “When you’ve got 7 or 8 farmers spread over a massive area it’s just got no political weight to it. There’s just 
not that weight of pressure from even media to get things done and for justice.” 
The Farm A farmers hired a lawyer several months into the recovery process. They 
found themselves in a prolonged insurance process and needed someone to help them 
develop a strategy to deal with it. According to the farmers, hiring a lawyer earlier in the 
process would have decreased their stress levels. A farmer described the lawyer’s 
support: 
 “So, we are doing a due diligence process with them. In hindsight, I probably should have rung the lawyer 
within a week. It just looked at- even, you know, just put a game plan in place. Just a strategy. ‘Cause I think I, 
personally, feel calmer when there’s a strategy in place ‘cause then it helps you deal with- it’s just like this is 
what they are going to do and they are going to do this and this and this and when you see it happening 
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you’re just like aw, you said that was going to happen, that’s fine. Those are stories that people tend to share 
when they catch up and talk earthquakes.” 
Time is vital to recovery. Not just spending the time to repair something but having the 
time to consider various options to rebuild or not, as the case may be. The Farm B 
farmers experienced an increase in mental time upon securing more stable housing: 
“That gave us time, once we were out of the caravan to really start thinking about the situation, which was 
quite good so we were starting to think in terms of rebuilding, etc. Are we going to build a great big 
homestead? We got to look at what are we going to get paid out, what are we going to contribute? And we’ve 
been in the drought for two years financially we were really feeling the effects of that drought. It wasn’t ideal 
timing. "  
After emergency repairs are complete, long-term planning shapes the mental health 
concerns. The prolonged focus required to conduct repairs and manage contractors and 
new staff drains farmer energy. In order to maintain recovery momentum, farmers are 
unable to take sufficient breaks to replenish their energy stores. A Farm C farmer 
commented that even with staff, they needed to stay on-farm: 
 “And we’ve found that it’s important that you don’t go away because if you do go away. Momentum just drops 
off. We want to keep it going and we need to be here every day. And with new staff, only one of the original 
staff the manager is new and the rest of the staff, so it was important that I was around. No water, well I know 
where to go or an idea of where to go to get it going again. Or where the cows go or the irrigation, I’d show 
them how to do the irrigation. So, it’s put a lot of pressure on us, but it’s always been that way.” 
From the time of the earthquake to being interviewed in October 2017, the Farm C 
farmers had been able to take less than seven days total off. The exhaustion was 
building after working everyday every week for months. 
4.5.1.4  Mental Health Summary 
Earthquake event and recovery related stress has a compounding effect on mental 
health. A farmer’s mental health in turn feeds back into their farm’s recovery by 
diminishing their energy and recovery speed. There are many sources of stress and 
many avenues to address or alleviate it. The Rural Support Trust did excellent work 
organising community meetings and advocating on behalf of farmers. Farmers reported 
hiring lawyers early in the insurance process to at the very least put a strategy in place 
reduced stress. An unaddressed source of stress was the one that spring from the 
inevitable ending of intense outside support and concurrent loss national and regional 
media and public attention. The feelings of isolations this causes needs to be addressed. 




4.5.2  Endogenous Support 
Another form of on-farm resource is endogenous support. Endogenous support is all 
internal human factors. This encompasses personnel employed on-farm and 
management systems with a majority of endogenous components. Farm personnel may 
be contract, seasonal worker or full-time employees. A farm’s ability to employ on-farm 
personnel can be impacted by the earthquake. Farm personnel are an essential part of 
farm recovery and a return to normality. The alternative to an exogenous management 
system (Section 4.5.3.4 ), is an endogenous management system.  
4.5.2.1  Full-time Employees 
Full-time employees work year-round and are frequently housed on farm. Their 
employment and housing is dependent on farm status. They are at risk of job loss if their 
housing is severely damaged or the farm losses its financial ability to keep them 
employed. The ability of farms to maintain full-time employs may fluctuate during the 
recovery process. At the time of the earthquake, only Farm C had full-time employees. 
Most of Farm C’s staff are full-time employees. At the time of the earthquake, there were 
about ten staff members. Most of the staff was housed on-farm with their families. 
Despite not having an on-farm emergency plan, the farmers and staff still met by the 
dairy shed soon after the shaking stopped. The farmers’ first priority was to look after 
their people. The yard around the dairy shed became the gathering and cooking site 
during the initial recovery stages. While the dairy cows were off farm and the dairy shed 
was not operational, the farm could not afford to continue to employ most of the 
employees. All but one staff member, who was the second-in-command for the runoff, 
was let go. A employee wage subsidy fund from MBIE helped the farmers pay the staff 
their remaining salary until most of them left in mid-December. Their previous manager 
had left the month before the earthquake and their new manager had yet to start. The 
new manager’s start date was pushed form December to May. By June the farm had re-
staffed the dairy shed. In January 2018, one of the farmers was still managing the runoff 
by themselves. The damage to their staff housing had the knock-on effect of keeping the 
farm understaffed. The farmers also said that non-priority jobs had to be postponed 
because they were understaffed.  
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The Farm C farmers saw an opportunity to rethink their business model following the 
earthquake. Something they would not have had the opportunity to do if they had not 
had to let go most of their staff.  
Farm B acquired a few new houses during recovery. A farmer mentioned they were 
considering using one to hire a full-time employee. Prior to the earthquake, they did not 
have the housing capacity to do so. 
4.5.2.2  Seasonal Employees 
Seasonal (or contract) employees are workers hired to complete specific jobs or for a 
season. They typically supply their own housing and transportation.  The workers 
themselves are less directly impacted by damage to the farm because their employment 
is not dependent on one farm or maintaining function. A farm’s inability to hire contract 
employees will significantly slow their recovery. The most common impact on the 
employment of contract workers was shifting the timing rather than eliminating their 
use entirely. 
Seasonal workers are employed on Farms A and B for three main tasks: drilling, weed 
removal and shearing. Drilling timing is entirely weather dependent and takes several 
days in good conditions. In wet conditions, these tasks may stretch over a couple of 
weeks. Weeding for some plants, such as Nassella tussock (Nassella trichotoma and 
Nassella tenuissima), is legally required. This takes place over several days in spring to 
best avoid disrupting the young lambs. Contractors weeding must walk the whole 
property on foot. Shearing takes place throughout the year to reduce animal health 
problems. Crutching in November to December, belly crutching from April to May and 
shearing from mid-July to mid-August. Most of the seasonal work is done by contracted 
employees (e.g., shearing, road maintenance, harvesting). 
There are also part-time workers employed for general maintenance work on Farms A 
and B. On Farm A, they are employed for 3 days of the week. On Farm B, they are 
employed for the whole winter season. 
The employment of contract workers is essential to completing vital farm tasks. The 
workload on these farms is too large for the farmer and their family to complete alone. 
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4.5.2.3  Endogenous Management System 
An endogenous management system consists of the farmer, their family and on-farm 
staff. They do not employ off-farm managers like exogenous managements systems 
(Section 4.5.3.4 ). The farmers on Farms A and B both use this management system type. 
This style of management is more flexible on a day-to-day basis. It lacks the far-reaching 
network of the exogenous management system. It consists of an on-farm manager, but it 
can also just be the farmer’s family. A Farm A farmer described this system: 
“I enjoy operating on a very short chain of command. I don’t have shareholders or a board of directors to tell 
me what to do. I’m in total, obviously with Farmer 2 and a little bit with my in-laws, but I make all decisions. 
And I can make them in a heartbeat. It takes the pressure off because you’re not being delayed to make 
decisions. I think that was helpful, to me. Because I know other people in the district when they’ve got owners 
and shareholders, it hasn’t been as straight forward to prioritise what gets fixed and stuff like that.” 
4.5.2.4  Endogenous Support Summary 
Endogenous support is a key on-farm resource for reducing workload stress on farmers 
and maintaining farm functionality. It contributes to how a farm can be flexible at short 
notice. A farm’s immediate resilience in isolated situations is heavily based on its 
endogenous support. Less isolated farms may rely on exogenous networks. 
4.5.3  Exogenous Support 
When the on-farm resources are drained or functionally-compromised, the farm must 
reach out to off-farm support. Exogenous support refers to people and organisations 
that influence a farm’s recovery from the outside. This includes: government, insurance, 
NGOs, contractors and volunteers. It also refers to any management structure with 
exogenous components. Outside disaster periods these entities may have little or no 








Table 10 Major active periods and contributions of each major exogenous organisation during the 14th November 2016 
recovery period. 
Earthquake Recovery Contributions by Organisations 
 




EQC Short-term EQC Earthquake Insurance 
ECan All Surveys 
MPI Short-term Uninsurables fund 
MBIE Short-term 











CDEM Immediate Emergency aid 
Rural Support 
Trust 









Fonterra All Organisational support 
 
4.5.3.1  Immediate 
The first six weeks after the earthquake contained the greatest contact with exogenous 
support. The national government announced and enacted legislation to aid the 
recovery process. Groups involved in emergency aid and repairs (e.g., CDEM) were 
particularly active. Other organisation (e.g., insurance companies, ECan, EQC) began 
their surveying work to inform their assistance during the later stages of recovery. 
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Community groups and rural support trust were actively checking on neighbours and 
delivering donated supplies. 
Community 
The community (family, friends, neighbours and volunteers) were the first to respond 
and be on-farm within the first few hours. As coseismic hazards to roads and roadblocks 
(implemented by CDEM) isolated several farms after the earthquake, these groups 
continued to be the main initial source of human resources. 
Life safety was the first priority. Checking on family, staff and neighbours was the first 
action of all three farms. A Farm B farmer described the early hours: 
"About between 1 o’clock and 2 o’clock in the morning we had enough cell coverage from texting and the odd 
broken conversation to establish contact with all of our neighbours. So, I knew everyone was alive. And 
everybody felt as though they were in an area where they felt safe in. So, that was my immediate concern was 
everyone else really. The next day is was just was well that everyone had reported in that they were okay 
because if we’d got through to someone and they’d been in danger. I think probably the biggest loss of life 
would have been getting to them. We didn’t know that the road had ruptured completely and there would 
have been that much going through your mind, you would have just driven off bluffs and roads. There was 
areas of roads that weren’t there further up, that if people had tried to go and help someone probably in the 
dark, if might have ended up being a bit of a disaster, I think.” 
Neighbours and volunteers were a significant source of equipment and workforce 
during the initial repair stage. One Farm A farmer commented: 
“I had some volunteers come up from our building company…and we tailed our sheep in the yards 
on the 26th. That a pressing job that needed doing. I just rung one of my best mates and he just 
brought his company up and we smashed it out.” 
Farm A’s woolshed was too damaged to be used. The farmers were permitted to use 
their neighbour’s woolshed to complete planned shearing. They described this event: 
“One of the first big events we had. On the 6th of December we had to walk our sheep to our neighbours to 
shear them. And they’re probably 10kms always. And we were offered their help, the free use of [their] 
woolshed, which was really pleasing.” 
Much of Farm B’s early water system repair progress was thanks to an excavator that 
had been on a neighbour’s property at the time of the earthquake. Because of the 
roadblock, the digger was unable to leave and so, the farmer was able to borrow it. Also, 
Farm B’s first temporary accommodation, a caravan, after the homestead was deemed 
uninhabitable was borrowed from a family friend. 
Government 
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE); the Ministry of Primary 
Infrastructure (MPI); Environment Canterbury (ECan); Civil Defence and Emergency 
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Management (CDEM) and the local council were the most involved parts of government 
in the recovery process. Most of the national governments immediate support was in 
the form of announcing funds that came into effect during the short-term recovery 
stage. Representatives from all off the groups were on the ground at some point. 
The first government organisation on the ground was CDEM. They were responsible for 
checking life safety and attending to basic needs. A Farm B farmer described their initial 
interactions with them and their aid in bringing attention to their landslide risk: 
Farmer: “So, [Insurer] did an imminent risk report ‘cause we made- Who are the guys that come in…? [The 
Government Department]. So, they came in and they started door knocking, a few days after the earthquake 
to make sure A) is everyone alive and B) do you need anything essentially because the road was all beat up 
and no one was getting through they had it closed off. So, [The Government Department] were doing the 
rounds by that stage, getting water, whatever. They came in and I said, ‘Look, I’m a bit worried about this hill.’ 
They came back well we’re not qualified to answer that, so they sent up two guys that were contracted [The 
Government Department] and they were from…doesn’t matter, I just can’t think of the two companies.” 
Researcher: “[Engineering Company]?” 
Farmer: “No, [Engineering Company] worked for [Insurer]. There was a couple of other companies that 
obviously [Insurer] had contracted in they were going ‘round looking at bits of unstable land, or whatever. So, 
they came in and did a rapid response report and said, “Yeah, no we’re not very happy. That we’ve got to be a 
little bit careful with what could happen there.” 
The most significant and broad impacting action by the national government was the 
Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Bill. 
The Farm C farmers used MBIE’s employee wage subsidy fund. Following the 
earthquake, they had to let nearly all their staff go because without a functional dairy 
shed they could no longer employ them. The wage fund allowed them to keep paying 
their staff during the letting go period. 
Not all aid from government organisation was perceived as helpful. Some 
miscommunications were reported during the initial recovery stage. Farmers reported 
redundant action and contact was irritating. Farmers on Farm A described how this 
redundancy affected them: 
Farmer A1: “Then you got your rural support network where people come and just touch base with ya. We 
had a bloke turn up, he was a volunteer for CDEM, to talk to us and he wrote down what we thought our 
immediate concerns were.” 
Farmer A2: “But then once CDEM national body took over they had to come back and ask us all the same 
questions again.” 
Farmer A1: “I think I immediately realised that we were on our own.” 
Farmer A2:“We didn’t even think about it. It just needed to be fixed, so we just got on to fixing stuff.” 
In addition, although necessary for hazard zone control, the roadblocks by CDEM also 
had the negative side effect of restricting access to some farms. Farm A and B were 
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behind the roadblock. Their farmers experienced a few weeks of frustration as 
contractors and sometimes even their fellow farmers, who also resided passed the 
roadblock, were unable to use the road. One of the farmers described the roadblock’s 
initial impact: 
“Well they blocked the Leader Road at both ends. It wasn’t us. That happened one or two days afterwards 
where people who wanted to come see us or help us, couldn’t get though. It felt like there was a window where 
it felt like you could do whatever you liked for about 48 hours and then it just sort of clamped up.” 
Contractors, Consultants and Suppliers 
All three farms employed contractors to carry out their repair projects and bring in 
supplies. Pre-existing relationships and trust became a reoccurring theme.  
A contractor was responsible for much of the farmers’ initial difficulties restoring Farm 
A’s water pump. One farmer described this: 
“I was having ridiculous problems with the pumps. So, we spent six weeks of just, this guy who was over his 
head, ordering, you know, crap stuff. I just expected that it wouldn’t be that hard to find a pump that could 
pump for twelve hours. And he had this pump that turned up, it could hold a litre of petrol. And then it 
couldn’t lift enough water to the woolshed. So, we had two pumps going. And then when he sent the bill in I 
refused to pay it ‘cause I was ‘you’re a muppet.’ So, when we got a generator and a proper pump on site on the 
14th of January that was the first point where I felt as though we had a reliable source of water. Wasn’t ‘til the 
14th of January.” 
The farmers had a much better time working with contractors with whom they had pre-
existing relationships. Their responses were quick. However, farmers could not always 
work with their trusted contractors. This problem was caused by the fact that there was 
such a big call for contractors. Farmers may not implicitly trust new people whose 
competency they were not sure of. This led them to often closely manage repair work. 
This added to stress levels and interfered with essential farm jobs. A Farm A farmer 
commented on this: 
“The frustrating thing for me was you don’t get your regular guy, they bring in a lot of support workers. And I 
had to stand in front of that bulldozer and those machines and I didn’t trust them to do what I wanted them to 
do and in a lot of cases when I went away the wrong thing was done…Part of me felt as though I should have 
just been driving the machine myself. But there was a massive tie. I couldn’t really leave anyone to get on with 
it. And then I got a bit angry because I asked a contractor stop because I wanted to harvest our lambs and just 
keep the business running. And he threatened to take the machine away. You know, probably thinking it could 
be used somewhere else. Yeah, but then it gets busy somewhere else and it doesn’t come back.” 
Attitudes from suppliers covered the spectrum from focused on making money to being 
supportive. Some farmers reported problems with suppliers hiking prices post-
earthquake. Their regular suppliers were less of an issue. Other farmers said the found 




Agricultural Businesses and Organisations 
During the initial recovery stages, agricultural businesses and organisations were 
present on farms to offer various forms of support. Farmer membership or participation 
with them tends to depend on farm type. A Farm A farmer commented on Beef+Lamb’s 
aid: 
 “Yeah, Beef+Lamb are good. They gave us the helicopter to use. That was sponsored. The helicopter just 
turned up and someone said do you need to go for a ride, so that was pretty cool.” 
Farm A is a large farm (>2000ha). The helicopter offered the opportunity for the 
farmers to conduct an aerial survey of the damage caused by large landslides and 
surface rupture across their property faster and safer than they would have been able to 
on-foot. 
Some of the assistance was less vital, but still appreciated. Farm C farmers are a part 
Fonterra. About Fonterra’s assistance on the day of the earthquake, they said: 
“Fonterra were here that day [14th November] to see how we were getting on. They didn’t help that much 
because we had things that our advisor had things under control. But they made sure they [the cows] weren’t 
in the road and whatever had to be done. So, they were good, supportive.” 
The agricultural organisations (e.g., Beef+Lamb, Fonterra, Federated Farmers) stepped 
in to support their farmers in a variety of ways immediately after the earthquake. This 
support maintained throughout the recovery stages. 
4.5.3.2  Short-term (<6 months) 
Community 
The community continues to be a source of off-farm resources during the short-term 
recovery period. 
The Farm B farmers worked with one of their neighbours to manage an unrepaired 
boundary fence through the winter rains (See section 4.4.1.3 for more). 
Government 
During the first six months, many of the government mandates and aid came into effect. 
MPI had an uninsurable assets fund that provided money to farmers who had assets 
that were not covered under insurance. For many this was tracks and fences. One 
farmer described how the uninsurables fund helped their financial issues: 
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 “We’ve probably spent close to $300,000 of our own money. We did get $100,000 dollars from the 
government. It initially looked like we were going to get about $45,000 maximum. So, when they subscribed 
the uninsured infrastructure fund that was undersubscribed. So, you’d think 4 million dollars, but as it turned 
out there’s a small amount of farms with a lot of damage. So, they put a few points of entry into it. So, you had 
to make a deposit ‘cause that would sort of rule out any lifestyle block owners trying to tap into it. You know, 
they really wanted, from their perspective the money to go to the right place. So, we did a scope of works. I 
think [Farmer 2] came up with somewhere around 600,000 dollars infrastructure damage, which is 
uninsured. Which was water, tracks. Repairing land. All that sort of stuff. So, we put that scope in. And then I 
had a conversation with our local MP and MPI, I wanted to know when they got the information in about the 
level of damage, what they were going to do about it. If there was a lot more damage than what they’d 
supplied money for. Were they prepared to front up with any more money?” 
MBIE offered Rawhiti cottages, originally from the 2011 Christchurch Earthquakes, at a 
discounted price to farmers. The farmers on Farms B and C took advantage of this. Farm 
B’s cottage arrived in April. Farm C’s Rawhiti cottage replaced one of the damaged staff 
houses. 
One farmer remarked that some lessons with regards to public engagement had been 
learned from the Christchurch earthquakes and beneficially applied. There were 
frequent public meetings in the first few months that helped explain insurance rights 
and earthquake law. The farmer described these meetings: 
“We had several meetings at the community hall in Waiau that were run by [Insurer], private insurance, 
council and everybody was there. And they had to stand and talk and people could fire questions at them and 
they were accountable, all of a sudden. And so, the council was really proactive or Rural Support, whoever it 
was, at getting every eight weeks or so there was a different stage, so we’ve had the initial response and now 
we are at the stage here that’s repairing infrastructure, so we had another meeting and we started getting to 
the rebuild, insurance side. They had people talking that weren’t aligned with the parties that you were 
dealing with, but were experts in the knowledge or the law around that talking to you, so you knew what your 
rights were. ‘Cause it cost us a lot of money to engage with our lawyer, but some haven’t got the ability to do 
that. That community laws been set up that’s specialising in earthquakes.” 
Contractors, Consultants and Suppliers 
The Farm B farmers were able to complete emergency woolshed repairs within the first 
few weeks. In order to complete their more permanent stockyard and woolshed repairs 
a consultancy company was hired by insurance to complete the scoping work. The 
company had Christchurch earthquake experience, but had never done rural work. They 
were unfamiliar with many farm terms and farm infrastructure requirements. Their 
experience did not transfer regions. This lack of experience slowed the recovery process 
because the company had no understanding of what needed to be repaired. One of the 
farmers commented on a survey company’s lack of experience: 
“The sheep yards, for example, lifted 1.6 metres from the back of the yards to the front. They used to run 
slightly uphill. Sheep naturally like running uphill. For a sheep to run downhill, they just hate it. Don’t ask me 
why, but they don’t do it. To try to get a scoping team from Christchurch that have never done any rural work, 
to try and explain to them that the sheep yards need to be flat or on a slight incline because that’s what they 
were. They look at it and tell you, they’ve just got no understanding of what it is they’re dealing with" 
In a follow up, the farmer noted that the company had a bad reputation. 
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“We’ve since heard that the guys that started, I won’t use the company’s name, but it won’t be hard to find out, 
that do the scoping for FMG was a failed building company in Christchurch anyway. And I don’t even think 
they employ a structural engineer.” 
Employment costs were another issue. One farmer explained why hiring contractors to 
complete several tasks at one time and accommodating them on farm as cheaper: 
“It's way cheaper to get a contractor to do lots of little jobs, rather than hire for each job. The travel, 
accommodation and meal allowance for a thirty-week project, which is around building a new home would be 
80,000 dollars. So, you could imagine if you take a cash settlement from your insurance company and your 
painter has done a quote say to spend four days on site and they don't get a bit finished and there'll be a 
clause in there that if they have to come back and forth, it's around 70 cent a k. Most people are charging 
around 70 or 80 cents a k...it doesn't take many days of travel to start to ramp things up. And whether they 
come up for a day or half an hour, you incur the same cost. " 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
NGOs stepped in to help in specialised ways following the earthquake. The Queen 
Elizabeth II (QEII) trust was involved in retiring land that had been damaged by 
coseismic hazards. The Rural Support Trust expanded their work that had begun during 
the drought to include advocacy as well.  
Before the earthquake, the Farm A farmers had gifted some land to the QEII. QEII acts as 
a steward for the land gifted to it, but the gifter typically continues to maintain and care 
for the land. Some of the land that Farm A had gifted turned into a large landslip during 
the earthquake. It had been mostly returned to its natural state and was covered in 
Manuka. The earthquakes damaged fencing on the gifted land. QEII had a fund to pay for 
natural disaster mitigation and repairs. The farmers were able to use this fund to repair 
the fences on the gifted land rather than having to use several thousand of their own 
dollars. 
Rural Support Trust is an organisation that really imbedded itself in the community 
during the drought. Its purpose is to provide mental health services to farmers. There 
are several regional branches. The organisation made its presence felt by simply being 
around, supplying community get-togethers and even acting as advocates at civic 
meetings. One farmer described the trusts contributions to the recovery effort: 
Farmer B: “Rural support trust. They had really kicked into gear during the drought. Well after the 
earthquake, they knew exactly what they were dealing with from stress, whether it was from the drought or 
earthquake or whatever. I am not aware of anyone around here that committed suicide in the wider 
Canterbury from the earthquake. From the drought, I better not speak out of turn ‘cause there are quite a few 
farmer suicides every year in New Zealand. Just financial pressure or whatever and I am not aware of 
anything that’s gone on down here. But they’ve got to take a huge amount of credit for- they were just around. 
There was beers arriving at people’s farms for barbeques. We just need to get everybody together, have a 
barbeque. If somebody’s sitting by themselves who is normally quite friendly and got a bit of attitude with 
them and all of a sudden, they’re looking a bit down and stuff. That’s the chance that everybody’s got to and 
they were out there saying there’s no disrespect. If you think someone is not right, just get off to say something 
to one of those rural support people because it’s all confidential and behind closed doors and we just go out 
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there and make sure they are ok. You are better off to make that phone call rather than…yeah, not do 
anything. That Rural Support Trust has been amazing. Just linking stuff in people’s ears. They are high enough 
up the chain that giving a bit of trouble with something they can- “ 
Researcher: “Grease the wheels?” 
Farmer B: “’Cause once a month, once every few weeks, once we got further into it. All the insurers had to 
report in a three weekly, monthly meeting, whatever that was. MBIE, I think was part of it, MPI, I think was 
part of that, the council was and so they would say this is case X and there’s been a lot of frustration from 
those people and what’s going on? And they’d say we’ve done this or we’ve got this in line and all those other 
organisations knew, like Rural Support Trust, knew exactly what was going on and if someone was not quite 
putting out what the case was they were caught up with quite quickly and so there was no sort of hiding. 
Originally, there was people coming into these meetings saying this, this and this have been done and these 
people are fine and someone was able to sit there and say, well we’ve been there and that’s not the case at all. 
I was pretty impressed with how everything kicked off around that with the earthquake." 
4.5.3.3  Long-term (>6 months) 
As time passes, outside support recedes. The sudden absence of attention and aid 
magnifies the stress of recovery. A Farm A farmer commented on this effect: 
“Well you talk about the cascading effects of physical business and stress and physical reactions to things. 
That in itself is probably the biggest thing I’ve had to deal with. The anger and the frustration and the turmoil. 
I think at the start. There is a lot of love around, good will, a lot of help. It’s a really good vibe and then it all 
disappoints. You feel like you’re trudging along by yourself.” 
Insurance and contractors have the most contact. Some longer-term government and 
NGO initiatives come into place following lessons learnt from the earthquake. 
Government 
Most of the government initiatives were enacted soon after the earthquake. Most of the 
government’s interactions with the farms’ recovery in the long-term were with this 
previously discussed initiatives and a return to regular regulation. Later in the year, 
Farm A also acquired a discount Rawhiti cottages. The cottage arrived on site in 
December. 
Contractors, Consultants and Suppliers 
The Farm A farmers hired a lawyer in August 2017 to help them deal with insurance. 
This was much later in the process that the other farms. They were pushed to hire a 
lawyer when they realised that they might lose the chance to complete repairs before 
winter. They commented: 
 “And [lawyer]’s just sort of making sure the wording of our insurance means that we are covered for the loss 
and the land equation of the insurance. So, we are doing a due diligence process with them. In hindsight, I 
probably should have rung the lawyer within a week…Just put a game plan in place. Just a strategy.” 
On Farm B, the farmers encountered issues when reinstating insurance on their 
repaired buildings and adding insurance for their new buildings. They recommend 
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hiring a lawyer pre-earthquake in order to make sure that farmers have a thorough 
understanding of their coverage. One farmer described their process of insuring their 
new structures: 
“But what we’re finding now is we’re starting to get the woolshed reinsured and insurance for this house, 
when we got it on site that you probably really need to get a lawyer or solicitor to read through because 
they’re changing what we had. We’re on total replacement for everything here, but everything that’s been 
bought on farm or will be built, which they now consider more risk than what they had has now gone on 
nominated policy...Since we’ve got through this, it pays to spend a couple of thousand dollars, five grand for a 
solicitor to read your policy and actually have a full understanding of what you’ve got so if you need to tweak 
them, you do because when an event, or something like this, occurs you rely so much on insurance.” 
Agricultural Businesses and Organisations 
Federated Farmers and Beef+Lamb, with the support of MPI, have started a series of 
projects to help with long-term re-planning. MPI originally set up a land-use advisory 
fund for individual farmers. This fund has transformed into community advisory 
projects so that consultants can be hired to create issue specific reports. The initiative 
had not kicked off by the time of the second interview in January of 2018. Committees 
had been formed and the opinions of the two involved farmers were mixed. 
One farmer described what they hoped to gain: 
 “Yeah, well we haven’t kicked that off yet. There was a lot of toing and froing about how the money should be 
spent and what it should be spent on, but that’s what been come up with. So, they’ve split into three groups, 
the money’s been allocated and then of those three big areas they’ve gone into little subgroups and so instead 
of paying a consultant to come to each farm. He can come out, ‘cause you’re going to pay for him for a day and 
do say three farms or whatever it was, but other people who are involved in that group would learn enough 
from the reporting that came back to put the ideas-…So, he might do a bit of a report on forestry and bees, 
which he doesn’t need to go onto everyone’s farm to do because we know that area might go into trees and 
we’ll leave a bit Manuka there for the bees or even plant some Manuka for the bees. That report will tell us 
everything from step one through to-. It’s put the foundation there for us….” 
Another farmer commented that they would prefer a more practical repair focused fund 
than the committees: 
 “Yup, so they are trying to get- To me I’m a bit cynical. Fencing is still number one. It’s all very well and good 
walking in and saying you need to do this, this and this. I just don’t see why we have to pay people to come and 
tell us how to suck eggs. Pragmatically, ten grand on wire and Waratahs, fencing standards would definitely 
be a better use of the money. I think the council was always going to have an advisory role because 
Environment Canterbury ultimately has a say on how land is managed anyway. So, you could argue that that 
sort of stuff is already in place. We need pragmatic solutions.” 
4.5.3.4  Exogenous Management System 
Exogenous management systems are management systems with a majority of off-farm 
support components. These may include advisors, ownership boards and financial 
consultants. They are frequently associated with large off-farm networks. The farmers 
of Farm C are the only ones of the three sets of farmers to have this management style. 
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The Farm C farmers had a team consisting of their bank manager, farm advisor and 
accountant. Their bank manager and farm advisor called on their extensive farm 
networks to identify and contact dairy farms who were able to take in some of Farm C’s 
cows. The farmers would did not have access to the information about which farm had 
which kind of dairy shed. They were also not have had everyone’s contact information 
readily available. Without this team they would not have been able to evacuate their 
dairy cows as quickly and efficiently as they did. Their team knew Farm C’s status, 
assets and dairy shed type and were able to match it to that information for many farms 
in the region. This collective, network knowledge allowed them to select the farms best 
suited to take the dairy cows. 
One farmer described their team:  
“…we’ve got a team. And as I say, we’ve got our bank manager, our accountant, our advisor and ourselves. The 
four[?] of us know exactly what is going on on this farm all the time. We don’t see the bank manager all the 
time, but he gets a breakdown of our money pay-outs accounts and that. So, when it has happened that team 
has worked for us. So, I think that’s the main thing to have. You can’t say ok I’ll build a plan round this 
disaster, that disaster, you can only react to disaster really. But the plan is to have that strong group round 
you and that sort of includes insurance too.”            
Exogenous management systems’ greatest asset is its network capacity. This system 
works with farms that have a precise day to day plans. It makes up for not being as 
flexible as a small on-farm team by having a larger human resource pool to draw from. 
4.5.3.5  Exogenous Support Summary 
Exogenous support infuses the farm with resources when their on-farm resources are 
stretched to their limit. Every exogenous entity varies in term of interaction timing and 
the nature of their support. Coordination between levels and different entities could be 
improved. Long-term support is lacking. The sudden absence, after much immediate aid 
at all levels, magnifies stress. Large networks of support save lives. When a farm is 
isolated by geography or hazards, exogenous support cannot access the farm. Instead 
the farm must rely on its internal, endogenous, support, which may not be enough. Most 
exogenous support is economic. 
4.6  Economic Factors 
Economics drive the farm. Without financial resources or the ability to create financial 
resources, a farm cannot function. The economic decisions a farmer makes pre-
earthquake (i.e., buying insurance and setting up an emergency fund) are forms of 
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preparedness that affect their ability to recovery. Exogenous support often comes in 
financial form (i.e., government grants or NGO donations). Government grants generally 
apply after the event’s scale is known. A farm’s immediately accessible economic 
resources is both their physical assets and their liquid capital. The timeline of when and 
for what purpose money is made available controls the recovery timeline. This section 
will focus on the major economic sources: insurance, emergency funds and government 
grants. 
4.6.1.1  Pre-earthquake 
Before an earthquake occurs, farmers can make several financial decisions to increase 
their capacity to recover. Insurance is the most direct form of financial preparedness. 
Farm A had business interruption insurance. When they were unable to shear their 
sheep because of the damage to the woolshed, they were able to enter a claim. The price 
of the wool decreased due to deterioration tied to not being sheared on time. 
A farm’s emergency fund is a measure of preparation. The amounts vary between farms. 
The Farm A farmers’ fund was not as large as it might have been because they had just 
completed a water and fencing infrastructure upgrade. In addition, the damage meant 
they effectively had to purchase that infrastructure twice. 
Like the Farm A farmers, the Farm B farmers had suffered some economic losses due to 
the earthquake. However, much of their low financial resource pool came from 
resolving an ownership buyout. One farmer commented on their compounded loans: 
“‘Cause probably we were in the drought and we had to take some loses anyway and all of a sudden, we were 
talking about a substantial amount of money we had to pay others out and then we had the earthquake. So, 
we had basically gotten to the point where our borrowings were what we basically considered to be the 
maximum to still run efficiently on farm.” 
Insurance is another form of preparedness. The intricacies of different insurance types 
are outside the scope of this these. The importance of hiring a lawyer before insurance 
needed to be used was emphasised.  
The Farm C farmers did not have business interruption insurance. Unfortunately, this 
meant that when their dairy shed was made non-functional, they were left without 
recourse for their lost income. The farmers discussed this insurance: 
Farmer C1: “And we should have had business interruption insurance. You know, we had talked about it, but 
you don’t think- But with the dairy shed out, it’s not like if you’re sheep and beef, you know, the grass still 
grows. Even if you’re flooded or whatever, it’s still going to keep growing, but with the dairy shed out, we were 
totally out of business.” 
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Farmer C2: “Worst scenario, you know, yeah the shed might be a bit- but the cows can still go somewhere for a 
couple of weeks then you get them back and start milking again, but it didn’t it was out all season. Had it been 
at the end of the season, it wouldn’t have been too much of a problem, it just hit us right where- “ 
Farmer C1: “Peak.” 
Farmer C2: “And when you’re running, it’s a reasonable size business, and five grand or whatever for that 
business interruption, is not going to break the business. But if we don’t have it, it could.” 
Farmer C1: “The two sheds either side of us, they were out for one day, they were out for two days and the 
farm next to them, they carried on milking, so you know it’s very extreme for your shed to be a total write off 
and that’s what the insurance have said. Total write offs are usually fires or maybe floods, perhaps, but not 
like that. So, in hindsight we should have had business interruption, but we have now. We’ve shut the gate.” 
4.6.1.2  Insurance Claim Settlement Processes 
MBIE opened a wage subsidy fund for small business employers to be able to continue 
to pay their employees. The Farm C farmers were able to take advantage of this fund. It 
helped fill some of the gap left by not having an income source and business 
interruption insurance to replace it. Since the earthquake, they have taken out business 
interruption insurance.  
Insurance came into effect immediately. Two of the farmers had spoken with their 
insurance agents and companies on the day of the earthquake. The third had an on-farm 
visit within a week. This speed did not last past Christmas. One Farm B farmer 
described their insurance’s early involvement: 
“Yeah and the response from the 14th of November to, I recon, about the 14th of December, for about a 
month, maybe for a few days after that was…you could not fault it. There was nothing they weren’t trying to 
help with. If we can get that person there to find out what- if you get that done, send us an invoice, but all of a 
sudden, the rules changed and it went from let’s get this working and moving to we need to send out Inovo, 
which is the company that does the scoping for them.” 
A number of lessons about insurance coverage were garnered during this time. One 
Farm A farmer commented: 
 “The insurance for farm houses is geared towards urban water supply, where you’ve got a supply of water at 
your gate. And they will cover you for 50 metres or so within your house boundary.”  
On the other hand, a Farm B farmer found that some parts of their system were 
unexpectedly covered under insurance.  
“We’ve discovered that a water tank comes under an unspecified farm building. For my policy, we could have 
a claim for 5,000 dollars per unspecified building to a maximum of six claims. So, you could have up to 30,000 
dollars. There are things like that that are in your fine print, that to be honest I haven’t really read through it, 
but they triggered.” 
In mid-December 2016, the insurer closed a deal with private insurers to manage 
processing for earthquake claims covered by insurer (EQC 2016). The goal of this 
agreement was to simply speed the insurance process for claimants. The insurer’s 
earthquake insurance claims window closed mid-February. Most of the claimants have 
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been addressed, but not everything had been resolved as of January 2018. Farm A 
rejected the insurer’s initial offer. The farmer described their experience with the 
insurer: 
Farmer A: “This earthquake is a little bit different to the Christchurch earthquake where [Insurer] got the 
insurance companies to act on their behalf to do all the building assessments and stuff like that. So, [Insurer] 
haven’t been on the coal faces this earthquake. It’s been subcontracted to [Insurer] and [Insurer] companies 
like that. So, [Insurer] when we have dealt with them have been really prompt and on site. The likes of 
[Neighbour]’s retaining wall and damage to his land. They were very quick about that. And they were quick 
over there [the shearers’ quarters’ direction] too, it’s just that I think they were wrong. And they will say ‘Aw, 
it’s not impending doom’ or what’s that the term or phrase.” 
Researcher: “Imminent Risk.” 
Farmer A: “Imminent Risk. And I’m like, ‘Aw well doesn’t really matter because it’s on a fault rupture.’ The 
hazards, they are two different things, but they cover more ground. The landslides giving me the shits more 
that the fault ruptures. But also, it’s just not going to neatly follow that fault and then that fault there. It could 
be once that bit goes, that bit decides to go as well.” 
During the start of the short-term recovery period, insurance companies began to be 
impacted by the reaction of their reinsurers. A farmer described this transition: 
"When they were starting to see the size of the event. The reinsurers were starting to get involved and as soon 
as the reinsurers got involved, all of a sudden, the breaks went on and that was it. ‘Ah, no sorry. We can’t do 
that now.’ Like, ‘We’ve got so-and-so coming up to fix this, do emergency repairs, not a problem, just send in 
the invoice when you’ve got it fixed.’ And reinsurers were starting to get some exposure to it and all of a 
sudden, it’s like there’s no more of that. You have to be assessed by [Surveying Company] was the company 
that they used. They have to come up and assess it and there’s all this reporting that has to go through before 
anything would be. And so even your assessor you’d ring him up, that was on your case, and say ‘We’re at a 
point where we fix this to keep going.’ And he’d just say, ‘My hands are tied. I’m not allowed to do anything 
unless scoping team signs off on it.’” 
Insurance claim resolution is a gradual process. Claims for infrastructure covered under 
the same policy may be settled at different rates.  
The extended process allows for more opportunities for slowing the process further as 
new people are brought in. One Farm A farmer discussed slowdown: 
Farmer A: “We’ve had a number of staff members from [Insurer] leave or move on. We had our own broker 
leaver her job. We haven’t actually dealt with one person all the way through. That’s quite frustrating because 
you feel as though you’re actually making some progress and then they leave. They go on holiday. I guess it’s 
the human factor that people’s lives change and you can’t expect people to keep a job just because your 
insurance claim is-. But it just creates- there is still a lot of pragmatic conversations that are had and I guess 
they form positions that they generally sway either way on. And when they start to sway a certain way they 
act quite quickly. But they seemed to be going back to these new people that all of a sudden they’ve got to get 
a heads up.” 
Researcher: “You’re potentially educating a new person?” 
Farmer A: “Yeah, it feels like that.” 
On Farm B, the farmers had nearly a year long argument with their insurers over the 
coverage and payment of their policies on their woolshed and homestead. Their 
woolshed claim was settled by April. A major part of their insurance claim struggle was 
over the coverage of the woolshed’s power source. There was disagreement about 
115 
 
whether or not the land damage that made the power unusable was covered by 
insurance. Also. The repair estimates from the insurance company’s scoping company 
and insurance company themselves were not matching. Once the insurance claim 
settled, the power companies were quick to fix the line.  
Farm B’s homestead claim took longer. The homestead was not uninhabitable due to 
damaged sustained, but because a large historic landslide was declared an imminent 
risk. The local council had refused to issue a building consent for repairs. Numerous 
surveying companies had surveyed and written up reports declaring imminent risk. The 
insurance continued to offer repair in the same place. The farmer described the back 
and forth between various engineering companies, geologists, insurance and the 
council: 
"So, we had all these reports back and in the meantime, to get [Engineering Consultant 1] to come back we 
had, [UC geologist] had put us in contact with [Engineering Consultant 2] and we had a guy that we were 
working with there that, his name slipped off the top of my head. But anyway, [UC geologist] had said to us, 
[Engineering Geologist]. They said to us, ‘Look we’ll put you in touch with this guy and we’ll get things rolling. 
So, we had another report that came back from [Engineering Consultant 2] before the last [Engineering 
Consultant 1] one that said, ‘No, we believe there is imminent risk.’ So, as soon as we sent that into [Insurer] 
they started to really get things rolling and that’s when they got [Engineering Consultant 1] back. And there 
was obviously a lot of stuff going on because that’s when that [Engineering Geologist] came out and said, 
‘Well, yeah.’ So, in the end we had two reports. We had the original [The Government Department] one that 
said not to go into the area. Then we had the [Engineering Consultant 2]’s one that said Nah. They had to 
state that there was imminent risk, which they did. And then we had [Engineering Consultant 1] come back up 
under [Insurer] and said yup this is imminent risk. So, we had all these reports and they all went to the private 
insurer ‘cause by this time they were saying Ah yeah send them in send them in ‘cause this will help us with 
our findings, so we sent them all in and the offer came back exactly the same. They said no we don’t believe 
there’s any risk. So, we will repair you in the same location. In the meantime, the council won’t give a consent 
for repairs because you have a building consent it has to have a fifty-year lifespan and no one would put their 
name on a document to say we believe that if we repair this house on this location that for the next fifty years 
someone will be safe in that location. Because as [UC geologist] had pointed out quite often you’ll get these big 
ruptures and I think he used the Napier earthquake as the prime location. They had a massive rupture come 
down, was it twenty years, quite a long period after they had a massive landslide come down. And that was a 
result of that earthquake, it was quite a long time. No one could come up there and say this moment, next 
month, it depends on weather conditions. So, we get another aftershock… " 
Their claims were settled in November 2017. They credit their lawyers with being a 
major force in reaching a satisfactory resolution. 
4.6.1.3  Long-term Economic Re-planning 
Post-earthquake recovery, there are several changes to the farmers’ economic 
situations, specifically in terms of insurance. To begin with, some of the insurance 
claims settlement processes stretched to over a year. 
The Farm B farmers finally settled with their insurance company in November 2017 
after meeting with the head of the insurance company. 
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"So, the biggest change we had from mid-August, when you were here to when we actually settled with them 
was that the head of [Insurer 1] came on site. He was bought up by an independent third party ‘cause there 
were two families in exactly the same situation. Us and another family up the road. Both with a house at the 
base of a hill. Both with exactly the same situation. Both fighting and arguing with the insurance company 
and getting nowhere. So, in the end a third party, once again a door was opened by someone else for a third 
party who knew how to link everything together, got the head of [Insurer 1] up and he came and sat and met 
with us and actually listened. Did both families on the same day. He came to us second. And listened and I had 
no idea what had gone on in the other meeting and what we were telling him mirrored exactly what the other 
family had gone through. Whether he knew or not, he just apologised and said, ‘What I’ve been getting down 
from my staff is completely different to what you guys have just told me. So, we had the head of the 
earthquake recovery for Kaikōura, which was [Insurer 1 Employee] who used to work for [Insurer 2] who was 
head hunted or whatever, snapped up by [Insurer 1] ‘cause of experience, was removed from our case that 
day. So, we’d been arguing with him for months. And we’d get some really smart. Even our lawyer, we ended 
up litigating through the litigation side of our legal team because our lawyers got so fed up with his bullshit. 
He was just the smartest…As soon as we outlined everything that was happening, he was removed from that 
point. And everything started to roll quite quickly. I kept saying it was funny, everyone was battling with 
[Insurer 2], [Insurer 1 Employee] was in charge of the bloody thing. And as soon as he leaves, all of a sudden, 
you start getting good stories about [Insurer 2]. And we’ve had no problems with [Insurer 1] and the minute 
he took up office in [Insurer 1]. We broke up for Christmas, as soon as they started back, I’d say properly 
because your insurance agency never shuts down, but once that mid-January period rolled ‘round he was in 
charge and that was when everything started getting sticky.” 
The Farm C farmers commented that insurance companies had to learn how to process 
earthquake claims. Insurer and the private insurance companies had come to a claims 
processing agreement shortly after the November 14th earthquakes. The farmers were 
impressed by their insurance company’s adaption: 
 “I think the insurance have come a long way since then too. You sort of have to appreciate where they are to 
the Earthquake Commission when they put it all together ‘cause our insurance joker said we don’t know what 
we are doing because we haven’t dealt with that part before. And yet they were handed that over. Since then 
they’ve gotten a couple of chaps from the earthquake commission team. But there was a lot of work for them 
to do to get up and running as to what they needed to do and how they dealt with it. ‘Cause it’s like everything. 
It’s always changing, isn’t it? ‘Cause you think you’re set up right, that earthquake came along, bam, how do 
we deal with the commission? Set up there, how’s it going to work? We’ve got the team, have we got enough 
people?" 
By January 2018, the Farm A farmers had put a halt to repairing any more of their water 
system until an insurance claim they had put in for it came through. Their water was 
functional, but not ideal at this time. 
A Farm B farmer hoped for the chance to give their insurance feedback: 
Farmer B: "And I would hope that they would ring me and actually sit down with me to say, you’ve gone from 
the earthquake, now you’ve been settled. Probably got a pretty good idea of what they thought our experience 
was, but sit down and actually work out what the short comings were. I think they need to visit their clients 
and work that out. They can do it internally, but they’ve got to speak to the people-“ 
Researcher: “Decent debrief type thing?” 
Farmer B: “Yeah" 
In addition, post-earthquake the farms’ insurance policies are being updated. The Farm 
B farmers are finding that the earthquake has changed their policies completely. They 
explain that their coverage type changed: 
 “But what we’re finding now is we’re starting to get the woolshed reinsured and insurance for this house, 
when we got it on site that you probably really need to get a lawyer or solicitor to read through because 
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they’re changing what we had. We’re on total replacement for everything here, but everything that’s been 
bought on farm or will be built, which they now consider more risk than what they had has now gone on 
nominated policy.” 
They found that the nominated policy offers were not close to the values they had 
anticipated. They discussed the frustrating difference between nominated and total 
replacement coverage. Some of their neighbours found that following the Christchurch 
2011 earthquakes, the insurance wording had changed. The farmer explained the 
confusing disaster-related insurance changes: 
 “With the nominated their saying that ‘Well if you can get someone to come up and replicate what you had, in 
terms of damage, we’ll rebuild it’s a total loss. If we think we can do it for less than your nominated value, 
we’ll manage the project.’ I’m better to be slightly over insured because I’m the one paying the premium. If you 
think you can fix it or reinstate it for less than the amount that I’ve insured it for, to me that doesn’t matter 
because if you’re putting back like for like what difference does it make? But if I only insure at your value and 
then the woolshed burnt downed and someone came up to do a quote to rebuild it and they said it was half a 
mil and I’m only insured for 300, I’ve got to find 200,000 dollars. Because at that point they say, ‘Aw, we’re 
going to cash settle you’ I bet you they don’t say ‘we’re going to manage the project’ because they know they 
can’t reinstate if for the money they’ve got on the-. I know of people, the guy that works for me even, who have 
got some insured. Just round numbers again we’ll just say half a mil and then in their policy fine prints they’ve 
discovered that since Christchurch it’s been changed now under an earthquake or a natural disaster, even 
though you have some insured for that amount, we send valuers back in and if we think that the house is 
worth less or the value of things is worth less than the sum insured we’re going to pay you out the lesser of the 
two amounts. And so, a lot people are saying, ‘well hang on. We’ve actually asked you what you think we 
should reinsure our house for and they’ve said half a million dollars or that half mil marker, whatever sort of 
house you’ve got. ‘Cause that’s what it is to replace. But now you’re saying that you’ll send someone in and if 
they say that it’s an old house and it’s only worth 300. Cause you can’t rebuild something for that.”  
Ultimately, the farmer recommended involving a lawyer to aid coverage understanding 
and prevent issues before insurance was needed. They said: 
“Since we’ve got through this, it pays to spend a couple of thousand dollars, five grand for a solicitor to read 
your policy and actually have a full understanding of what you’ve got so if you need to tweak them, you do 
because when an event, or something like this, occurs you rely so much on insurance.” 
As contrast the Farm C farmers have experienced only minor changes. Their insurance 
premiums increased. Nothing changed outside their expectations. 
4.6.1.4  Economic Summary 
A farm cannot pay the recovery bills required to return to full functionality from their 
own capital resources alone. Insurance and government grants are vital for farms to be 
able to complete repairs within a reasonable period of time and maintain functionality. 
Legal advice is essential to help farmer understand the extent of their coverage before 
needing to place a claim. Post-earthquake legal advice for dealing with insurance was 
advised as well. Several issues arose in connection with the insurance process. Given the 
new policy of having the private insurance companies subcontract for insurer and the 
magnitude of the event, it would be prude for insurance companies to conduct post-
event debriefs of their own. Pragmatic focused grants (i.e. paying for uninsurable 
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infrastructure such as fences and water) was viewed more favourably than advisory 
grants.  
4.7  Impact and Recovery Timeline 
Earthquake impact and recovery happens over three stages: initial response, short-term 
recovery and long-term re-planning (Figure 10). A close examination of the timelines of 
each case study shows similarities at the larger scale (i.e. regional) and differences at 
the smaller scale (i.e. farm). Although, all three farms experience the three stages of 
recovery, their timing and transitions are different.  
Stages of Recovery 
 
Figure 19 The three broad stages of post-earthquake recovery are initial response (approx. the first six weeks to three 
months), short-term recovery (approx. first six to eight months.), long-term re-planning (may span years). The transitions 
between each stage are gradual. The length and timing of each stage differs between farms. Significant events marked are: 
14th November 2016 earthquake (star) and April 2017 cyclones Cook and Debbie (spiral). 
4.7.1  Response and Early Recovery 
The initial response to the earthquake lasts approximately 6 weeks to three months. 
The farm level priorities are similar across all farm: life safety and lifeline restoration. 
Most repairs done during this time are emergency repair designed to restore basic 
function to the farm. Farm A’s initial response stage lasted slightly longer due to on-
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going water restoration issues. Slow contractor work and cascading hazards (in the 
form an overtopped landslide dam) re-damaged their water system. 
Short-term recovery is from approximately six weeks to eight months after the 
earthquake. The basic priorities have been achieved. Repair shifts from emergency to 
permanent. The April cyclones and winter rains stretched out repair by undoing repair 
work during this time. Farm type (e.g., dairy, sheep and beef), topography, contractors, 
off-farm networks and insurance are main influencers to the speed and prioritisation of 
tasks during this stage. Each farm type has different infrastructure and resources. The 
farms with more variable topography displayed more cascading hazards that re-
damaged infrastructure. Pre-existing relationships with contractors can be beneficial. 
High demand for contractors decreases workforce availability, which slows individual 
farm recovery. Strong off-farm networks can be another workforce and experience 
resource during this time. The insurance process enters high gear during this stage. 
During the initial response stage, most of the insurance process was submitted claims, 
conducting surveys and returning initial estimates were the bulk of the initial response 
stage. The major claims began to be resolved and paid out during the short-term 
recovery stage as permanent repairs began. 
4.7.2  Long-term Re-planning 
Long-term re-planning spans years. It typically begins after permanent repair of major 
infrastructure is complete. However, if rebuilding is delayed or the farmers are 
considering a major change in direction, re-planning can begin much sooner. During this 
stage farmers may adopt a conservative, expansionary or mixed approach to plan the 
future of their farm. Repair of water pipes and fences continue. Cascading hazards 
triggered by the earthquake continue to re-damage the farm.  
4.7.3  Case Study Timelines 
The case study timelines were divided by spatial and temporal scale to demonstrate the 
variations on those scales (Table 11, Table 12 Table 13). At the district and national 
levels, the key events for each farm are nearly identical. The only variation are 
initiatives that only impacted certain farms. For example, the MBIE’s wage subsidy for 
small business employers used by the Farm C farmers. Also, only the Farm A and B 
farmers have participated with the land-use advisory committees because they have 
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had more significant land-use issues that the low relief dairy farm. All three continue, 
and anticipate continuing, having to conduct water pipe and fence repair. 
Key variations at the farm level: 
 The Farm A farmers did not receive major insurance claim resolution within the 
first twelve months. 
 Farm A’s pump shed was re-damaged by landslide dam overtopping. A smaller, 
unstable landslide dam-related lake continued to damage fences for several 
months. 
 Farm B’s homestead was the only main homestead lost due to coseismic hazard 
related risk. 
 Farm B had power and water restored at the farm-scale during the first few 
weeks. It was not restored until April (power) and May (water).  
 The CDEM roadblock only impacted Farms A and B, of the three. 
 Farm C’s primary economic infrastructure complex (i.e. dairy shed) was repaired 
within eight months of the earthquake. 
 Most of Farm C’s livestock (1000 dairy cattle) were evacuated within the first 
forty-eight hours. This left the farmers unable to use their main revenue stream 
until the end of July (eight months later) when the cattle had been returned and 
the dairy shed rebuilt. 
Insurance, farm type and geographical location are the main factors in the key farm 





Table 11 Farm A's earthquake impacts and recovery timeline. The timeline is displayed on two intersecting scale (spatial and temporal). The yellow boxes refer to asset acquisition, rebuild or 
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Table 12 Farm B's earthquake impacts and recovery timeline. The timeline is displayed on two intersecting scale (spatial and temporal). The yellow boxes refer to asset acquisition, rebuild or 
repair. The green boxes contain financial input events. The pink boxes refer to financial grant announcement or process engagement. 
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Table 13 Farm C's earthquake impacts and recovery timeline. The timeline is displayed on two intersecting scale (spatial and temporal). The yellow boxes refer to asset acquisition, rebuild or 
repair. The green boxes contain financial input events. The pink boxes refer to financial grant announcement or process engagement. 
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4.8  Future 
The future of the farm is the goal of the final stage of earthquake recovery. A 
combination of long-term goals, plans and the responsibility for the next generation 
factor into the decisions made. Farmers display a variety of attitudes to the results of 
the earthquake. Some convert to more conservative mind-sets to try and limit their 
exposure in the future. Others take the opportunity to expand and diversify their 
economic sources. All three farms changed their business plans slightly. The Farm A 
farmers developed a conservative farming approach during the three drought that 
preceded the earthquake. They have maintained this approach but are focusing on and 
expanding their current ventures. For example, they are going to train and begin caring 
for their own bees rather than just working with beekeepers. The Farms B and C 
farmers all discussed more optimistic driven expansion of their farms. 
4.8.1.1  The Next Generation 
The farmers on all three farms are parents. They intend to pass their farm onto their 
children in the future. Many of their decisions regarding the future revolve around 
making sure the farm is better for their children. One farmer commented: 
“Farming’s intergenerational…There’s not many of us who would pass something on in worse condition or not 
have an eye on the future. Cause what have we done for our children and our grandchildren, nothing. We’ve 
got to be sustainable.” 
4.8.1.2  Conservatism 
The conservative approach is used to try and maintain the assets and function the farm 
still has. This can mean reducing stock numbers. The farmers reduced Farm A’s stock 
numbers during the drought as well due to financial pressure. This practice has 
continued because the weather has continued to be dry. Also, the earthquake made the 
physical task of controlling sheep more difficult because of the extensive fencing 
damage. 
4.8.1.3  Diversification/Expansion 
The diversification or expansion approach involve exploring new or expanding existing 
aspects of the farm. For Farm B the earthquake has prompted the farmers to reassess:  
"There could be opportunities for bees or pine forestry or whatever that I wouldn’t have thought of or I just wasn’t interested in. I was 
quite happy doing what we were doing.” 
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Farm A had bees on-farm pre-earthquake. The farmers contracted with local 
beekeepers. They are looking to expand into owning their own bees. One Farm A farmer 
commented the following: 
“We have decided that we see beekeeping as a future here. We’ve bought some hives. [Farmer] is doing some 
training. ‘Cause it just changes the risk profile because bees don’t need infrastructure. I think beekeeping has 
a massive future. I just think anything to do with real food and nature operating in a system has got to be 
good to be involved it.” 
Land-use changes also falls under this approach. A large section of Farm A’s property 
lost its grazing productivity capacity due to landsliding. The farmers had retired land 
pre-earthquake by gifting it to QEII (Section 4.5.3.2 ). They may consider retiring some 
earthquake damaged land. The retired land was returned to native bush and fed back 
into their expanded bee enterprise. 
The Farm A and B farmers discussed modifying their infrastructure to reduce risk and 
increase resilience. 
The Farm A farmers had adjusted their fencing to reduce risk from landsliding: 
“We are sort of developing a farming system that is extensive, there’s always going to be risk but we are trying 
to lessen the risk to our infrastructure. Even when we’re planning our fences now. I think that’s been the thing 
with this earthquake, which has been a bit of a curve ball. Normally, if you stick to the crest of slopes you are 
getting out of the landsliding area, but in some places the whole tops of the hills have pulled off, which is just 
hard luck, but in general we are reinstating. Fences that used to be on slopes we are now pulling them out and 
we are reinstating them on ridges. ‘Cause now that my brain is hardwired to look at landslides.” 
Farm B is the only one of the three that uses the county water scheme. The farmers 
planned to increase water resilience. Their aim is to become more self-sufficient. One 
farmer said: 
“The next step will be, even though the drought there were still springs, there was ground that was still 
spongey. The next stage is digging into those or tapping into those because for stock water, we don’t need a 
consent to tap into them to feed them, but if we can get those. It’s probably not going to be as pure as the 
water that comes out of the river, but if we can have those to either be a backup or split the line because the 
stock water- well the county scheme water is of the quality we can drink it so it’s what we drink and that 
comes through the tanks and feeds the troughs on the way through. If you start putting springs into those, 
that water will eventually end up at the house, so if it’s clean spring water, it doesn’t matter, but it’s got a bit 
of parpara or something you’ll pick that up in the taste of it. But I think the next step is making sure we are 
resilient enough that if we get an event, like a drought or this earthquake or whatever it might come, you’ve 
actually got something that can deliver water, you’re not relying on someone else to get it to you." 
The Farm C farmers said that the post-earthquake recovery as an opportunity to 
reassess: 
“One thing out of this, which isn’t quite answering you, but our business model there, has given us an 
opportunity to really look at it. And we won’t be going exactly the same tram lines, we’ll be going back a 
different way and we’re looking at it and how we can, given this opportunity. We’ve had an opportunity to 
turn over staff that might not have been ideally suited for where they were. So, we got that opportunity to get 
them right and the business itself a good time to really you got to take the positives out of it. And it’s given us 
a positive as far as really looking at what we are doing. And we are up and running now and shortly we will 
start having a meeting or two with our advisors and all that and just see where we can.” 
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4.8.1.4  Future Thoughts 
A Farm A farmer on the future: 
“I just think it’s the sheer scale of it. The reality is that I will probably be dealing with it, this earthquake, for a 
lot of my life and it always seems to come back to the landsliding that has happened on this farm. As things 
lubricate and we are talking about massive chunks that in ten years just might have enough whatever they 
need to move again. So, I think I will be dealing with it for my career." 
A Farm C farmer on the future: 
“And then summing up like [Farmer] said, we personally are worse off, as of a result of the earthquake, 
financially, but the farm, like for our boys they’ll inherit a better asset. We’ve got a new dairy shed, a better 
dairy shed. We will have one new house. That house was sixty, nearly seventy years old. So, we will have a new 
house. And it looks like we might get another new house that was forty years old. And we’ve got a better 
model. We think we’ve got a much better model of how our business should run. So, in five years’ time, I think, 
we will look back and see the farm is in a much better position. But us personally, we’ve suffered financially. 
Like we’re getting old and [Farmer]’s working harder than [they] ever has. And we’d like to travel at this 
stage of our lives, but we can’t leave the property because there is just so much going on and still to go on. Our 
boys will inherit- the mortgages will have a few extra zeros on the end, but that probably won’t even worry 
them.” 
4.8.1.5  Future Summary 
The 14th November 2016 earthquake presented an opportunity for all three farms to 
reassess their situations. The farmers adopted a mixed of conservative and expansionist 
approaches aimed at reducing risk and increasing their economic profile. All three 
farmers were made more risk aware by the earthquake. Regardless of their future plans, 
they all share the same goal of maintaining their farm for their children. 
4.9  Conclusions 
Lessons and recommendations for future farm level resilience and rural area 
earthquake preparedness have been developed from the five major themes. They touch 
on every aspect of earthquake impact and recovery. 
 Pre-existing conditions: 
o Pre-earthquake farmers and rural areas should conduct surveys to 
identify earthquake proneness and potential resources. The plans 
developed from these surveys should take on-going and seasonal climate 
conditions into account. 
 Farmer Experience: 
o Multiple types of farm and community experience contributes to 
resilience and recovery decisions. 
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 Physical Impacts: 
o Cascading hazards must be considered for future planning. Reactivated 
and cascade triggered hazards can cause more damage than the original 
earthquake and undo months and thousands of dollars of repairs. 
 Essential Infrastructure: 
o Infrastructure repair priority varies depending of farm type. 
o A strong neighbour/community/industry network to rely on when 
infrastructure is damaged or destroyed, reduces impact severity. 
 Essential Services: 
o Built-in redundancy and backup system components (e.g., generators, 
pump repair parts, track access to tanks) speeds recovery. 
 Livestock:  
o Every livestock type has different vulnerabilities. Changing or diversifying 
stock classes may reduce overall impact. 
 Mental Health:  
o The recovery process is a cumulative source of stress. There are multiple 
sources of stress and multiple avenues of support opportunities (e.g., 
community activities, advocacy, and restoration of home safety).  
 Endogenous:  
o On-farm human resources more vulnerable that exogenous support, but 
essential to day to day flexibility and operation. Cultivating on-farm 
human resources, if possible may help recovery. 
 Exogenous:  
o Off-farm human resources are less flexible and more specialised than 
endo support, but their large networks can complete tasks that endo 
support does not have the resources or energy to perform. 
 Economic Factors:  
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o Farmer emergency funds, insurance and government aid are the three 
main sources of post-earthquake recovery finance. Involving a lawyer 
early in the insurance and government aid process eases the process. 
 Future:  
o In order for the farm to be functional for the farmers’ children, which is 
the ultimate goal, adjustments must be made. This may mean 
conservatism or expansion. An earthquake is an opportunity to reassess 
the plan. 
 Timelines: 
o Impact and recovery timelines vary at the smaller scale for each farm due 




Chapter 5  Conclusions, Recommendations and Further Work 
5.1  Thesis scope and methodology 
The purpose of this study was to develop several case studies of the Hurunui/Kaikōura 
earthquake impact to and recovery of farms. The M7.8 Hurunui/Kaikōura earthquake 
occurred at 12:02 am on the 14th November 2016. The earthquake triggered 
widespread landsliding, rockfall, liquefaction and extensive surface ruptures 
throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough region. In addition, the lower part of 
the North Island, in particular the City of Wellington, was subject to damage from strong 
earthquake shaking. The Hurunui District is predominantly farmland and was 
significantly impacted by the earthquakes. To date there have been few farm level 
earthquake impacts studies in New Zealand and globally.  
This gap in global knowledge means that urban earthquake recovery strategies are 
sometimes misapplied to recovery in rural areas with less than optimal results. A 
general inductive approach analysis was conducted to identify key factors influencing 
the impacts to and recovery of farms from the 14th November earthquake.  
Timelines and key impact and recovery factors for the three case study farms were 
developed from the interview responses. A literature review of previous farm-scale 
hazard impact studies (e.g., Almond et al. 2010; Craig et al. 2016a; Craig et al. 2016b; 
Farmar-Bowers & Lane 2009; Whitman et al. 2013) were used to help inform the semi-
structured interview question and factors.  
5.2  Conclusion Summary 
Several conclusions can be drawn from analysing the three case study farms and 
previous literature. Although the earthquake significantly impacted all three farms, the 
impacts and recovery timelines were different. The farms encompass the spectrum of 
farming in North Canterbury, which is mostly a livestock-arable mix (Statistics New 
Zealand 2013a). The recovery timeline for the three farms followed the same general 
pattern. Difference sprung from a number of factors, including farm type, pre-existing 
conditions (e.g., drought) and insurance. Outside assistance was vital to survival of all 
three farms. However, there were several cases of less than optimal assistance 
procedure by some groups. Existing earthquake recovery strategies should be updated 
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to properly address farm-scale and rural area needs. The case studies also showed that 
there are preparedness and recovery strategies that farmers can enact on their own to 
reduce stress and speed recovery.  
Most factors that influence the geological aspects of earthquake hazards on farms are 
beyond the farmer’s direct control or require major restructuring. Key amongst these 
are farm type, geographical location, climate and time of year. Whitman et al. (2013) 
found from an analysis of urban studies that “vulnerabilities stem from factors that are 
often sector specific and geographically driven.” This holds true for the case study farms. 
The case study dairy farm’s initial impacts were the most severe of the three because of 
the damage to their dairy shed. All three farms’ primary economic infrastructure 
buildings were disabled or permanently destroyed. The higher impact severity was due 
to the high daily reliance on the dairy shed compared to seasonal woolshed usage. The 
hazards varied between locations based on topography, and rock and soil type. The on-
going climate conditions also changed hazard probability. For example, the North 
Canterbury drought contributed to decreased soil moisture and consequently decreased 
landslide probability. The time of year that the earthquake occurred also influenced its 
impact. Not only because of the seasonal climate variations, but also because the 
impacts of farm calendar disruption and resource availability varies year-round. 
Most earthquake resilience came in the form of earthquake preparedness. This included 
a variety of forms: insurance, back-up systems and strong off- and on-farm networks. 
One farmer recommended hiring a lawyer to develop a thorough understanding of 
insurance coverage before it needed to be used. Misunderstanding or undercoverage 
increased stress and limited recovery options. Building in essential service and 
infrastructure redundancies was shown to decrease the overall impacts and increase 
recovery options. Power generators and equipment, such as diggers, also sped up 
recovery. Human resource networks were the most vital recovery resource, particularly 
during the initial response phrase. 
Three stages of post-earthquake farm recovery were identified: initial response, short-
term repair, and long-term re-planning. The duration of each of these stages was 
different for each farm.  The transitions between each of these stages were gradual. 
During the initial response stage, the priorities are similar to those in urban areas: life 
safety (humans and livestock), lifeline restoration and emergency infrastructure repair. 
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During the short-term repair stage insurance, government aid and permanent essential 
farm repairs became the focus as the immediate post-event situation stabilised. The 
final stage, long-term re-planning, may last a number of years. 
Farm type, and the inherent aspects of each type, were the main influencers on the 
lengths and timings of the recovery stages. This is because repair priorities and 
resources varied. The extensive off-farm network inherent in dairy farming was 
primarily responsible for the case study dairy farm’s survival. They were able to use it 
to complete a rapid, mass cattle evacuation before infection could set in. Dairy shed 
insurance claim settlement and repair was faster than woolshed repair for the same 
reasons.  
After the initial response stage ended, emergency aid was rolled back and public 
attention diminished. The sudden loss of attention and aid added to the stress of the 
repair slowdown that marked the transition to short-term repair. The Rural Support 
Trust did great work maintaining momentum by advocating on behalf of farmers and 
organising community events. The transition from short-term repair to long-term re-
planning decreased outside aid and increased stress again. The on-going recovery 
process is itself the greatest source of secondary stress. 
The insurance process began on the day of the earthquake, but became the primary 
focus during the short-term repair stage. This process contributed to farmer stress.  In 
December 2016, EQC and private insurers came to a deal where in by private insurers 
would handle earthquake claims covered by EQC (EQC 2016). This new deal was meant 
to streamline the claims process, but may not have worked as intended in all cases. A 
debrief post-claims resolution would have helped to improve the process. Farmers 
reported that involving lawyers early in the process decreased stress levels. 
Long-term re-planning takes years as each farm continues to adjust to their new 
situation. The case study farms addressed and applied earthquake lessons to prepare 
for the next earthquake or large-scale disaster. This meant land-use and business plan 
changes. Depending on previous experience, this took the form of conservatism or 
exploration of expanding alternate revenue avenues. The key to successful re-planning 
was taking into account the concepts of cascading hazards and cascading effects. This 
includes grasping the concept that physical hazards interact. The inevitable breaching of 
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a landslide dam may re-damage previously repaired fences, and winter rains may 
reactivate landslides to re-damage fences. Secondly, it includes anticipating that the 
compounding effects of damage, repair, recovery and post-emergency aid isolation will 
cause stress as time progresses. Also, that the decision to make one recovery step may 
negate or advance another one. A strong and adaptable farm plan post-earthquake can 
improve farm resilience moving forward. 
New Zealand is an earthquake-prone country with large areas of rural farmland. More 
research is needed to understand the impact of earthquakes to these areas. This will 
allow further development of farm-scale specific strategies and recovery processes. The 
14th November 2016 earthquake is one of the most complex earthquakes in modern 
New Zealand history. The second largest earthquake in the same rural region was the 
1848 Marlborough earthquake (M7.5) (Rattenbury et al. 2006). The high probability of 
another large earthquake impacting rural New Zealand necessitates effective 
preparation. Section 5.3  lists recommendations for farmers and non-farmers operating 
the in rural sector to improve earthquake preparedness, response and recovery. 
5.3  Recommendations 
From analysis of the three case studies, several recommendations for farmers and 
organisations involved in farm earthquake recovery were developed. These are as 
follows: 
For farmers: 
1. Hire a lawyer before an earthquake occurs to review current insurance policies 
and clarify the understanding of policy coverage. Post-earthquake, involve a 
lawyer early in the insurance claim process. 
2. Pre-earthquake, conduct a farm survey to identify hazard zones, vulnerabilities 
and resources. Make note of on-going conditions like climate change that 
influence vulnerability. Include seasonal changes. 
3. Acquire backup components or systems for all essential services (water, power, 
telecommunications and transportation). 
4. Cultivate human resources both off- and on-farm. Develop off-farm neighbour, 
community and regional networks. 
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5. Maintain a post-earthquake recovery and impact timeline. 
6. Consider the cascading effects of hazards when making land-use decisions. 
For supporting organisations: 
1. Recognise and expand mental health resources. Address the stress created by the 
removal of emergency aid and assistance. Combat the magnified feelings of 
isolation and stress that occurs when outside aid organisations leave the area. 
2. Develop resources for post-earthquake recovery focusing on land-use and 
business plan changes. 
3. Insurance agencies should conduct post-earthquake insurance process debriefs 
with clients. 
4. Consider the impacts of cascading hazards in post-earthquake recovery plans. 
5. Recognise and consider the influence of farm type on recovery stage length and 
timing. 
5.4  Further work 
The analysis of the case studies has captured the impact of the Hurunui/Kaikōura 
earthquakes and the recovery timeline on three farms. The initial aim of this study was 
to identify the influencing factors in New Zealand farm earthquake impact and recovery. 
More studies are required to understand the extent and variety of impacts and recovery 
timelines for the different farm types in New Zealand. To further advance this goal, the 
following future research is necessary: 
 Further interviews to expand the case study pool beyond three. This may include 
a questionnaire to >100 Hurunui farmers and the inclusion of more 
geographically isolated farms. 
 Conduct workshops with Hurunui farmers to discuss land-use planning changes 
as a result of shocks/ stresses (e.g., earthquake, drought, policy). 
 Conduct case studies, questionnaires and workshops with farmers in other parts 
of New Zealand regarding their earthquake impacts and recovery in order to 
capture topographic, farming type, demographic and regional variations. 
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 Conduct interviews with local, regional and national farm-focused NGOs to 
expand on the understanding of the timing and specifics of their contributions. 
 Develop of a standardised methodology for capturing the cascading effects of 
earthquake impacts on farm recovery. 
 Develop a framework for analysing farm-scale earthquake impacts and recovery. 
This thesis, in combination with future research, will inform improved land-use changes 
to reduce earthquake impacts, contribute to national understanding of the outside 
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 Historical Rural Earthquake Impact Cases 
The following is a collection of rural earthquake impact cases from previous literature. 
On July 21st, 1925, a M 7.7 earthquake occurred on the White Wolf fault near Kern 
county, California; it was followed by several weaker aftershocks (Oakeshott 1955). The 
agricultural damage following the 1952 Kern County, California earthquake was 
minimal (Steinbrugge & Moran 1955). Only cropland damage is mentioned in the 
reports. The farmers improvised, adapted and recovered rapidly. The Kern County 
Agricultural Department reported a total loss of twenty-three and a half million dollars, 
but the authors estimated the losses were closer to five to seven million dollars. The 
annual crop report supports this lower loss estimate as well (Grimm 1952). Most of the 
almost thirteen million loss compared to the previous year’s profits to unfavourable 
weather and economics. The farm vulnerabilities mirror those of the farms discussed in 
this study. The electricity system was down for two days (Steinbrugge & Moran 1955). 
The water systems required repair as various concrete irrigation canals and 
underground water pipes were cracked. Many fields suffered surface fracturing. 
On June 17th, 1929, a M 7.8 earthquake occurred near Murchison, South Island New 
Zealand (Stephens 2016). Landslides and rockfall were made worse by heavy rainfall as 
farms and roads throughout the Greymouth, Nelson and Westport Districts were 
damaged and destroyed.  
On May 18, 1940, a Mw 6.9 earthquake occurred on the Imperial Fault near Imperial 
Valley, California (California Institute of Technology 2013). On October 15th, 1979, a M 
6.5 earthquake occurred on the same fault (Johnson et al. 1982). Farmer knowledge was 
used to compare the 1940 and 1979 earthquakes. Near Holtsville, California fissures 
and sand boils caused by the 1979 earthquake occurred in areas that had not been 
affected by the 1940 earthquake. Bulldozers were used to relevel the slumping ground 
and fractured tile drain required replacement (Youd & Wieczorek 1982). Several 
unpaved farm lanes were also destroyed by fissuring. Near Gadsen, Arizona, an area 
that had experienced liquefaction and irrigation and canal drainage deformation in the 
1940 earthquake, experienced no liquefaction after the 1979 earthquake. The 1940 
earthquake damaged irrigation canals (Ulrich 1941). According to Ulrich (1941), the 
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damage was too widespread to give specific details; sixty miles of canals were damaged, 
destroyed or drained. 
On September 13, 1986, a series of earthquakes, the strongest was M 6.2, occurred near 
Kalamata, Greece (Anagnostopolous et al. 1987). The electrical, water and 
telecommunications networks were temporarily inoperable. Gazetas et al. (1990) 
reported no liquefaction after a detailed survey; rockfall in mountainous areas and 
fissuring occurred across the region. Farmers were not directly or severely impacted by 
the earthquake; the flood of food aid that followed was more devastating (Coburn & 
Spence 2002). More devastating to the farmers’ recovery was the flood of outside food 
aid into the area. Tourism suffered slightly as well. 
On May 21st, 2003, a Mw 6.8 earthquake occurred near Zemmouri, Algeria; it was the 
latest in a centuries long line of devastating earthquakes (Bouhadad 2013). The 2003 
earthquake triggered a tsunami, just like the 1980 El-Asnam Ms 7.3 earthquake. Unlike 
other Algerian earthquakes, Zemmouri’s epicentre was in far eastern Algeria (Harbi et 
al. 2007). The quake triggered landslides, rockfall, liquefaction, ground fissuring and 
damaged electricity, telecommunications, water systems and transport routes (both 
roads and airports). The area affected in 2003 was highly urbanised. Due to the arid 
nature of southern Algeria, most of the population is situated in the hilly, seismically 
active north (Bouhadad 2013). The 1980 El-Asnam earthquake caused most of the 
structural damage was related to ground shaking, not coseismic hazards (Leeds & 
Jennings 1983). Tectonic downwarping, uplifting and liquefaction related ground 
subsidence led to the submerging of many acres of farmland and the creation of a two-
square kilometre lake. A major irrigation pipe line was ruptured due to its path across 
the fault. Roads and railways required rebuilding and temporary rerouting, in the cause 
of the roads. Ground deformation and liquefaction damaged bridge approaches, created 
sand boils and sunk trees. Landslides occurred within 10km of the fault. The damage 
was minor. 
On May 12th, 2008, a Ms 8.0 earthquake occurred near Wenchuan, China (Yu et al. 2010). 
Landslides and flooding were significant coseismic hazards that disrupted 
transportation by blocking and destroying floods and bridges (Edwards 2009). The 
earthquake happened in the dry season, just before the rainy season. Heavy rain 
increased the number of landslides; this continued more than six months later. Some 
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fault surface rupture was reported along rural roads and on farms (Yu et al. 2010). 
Landslides were responsible for more than twenty percent of event related deaths and 
created many ‘quake lakes’ by blocking river valleys. Channels were carved into some of 
the landslide dams to trigger a safe breach and lake draining. Liquefaction was more of 
problem in the plains and around rivers, landsliding was more of a problem in the steep, 
mountainous areas. Recovery aid was supplied by China (mostly via the military) and 
internationally. The Food and Agriculture Organisation supplied seeds, production 
materials and technical training to two rural villages (Edwards 2009).  
On April 6th, 2009, a Mw 6.3 earthquake occurred near L’Aquila, Italy (Kongar et al. 
2015). Co-seismic hazards include: surface rupture, slope instability, rockfall, 
underground cavity collapse and liquefaction (ground settlement, sand boils and 
volcanoes). Rockfalls and landslides, the major cause of road blockages in the rural 
areas, were worsened by heavy rain in the days after the quake. Rural tourism, part of 
the agricultural sector, is valued part of L’Aquila’s economy (OECD 2009). Closed roads 
and nervous tourists limit the growth in this area. 
On February 27th, 2010, a Mw 8.8 earthquake struck in the central southern Chile (EERI 
2010). The earthquake and tsunami killed hundreds of people and destroyed thousands 
of buildings. The wine, grain and fruit industries suffered the most notable non-
structural damage. The three regions most affected (O’Higgins, Maule and Bío Bío) also 
contained about half of Chile’s agriculture (ECLAC 2010). According to ECLAC, although 
exports were projected to increase across Chile, they would not do so in the three 
affected regions (ECLAC). The regions account for approximately thirty percent of 
Chile’s food and beverage exports. The estimated damage costs to agriculture was 300 
million US dollars (Núñez 2010). Despite its importance, specifics about the damage to 
the farms are difficult to find. 
On August 24th, 2014, a M 6.0 earthquake occurred near Napa Valley, California (Gordon 
2015). The earthquake occurred at the end of the dry season and during a multi-year 
drought. The consequently low water table inhibited landslides and liquefaction. Napa 
is best known for its wine production (Lapsley & Sumner 2014). Shaking broke bottles 




On April 25th, 2015, a M 8.1 earthquake occurred in Nepal (Zhao 2015). 8700 people 
died, hundreds of thousands of buildings were destroyed and landslides, barrier lakes, 
liquefaction and avalanches were triggered. According to the Nepal ALIA (FAO 2015), a 
close examination of the 2015 earthquake impact on the agriculture of six districts, 
seventy-six percent of households are rural and agriculture makes up 35% of the GDP. 
The earthquake occurred during the harvest of wheat, during the planting of maize and 
just before the planting of rice. Most of the wheat, important during monsoon season 
(June-September) had been harvested, but there were massive stored crop and seed 
losses (40% of household reporting at least 75% loss). Landslides and ground 
deformation were the largest contributors to standing crop loss. Seeds were mainly 
stored near houses and were destroyed during shaking induced collapse. Many 
household lost tools (ploughs, water tanks, livestock sheds, etc.). There appeared to be 
higher livestock losses due to indirect earthquake affects (e.g. disease), than the 
geological hazards themselves.  
On the 14th and 16th of April 2016, M 6.5 and M 7.3 earthquakes, respectively, occurred 
near Kumamoto on Kyushu Island, Japan (Japan Meteorological Agency 2016). The 
Mainichi newspaper (2016) reported that the total agricultural earthquake damage was 
over one-hundred billion yen, thirteen-million NZD. The greatest costs were due to 
damaged storage reservoirs and rice paddies and to surface rupture through fields. The 
rice paddy damage was so severe that it was thought a whole year’s production would 




 Block Models 
Block models of the three case study farms. Pre-earthquake, immediately post-earthquake, April 2017 (Five months after earthquake), 
August 2017 (nine months after earthquake and time of first interview) and January 2018 (fourteen months after earthquake and time 





Figure 20 Pre-earthquake block model of Farm A. Farm A is an extensive mixed sheep and beef farm on hill country. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 21 Immediately post-earthquake block model of Farm A. A large landslide buried the water pump. Surface ruptures, landslides and shaking damaged or pose an imminent risk to other 
farm infrastructure.. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 22 April 2017 five months post-earthquake block model of Farm A. The landslide dam lake overtopped several times and has re-damaged fences and the replaced water pump. Another 
smaller lake has formed. April cyclones possibly triggered landsliding and some overtopping. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 23 August 2017 Nine months post-earthquake/time of first interview block model of Farm A. The smaller landslide dam lake has begun to collapse. Some infrastructure has been 
repaired, others wait for insurance to be settled. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 24 January 2018 Fourteen months post-earthquake/time of first interview block model of Farm A. Some infrastructure has been repaired, others wait for insurance to be settled. Not to 
scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 25 Pre-earthquake block model of Farm B. Farm B is a medium mixed sheep and beef farm on steep hills with small flats. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 26 Immediately post-earthquake block model of Farm B. Large landslide behind the homestead reactivates. Major damaged caused by surface rupture through the woolshed stockyards. 
Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 27 April 2017 Five months post-earthquake block model of Farm B. The large landslide continues to move. Power restored after woolshed insurance settled, 5 months after earthquake. 
Homestead insurance claim settlement process on-going. Farmer family living off-farm.  Some infrastructure repairs (e.g., fences) delayed to reduce cascading on-going hazard impacts. Not to 
scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 28 August 2017 Nine months post-earthquake/time of first interview block model of Farm B. Large landslide continues to move. Rawhiti cottage installed on farm and farm family 
moved back on. New homestead constructions starts. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 29 January 2018 Fourteen months post-earthquake/time of first interview block model of Farm B. Large landslide continues to move. New homestead-shed completed and farmer family 
moved in. Insurance is settled.  Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 30 Pre-earthquake block model of Farm C. Farm C is a dairy farm on low relief, river terraces. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 
 




Figure 31 Immediately post-earthquake block model of Farm C. Liquefaction makes the dairy shed non-functional and the main off-farm road impassable. The damaged to the dairy shed 
endangered the lives of 1000 dairy cows and prompted a large-scale evacuation.  Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 32 April 2017 Five months post-earthquake block model of Farm C. Irrigation repairs mostly complete. Dairy cows still off-farm while new dairy shed under construction.  Not to scale. 
Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 33 August 2017 Nine months post-earthquake/time of first interview block model of Farm C. Dairy cows returned and dairy shed running by late July. Staff housing still under repair and 
insurance settlement process on-going. Some drainage change related flooding. Not to scale. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 




Figure 34 January 2018 Fourteen months post-earthquake/time of first interview block model of Farm B. On-going minor water pipe and fence damage repairs. Staff housing insurance claims 
close to settlement. Cartoon representative to confidentiality. 
Farm C: January 2018 
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 University of Canterbury Human Ethics Application 
Appendix C contains all documentation associated with the approved low risk 
University if Canterbury Human Ethics application.  
These documents are as follows: 
 Human Ethics Committee application approval 
 Participant information and consent sheets 
 Round 1 Questions list 
 Interview timeline handouts 
 
 
Ref: HEC Application 2017/43/LR - McHale
Human Ethics
Sent: 31 July 2017 16:40
To: Jess McHale
Cc: Clark Fenton
Attachments:2017-44 LR - McHale Approv~1.pdf (183 KB)
Dear Jess,
Thank you for your response to the Human Ethics Commiees comments on your recent applicaon. 
I am very pleased to advise that the Commiee has reviewed your feedback and approved the applicaon;
please see the leer aached. 
Kind Regards,
Rebecca Robinson
Ethics Coordinator and Erskine Programme Administrator
Level 5 South, Matariki Building
University of Canterbury ~ Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Ph: +64 3 369 4588, Ext: 94588
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz
Ethics hours of work: Mon 2.30-5pm, Tues 8.30-11am, Wed 8.30-5pm, Thu 2.30-5pm, Fri 8.30-5pm
P Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail
Ref: HEC Application 2017/43/LR - McHale https://exchange.canterbury.ac.nz/owa/?ae=Item&t=IPM.Note&i...
1 of 1 28/05/2018 4:23 p.m.
[Jess McHale]  
Dept. of Geological Sciences 
University of Canterbury 






Development of Methodology for Analysing Cascading Hazard Impact on Farm 
Infrastructure with Hurunui Region Farm test cases following the November 
14th, 2016 M 7.8 North Canterbury Earthquake 
 
Information Sheet for participation in Interview Research  
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study.  Please read the information sheet and read and sign the 
attached consent form.  
 
This information sheet outlines the purpose, benefits and methods of the research.  It also explains your rights 
as a participant in this study.  If at any time, you with to enquire about this research, please contact any of the 
research contributors listed below.  This research project is funded by EQC Capability Fund, Resilience to 









University of Canterbury 
clark.fenton@canterbury.ac.nz 




University of Canterbury 
thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz 
+64 21 434596 
 
Sarah Beaven  
University of Canterbury  
sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz 
+64 3 364 2987 ext. 95992 
Project Background 
The purpose of this study: 
 Develop a framework for analysing cascading hazard impact on farm infrastructure model with a focus 
on post-event impact analysis and future land-use planning  
How this purpose relates to you: 
 This interview and the related exercises aims to gather information about your experience with the 
November 2016 earthquake and its impact on your farm. 
Benefits of this research: 
 Develop rural/ agriculture specific model for disaster impacts 
 Increase understanding of cascading hazards in a rural setting 
Research Methods: 
 This research will consist of one-on-one interviews with farmers in the Hurunui District.  Participants 
were chosen to reflect a cross-section of scale, farm type and impact severity. 
 Information gathered from these interviews will be used to identify relationships between hazards, 
hazard mitigation, disaster recovery and farm operation in order to improve land-use planning and 
[Jess McHale]  
hazard mitigation in the future. 
 
Interview Participation: 
If you choose to take part in this study, your involvement in this project will be at least two –approximately 
two-hour meetings. The meetings will include a semi-structured interview, two timeline exercises and a 
mapping exercise.  There is also anticipated to be informal discussions between you and the researchers during 
any farm surveying visits. These will, as with the interview, be entirely voluntary and based on your 
availability and consent.  
Interview: The researcher will work from a list of questions targeting the key areas of interest.  General topics 
will include farm operation, pre-November 2016 disaster experience, the November 2016 earthquake and 
land-use planning.   
Map: The participatory mapping exercise will be linked to the semi-structured interview.  You will be asked to 
incorporate the map into your answers in order to provide spatial context.  All maps will be the most up-to-
date and available geological, hazard and topographic maps.  You will be asked to mark on the map where 
critical infrastructure, essential services, hazards and hazard impacts are located.   
Timeline: The first timeline exercise will ask you to detail the typical annual farm activities and then to detail 
the activities of the 2016-2017 agricultural year.  The second timeline exercise will ask you to verbally 
walkthrough the events (hazard impacts and your responses) from September 2016 to present.  The researcher 
will fill a timeline, printed on A0 paper, with post-it notes detailing the impacts and corresponding responses 
(actions).   
The maps and timelines will allow for the collection of spatial and temporal context.  The goal for the circular 
timeline is to establish the impact the earthquake and co-seismic hazards had on the operation of the farm.  
The goal of the impact/ action timeline exercise is to both aid you in remembering the sequence of events and 
to start identifying hazard impacts and recovery-action relationships.  The mapping exercise will also be used 
to analyse the spatial connections between hazards and their impacts. 
Permission and review of material 
You will be asked permission for the interviews to be recorded with an audio recording equipment. The 
researcher will also take notes by hand. At the completion of the interview, you will be invited to review the 
hand-written notes and a summary will be later emailed to you.   We would be grateful if you could review 
this summary, provide corrections and make any clarifying statements within 30 days of receiving it.  If you 
cannot, please just let us know. You will also be provided with a draft of the thesis before submission. We 
would be grateful if you could review the draft and make any comments or ask any questions within 30 days 
of receiving it. Again, if you cannot, please just let us know. 
In the performance of the tasks and application of the procedures there are risks of reactivating trauma/ 
stress related to retelling the events of the November 2016 earthquake.  You can ask for the interview to be 
stopped or to take a break whenever you feel the need.   
Participation is voluntary and you have the right to withdraw from the interview or decline to answer a 
question at any time. You may ask for your raw data to be returned to you or destroyed at any point. If you 
withdraw, I will, remove all information relating to you. However, once analysis of the interviews 
commences, it will become increasingly difficult to remove the influence of your data on the results.   
Data Storage: 
All recorded notes (notebook, audio recordings and electronic files) will be kept securely in locked room or 
vehicle (while traveling). Electronic data will be in a password protected folder on the UC servers and a 
portable hard drive, which will be kept in a locked office. Data on the laptop will be deleted after transfer. 
At the completion of the project all the data (both written and electronic file) will be handed over to a 
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supervisor for secure keeping for a period of 5 years, after which it will be destroyed.   Access to the data 
will be limited to Jess McHale, Clark Fenton, Thomas Wilson and Sarah Beaven (Geological Sciences, 
University of Canterbury).   
The results of the project may be published, but you may be assured that ever effort will be made to 
maintain the confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: your identity will not be made public. No 
farm will be referred to by its name. They will instead be referred to by their size and farm type (e.g. small 
mixed sheep-arable farm). Wherever appropriate, you will be referred to by your occupation and a letter 
(e.g. Farmer A, Farmer B, etc.). Given the small area in which the participants are being selected and the 
size of the farms, it is improbable that the identities of the participants will be kept completely confidential.  
Data Use: 
The project is being carried out as a requirement for a Master of Science in Engineering Geology by Jess 
McHale under the supervision of Clark Fenton, Thomas Wilson and Sarah Beaven, who can be contacted at 
(clark.fenton@canterbury.ac.nz, thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz and sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz). A 
thesis is a public document and will be available through the UC Library. The information collected may 
also be published in a peer-reviewed academic journal.  
Documents published throughout the study or at the conclusion of the study will be accessible to the 
participant.  If you would like a copy of the thesis – please let me know and I’ll send you one. 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, please don’t hesitate to ask.  
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, and 
participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
If you agree to participate in the study, you are asked to complete the consent form and return the signed form 
via email (to jess.mchale@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or in hard copy before at the time of the interview. 
Thank you for participating in this study.
[Jess McHale]  
Dept. of Geological Sciences 
University of Canterbury 
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University of Canterbury 
clark.fenton@canterbury.ac.nz 




University of Canterbury 
thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz 
+64 21 434596 
 
Sarah Beaven  
University of Canterbury  
sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz 
+64 3 364 2987 ext. 95992 
□ Participation will involve at least two one-on-one interviews and potentially several follow-
up informal discussions with Jess McHale (MSc Candidate) from the University of 
Canterbury.  I understand the interviews will be recorded using audio equipment and written 
notes.  An interview summary will be produced after the interview.  I have been given a full 
explanation of this project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
□ I understand that participation is voluntary and I may withdraw from the interview or 
decline to answer a question at any time without penalty. Withdrawal of participation 
will also include the withdrawal of any information I have provided should this remain 
practically achievable. 
□ I acknowledge that this research project is funded by EQC Capability Fund, Resilience 
to Natures Challenge, Environment Canterbury and the Mason Trust. 
□ I understand that to protect my privacy, any information or opinions I provide during the 
interviews or through email correspondence will be kept confidential to the researcher, Clark 
Fenton and Thomas Wilson.  I also understand that every effort will be made to maintain the 
confidentiality of the participants. I understand that the information collected will be used in 
Jess McHale’s Master of Science thesis, which is a public document and will be available 
through the UC Library, and possibly published in a peer-reviewed academic journal. 
□ I understand that electronic data collected from my interview will be kept on a password 
protected external hard drive.  The external hard drive and written notes will be stored in a 
locked drawer in a locked office.  Access to the data will be limited to Jess McHale, Clark 
Fenton, Thomas Wilson and Sarah Beaven (Geological Sciences, University of Canterbury).  
The data will be destroyed after five years. 
□ I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed. 
□ I understand that I will be sent a summary of the interview after the interview.  I understand 
I will have 30 days to review this summary, provide corrections and make any clarifying 
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statements before the information is used in research. 
□ I understand that I will be sent a draft of the thesis before final submission.  I understand I 
will have 30 days to review this draft, make comments and ask any questions before the 
thesis is submitted. 
□ I acknowledge that this proposal has been reviewed and approved by the Department of 
Geological Science, University of Canterbury and the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee. 
□ I understand that I can contact the researcher Jess McHale (jess.mchale@pg.canterbury.ac.nz 
nz) or supervisors Clark Fenton (clark.fenton@canterbury.ac.nz), Thomas Wilson 
(thomas.wilson@canterbury.ac.nz) or Sarah Beaven (sarah.beaven@canterbury.ac.nz) for 
further information. If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-
ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
□ A copy of this consent form and the information sheet have been given to me. 
□ I have read, understood and agreed with both the information form and consent form 
provided to me.  All my questions regarding the study have been answered satisfactorily. 
□ By signing below, I agree to participate in this research project. 
 
Name: Signed: Date:   
 
Email address (for report of findings, if applicable):   
 
Please return a signed copy of this form via email (to jess.mchale@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or in hard copy 
before at the time of the interview. 
Round 1 Questions 
 
1. Characterise the farm: Could you please describe your farming operation?   
a. How large is your farm?   
 
b. What type of farming do you undertake?   
 
c. How many livestock?   
 
d. Do you have irrigation?  If so, could you please describe where it is and 
what times of year it is used. 
 
e. Could you please summarise the different farm activities which occur 
throughout the year? Which periods are the most important 
(vulnerable)?  
 
i. What was happening at the time of the November 2016 
earthquake? 
 
f. What are the essential services you rely on, such as electricity, 
transportation access, water, etc.? Could you please rank them in order 
of importance? 
 
g. What are the essential infrastructure on the farm, e.g. dairy shed, 
woolshed, etc.? Could you please rank them in order of importance? 
 
2. First, can you describe your experiences with hazards/ disasters (drought, 
earthquakes, landslides, flooding, storms) prior to the November 2016 
earthquake?  
a. What and when were the hazards/ disasters? 
 
b. How did they impact the farm?  
 
c. What did you do in response to these events (mitigation, land-use 
changes, different crop/ livestock)? 
i. What part (if any) did insurance or outside organisations play in 
the recovery process? 
 
3. So, now we are going to talk about the impacts of the November 2016 
earthquake. 
a. Can you talk me through what happened and what you did starting in 
October of 2016?   
i. Can we place these in context on this timeline?  
 
b. How were farm assets and essential services impacted (both physically 
and functionally- broken fences, changed water flow) by the initial 
earthquake and co-seismic hazards (fault rupture, landslide, 
liquefaction, etc.)? 
i. In what order (if known) did the damage occur? 
 
c. How were the farm assets and essential services repaired? How long did 
it take? What does repair mean to you (return to pre-event or 
improve)? 
 
d. Is there anything you have been unable to repair or replace? 
 
e. How did you decide which assets and services needed to be addressed 
first? (interdependency, time of year) Are some assets and services 
dependent on others?  How? 
 
f. What long term damage/ disruption do you anticipate? 
 
g. Are the farm assets and essential services continuing to be impacted by 
aftershocks and coseismic hazards (fault rupture, landslide, 
liquefaction, etc.)? 
i. What is the timing of these impacts? 
 
h. What steps, if any, have you taken to prevent further damage/ 
disruption to these assets and services? 
 
i. How long did it take to repair these assets and services?  Are you still 
trying to repair or relocate them? How does this continuing damage/ 
disruption affect other parts of the farm? 
 
j. Are the assets continuing to be impacted by hazards (flood, drought, 
storm events, animals, etc.) that may not be related to the earthquakes?  
If so, how? 
i. How were the farm assets and essential services repaired? How 
long did it take? 
ii. What steps, if any, have you taken to prevent further damage/ 
disruption to these assets and services? 
 
k. What disaster mitigation steps were taken before and after the 
earthquake? How effective were they?  
i. What types of redundancy in assets or services do you have? (e.g. 
generators, spare equipment, fallow fields, etc.) 
 
l. What hazards (landsliding, flooding, droughts, etc.) do you anticipate in 
the future? 
i. What steps, if any, have you taken to address them? 
 
m. How has insurance impacted the recovery process 
i. Are there problems with what is and is not covered? 
ii. When did insurance kick in?  Can you tell me what the process 
was like? 
 
n. How have outside organisations (government and farmers’ 
organisations) impacted the recovery process? 
i. When did they (or you) first make contact? 
ii. What have they done to assist? 
iii. What do you wish they did (or did not do) to assist? 
 
4. And now let’s talk about land-use planning (pre- and post-November 2016 
earthquake) 
a. What was the land-use of various areas on the farm before November 
2016? (e.g. where was grazing, fallow fields, native bush, etc.) 
 
b. What was the land-use plan in October 2016? Any major projects? 
 
c. What (if any) change has been made or needed to be made to the plans 
post-November 2016? 
i. How did the earthquakes and coseismic hazards impact that 
plan? 
 
d. Knowing what you know now about the earthquake, coseismic hazards 
and their impacts, would you have done something differently? If so, 
what? 
 
e. What short term economic impacts have you felt? 
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